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The river
where you set
your foot just now
is gone
those waters
giving way to this,
now this
HERACLITUS
from the moment that the overtones can be heard parallel with the basic sound,
there also can be sensed vibrations, oscillations that cease to impress as tones, but rather as
purely physical displacements of the perceived impression
EISENSTEIN
Every something is an echo of nothing
CAGE
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ABSTRACT

Poppy Gauss

THE IMMERSIVE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: ACCOMMODATING ART’S
ONTOLOGICAL TASK

This dissertation examines how the immersive aesthetic experience engages sense and
reason in interpretation of ontological questions. This examination is important, as it reveals how
thinking contextually develops through the practice of nuance and lingering. My research
demonstrates that the ontological task of aesthetics distinguishes art from entertainment. As a
matter of fact, I argue that the immersive aesthetic experience avoids superficiality by
addressing: embodiment, intertextuality, and the sublime. Embodiment relates to the abundance
of sense data characteristic of immersive aesthetic experiences. Spaces, light, smells,
environments that elicit physical response. Presented with, and as, ambiguous signs that appear
to make ontological reference. Physical response stimulates interpretation, an interpretation that
is intertextual.
Understanding intertextuality can better facilitate operating in a complex and contextual
world. These experiences require focus, becoming conscious of. For this reason, the sublime,
understood as an intense experience of aesthetic understanding, is integral to the description of
immersive aesthetic experience developed in this study. As I will show later, when aesthetic
understanding is of an ontological nature, occurs unexpectedly, briefly, and intensely, it is called
sublime, and reveals the nature of singularity. This intense experience may act as an enticement
to engage sense and reason, freely and with more frequency.
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The dialogue developed in this research aims to understand what immersive aesthetic
experiences share in common and addresses four main questions. What kind of being does the
ontological content of each work address? What is the formal approach to the work? How does
the work physically engage sense? And what is revealed? The guiding voices that this dialogue
depends on include; Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, Jean Luc Nancy, Martin Heidegger, Henri
Bergson and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I argue Yayoi Kusama, Anish Kapoor, Olafur Eliasson and
Damien Hirst offer examples of the type of work that encourages nuance and lingering, and
reveals presence. Ultimately resulting in understanding that being responds to, and is responsible
for, the world.

Keywords: Immersive, Aesthetic, Experience, Understanding, Ontological
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1
INTRODUCTION
In the aesthetic age of the ‘post-object’, immersive experiences are increasingly
fashionable and while they respond to a genuine need of viewers hungry for multi-sensorial
experiences, many of these works remain confined to a superficial level (i.e. entertainment). The
problem is in the way the designation ‘immersive experience’ is being used to include
experiences not geared toward making one think and perceive in a heightened form. The term
immersive experience is used to describe a variety of events that include video and light
projections, virtual reality experiences and even online workspaces. What is missing from these
experiences is an engagement with philosophical questions of thinking and being.
In this book, I argue that the immersive ‘aesthetic’ experience is successful in avoiding
superficiality when it is able to address three main philosophical concepts: embodiment,
intertextuality, and the sublime. All immersive aesthetic experiences attend to embodiment
through their immersive characteristics. Embodiment, connected to Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Edmund Husserl and Jean Luc Nancy, involves immediate sensory interpretation, it involves
ephemeral, sensory and temporal experience. Embodiment depends on sense, which is primary
and comes before all signification (Nancy 10). Reaction to sensory data can even be involuntary,
and this kind of embodied engagement can result in transformation, a transformation that is a
result of a praxis, not a poiesis, “an action that affects the agent, not the work” (Nancy 9). It is
not the work of art that is transformed, it is the audience, the viewer, who becomes the
participant. Potential transformation of the audience through an engagement with the work is
emphasized over the artists’ role in the creation of the work. Embodied experiences take effect at
the deepest levels of being, the body interprets instinctively and unconsciously.
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Immersive aesthetic experience always involves intertextuality. Intertextual and text are
concepts developed by Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes. Immersive aesthetic experience
describes works that act as ‘texts’ and engage their audiences in interpretation. Text is not to be
understood here as a thing, not an object, rather a redistributive productivity, a permutation, as
intertextuality (Desire in Language 36). Following the post-structuralist dislocation of the signsignifier relationship, the ways in which meaning is determined appear increasingly complex and
the concept of the intertextual reading is one in which the “appropriation of signifieds and the
presentation of signifiers, in the very opening of the abandonment of sense” may help us better
understand the world (Nancy 3). We need signs to signify, in order to communicate, but signs
must be recognized as perpetually open to new significations.
Additionally, all immersive aesthetic experiences share the capacity to evoke the sublime,
through the successful crafting of excess sensory stimuli and ontological signification. The
sublime as discussed here, is a concept that is specific to the writing of Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean
Francois Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, Roland Barters, and Jean Luc Nancy. The immersive aesthetic
experience should disrupt. It is an aesthetic experience that overwhelms the senses and involves
ambiguous signification. This brief and intense embodied aesthetic reflection is what I call the
‘sublime’, a word with a long history of shifting definitions. The concept of the sublime, once
limited to natural phenomena but now part of the field of art and virtual phenomena, plays an
important role in the distinction between a superficial and an aesthetic engagement within the
immersive experience. The difference between entertainment and art is that art can overwhelm, it
can disrupt thinking patterns, create discontinuity, and act as a way of training us to think in a
multi-sensory contextual way. This aesthetic experience acts as a kind of ‘training’ for the
viewer, providing practice in thinking and seeing in an embodied way.
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Thinking is often associated with logic; however, it is apparent that our foundational
experience of reason, logic, category and equivalence is infinitely fractured. The immersive
aesthetic experience demonstrates one way of addressing the urgent task of locating a middle
ground between the absolute rule of logic and the chaos of mythic creation. In The Sense of the
World Nancy describes sense as occupying a border position, between faith in an ultimate
absolute truth and becoming so lost in relativism that no meaning can exist at all. Overemphasis
on conceptual thought neglects its relationship to immediate being and is therefore unable to
account for contextual contingencies. Understanding requires perception and sensation, which
are necessarily local, Nancy points out that a “sensation without difference and without locality...
would not be a sensation” (129). In order to establish meaning, immediate sensory information
must be attended to with as much urgency as reason and logic. It is necessary to recognize the
urgent need to prioritize the role of intertextuality in understanding. As we move farther away
from universal application of signs and toward the ambiguous multiplicity inherent in any
signification, the interpretation of signs is recognized as contingent. The immersive aesthetic
experience addresses this by shifting emphasis toward a praxis of embodied contextual
interpretation, where sense in all its meanings is engaged and may result in an experience of the
sublime.
In the following pages, I will elaborate on the role of embodiment, intertextuality, and the
sublime. I will describe how these concepts, which are crucial for my inquiry, have developed,
how they are discussed in contemporary art, and why this discussion is important for this project.
In addition to my foundational philosophers, I will reference contemporary academic research
relevant to this topic, including Simon Morley’s project The Sublime (Whitechapel: Documents
of Contemporary Art) and Joona Taipale’s Phenomenology and Embodiment: Husserl and the
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Constitution of Subjectivity. Additional resources include: The Tate Modern’s 2008 The Sublime
Project; a combination of exhibitions, and online access to articles and exhibition catalogues,
website archives of lecture series, articles, and other exhibition information.
Immersive aesthetic experiences involve art objects, but the emphasis is on the physical
and mental reaction to the work rather than its perceived value, technique, or materials.
Immersive aesthetic experiences are structural or installed aesthetic works that overwhelm the
senses and utilize ontological signification in a manner that provokes interpretation. The
immersive aesthetic experience involves the engagement of both sense and reason. The sublime
is a reaction to an aesthetic experience, a recognition of the boundless nature of the universe;
simultaneously forgetting oneself while recognizing an unavoidable connection to the infinite.
Therefore, chapter one addresses how this concept of the sublime has developed out of the very
logic and reason of Immanuel Kant.
In each of the other chapters, this dissertation analyzes the contemporary art practice of
Yayoi Kusama, Anish Kapoor, Olafur Eliasson and Damien Hirst, whose works are exemplary of
the notion of ‘immersive aesthetic experience’, as aesthetic acts capable of bridging the gap
between intellectual understanding and sensory experience. A gap, already apparent in the
writing of Kant, who emphasizes operations and structures of understanding in establishing truth.
Kant’s use of category and reason is so influential it has played a part in knocking sense out of
an essential balance. There is a contemporary need to re-engage the role of sensory experience in
the interpretation of being. This issue is brought forward by Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger, through philosophical concepts that emphasize active interiority in connection to a
contextual here and now. Nietzsche’s performative philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment,
and Heidegger’s presencing, each connect the interior with the exterior, in an awareness of being

5
present and acting in relation to that awareness. This focus on being present in the moment is
mirrored in the division between the art object and the art experience, where a passive reflection
on the beautiful object shifts to an experience of active transformative awareness of being,
through the aesthetic experience. All this shows that an essential component of the immersive
aesthetic experience, is that it offers up the sublime, as a seduction, an enticement to engage both
sense and reason in the interpretation of being. The immersive experience as active awareness of
presence, demonstrates a shift in emphasis from aesthetic objects toward aesthetic experiences.
Many of today’s immersive aesthetic experiences are related to installation art, but are
connected by more than a loose relationship between the work and its environment. As a matter
of fact, we will see that the immersive aesthetic experience involves a particular and intense
relationship between the work and its audience, one that makes the viewer aware of the
subjective nature of the unique and ephemeral encounter with the work. In this kind of work,
materials generally emphasize sensory perception through an excess of stimuli, while replete
with a multitude of signifiers. All signs point toward questions of being: the infinite, the void, the
earthly, and the unconscious. The works operate differently than the traditional art object, they
occur at a specific place, within time and space, immersing the viewer in an excess of sensation
and ambiguous ontological signification, which engage an embodied contextual interpretation
that is always singularly correct. This is how aesthetic understanding, connected to excess
sensation and ontological signification, is capable of evoking strong emotional response.
Therefore, the concept of the sublime is crucial for this inquiry: the sublime is that strong
emotional response, often associated with pleasure or disgust, that emphasizes an awareness of
being and the present moment.
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As we will see later, the works of art I have selected to analyze are works that engage
their audience in an open-ended conversation with questions related to being. Here, art models a
productive mode of creative thought by rewarding an awareness of sense and an intertextual
reading of signifiers that suggest a relation to being, with the pleasure of understanding. There is
a contemporary crisis of an imbalanced emphasis on reason, progress and exteriority related to
the logos of logic and it is my contention that if art is going to continue to play a vital role in
society it must engage in a leveling of the perceived hierarchy between reason and imagination
or mythos.
The role of art and its effect on society has been in question at least since Hegel’s
proclamation of its end. Hegel, Nietzsche, and Nancy each proclaim an end - the end of art, the
end of philosophy, and the end of the sense of the world. In each case the end should be followed
by a set of parentheses and the words (as we know it). For these authors, art, philosophy and the
ways in which truth and meaning are manufactured must be understood as processes that
continuously manifest new iterations. Nancy specifies that “nothing repeats itself, nothing ever
comes back, except coming itself, which is never the same - but, rather, the indefinitely altered
return of the same” (123). Is Nancy referring to Nietzsche’s eternal return? or perhaps an
unresolved Hegelian dialectic? It is possible that Nancy is pointing out that art, philosophy, and
signification are processes in which the sublation of their presentation is inherent in the structure
of their becoming, and that becoming is continuous change and manifestation of new iterations.
An assertion of an end is a questioning of the effective power of art, philosophy, and meaning to
disrupt current patterns of behavior and thought. He asserts the need for something new,
something ‘more essential,’ an art that “must have to do with the event of being that one also
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calls existence” (Nancy 127). What he calls for is an art that can provide opportunities to engage
with the sublime.
For Nancy, a true embodied experience of the world is one of “sense beyond all sense,
sense in the absence of sense, the overflowing of sense as element of the world or world as
absolute excess of sense” and can be described as tragic, comical, sublime, or grotesque, indeed,
“all of those things at once” (23). Art, philosophy, and meaning are practices that we need,
structures that necessarily must change as society itself changes. Today there is a need to counter
the exteriority of logic and reason with an examination of how we understand through a
continual process of sensory data interpretation and intertextual readings of our immediate
environment. Art can provide opportunities to practice engaging in this type of embodied
contextual interpretation.
This dissertation demonstrates how works by Kusama, Kapoor, Eliasson, and Hirst,
manage to avoid the superficiality of mere entertainment by engaging with the philosophical
concepts of embodiment, intertextuality, and the sublime. The methodologies applied to this
research include phenomenology, hermeneutics, and formalism: phenomenology because of the
emphasis on body and experience, hermeneutics due to the necessity to interpret text in all its
forms, and formalism because of the importance of the aesthetic works in expressing the function
of this type experience. Chapter one is the foundation upon which my argument is built; this
chapter provides a thorough explication of the sublime, a brief history, a justification for, and a
contemporary definition of, the sublime. Chapter two links Kusama’s Infinity Rooms to a concept
of sublimity associated with being at one with the infinite, of multiplicity, unity and universality.
Chapter Three demonstrates how the work of Kapoor reflects a concept of the sublime wherein
being is confronted by the void, the inevitability of death and abjection. Chapter four addresses
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Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic experiences that evoke a sublime, related to being present, as an
engagement with presence and responsibility. Chapter five asserts Hirst’s Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable as evoking a sublime recognition of unconscious determining
structures inherent in the development of meaning.
These particular artists are creating immersive aesthetic experiences that provide practice
in modes of thinking that need to be revived for a contemporary society out of practice in
contextual embodied thought, due to our long held exaltation of reason, progress, and exteriority
related to logos. Art can continue to play a vital role in society, giving balance to sense and
reason, but it is important to make the distinction between what art does and what entertainment
does, because as Nancy explains, art and life must remain distinct in order for art to be effective.
These are works that for however briefly, emphasize the experience of being present, and
thinking intertextually, which with practice may become the norm.
In order to search for an intertextual definition of what I mean by the term “immersive
aesthetic experience”, in the following pages I will elaborate on the concepts of embodiment,
intertextuality, and the sublime. I will describe how these concepts, which are crucial for my
inquiry, have developed, how they have been discussed in contemporary art, and why this
discussion is important for our topic. In addition to my foundational philosophers, I will
reference contemporary academic research relevant to this topic, including Simon Morley’s
project The Sublime (Whitechapel: Documents of Contemporary Art) and Joona Taipale’s
Phenomenology and Embodiment: Husserl and the Constitution of Subjectivity. Additional
resources include: The Tate Modern’s 2008 The Sublime Project; a combination of exhibitions,
and online access to articles and exhibition catalogues, website archives of lecture series, articles,
and other exhibition information.
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Embodiment
The concept of embodiment helps clarify how we perceive and make sense of sensation,
and why the immersive aesthetic experience is effective in evoking the sublime. Experiences
happen before they can be reflected upon and every experience involves sensory perception
(Taipale 26). Perception involves the whole body and the environment which envelops it. The
concept of embodiment distinguishes between an awareness of oneself and a self-awareness that
is constant, pre-reflective and non-objectifying. For self-awareness to be sensuously active it is
unnecessary to touch or see oneself (Taipale 23). Sensing can be described as a correlation
between the kinesthetic, and what Husserl calls, the hyletic. Kinesthetic and hyletic sensing are
two aspects of one continuum, hyletic data presents and kinesthetic informs reaction.
Hyletic sensing involves a type of intuition, they are sensations that “make present
something beyond” and constitute the basis of our awareness of sensuous exteriority (Taipale
27). Hyletic data does not intentionally aim at or represent anything, its data is imbued with
intentional content through kinesthetic sensing and involves no temporal distance. Hyletic
sensing transcends self-awareness and this is why Husserl considers the hyletic sphere as the
“ultimate non-egoic sphere”, it cannot be directed, hyletic sensing is involuntary (Taipale 27).
Because our self-consciousness is affected and motivated by our consciousness of the
environment, the activation of this non-egoic sphere through excess sensory data can facilitate an
experience of the sublime.
Taipale emphasizes Husserl’s assertion that “it is not until reflection that appearances
become ‘differentiated’, before reflection appearances are ‘fused’ into a stream of consciousness
and their temporal interrelations remain implicit” (24). In immersive aesthetic experiences,
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sensory data and signification are experienced immediately and appear connected, related. The
temporal frame of experience cannot be understood without content, “insofar as we are aware of
temporality, we are aware of something happening” (Taipale 24).
This idea of an awareness of something happening, connected to embodiment is also an
important point of departure for Lyotard’s discussion of the sublime. Lyotard explains that
because “the event happens as a question mark ‘before’ happening as a question”, a feeling may
be evoked, a feeling that nothing might happen, an awareness of the nothingness of now. This is
a contradictory feeling, one of pleasure and pain, or joy and anxiety, which Lyotard associates
with the sublime (Lyotard 92). The lived-body is not spatially confined to the objective locus of
the body-thing (Taipale 59). Physical pain turns attention toward oneself and motivates selfobjectification, while pleasure opens out toward the world. The lived-body serves as “an
intersection between the transcendental and the empirical, constituting and constituted,” the
lived-body constitutes the connection between experiential interiority and the sensible
environment (Taipale 66).

Fig. 1. Your Blind Passenger, 2010

11
Olafur Eliasson’s Your Blind Passenger, an immersive aesthetic experience that debuted
in 2010, exemplifies these aspects of embodiment (see fig. 1). Visitors walk through a tunnel
filled with thick fog and colored light. Fog dampens the senses: sight, sound, even smell are
muffled, and the visitor is made immediately aware of how the lack of this information affects
perception. Within the space, visitors encounter other visitors as shadowy specters, unable to
discern particular features unless intimately close. This work is an experience of being immersed
within an environment that impedes everyday sensory perception and compels visitors to
consciously consider sensory perception. The work utilizes elements that can be interpreted as
signs with ontological implications. Walking through a tunnel filled with fog and light, suggests
a notion of the afterlife or dreamworld. For these reasons, embodiment is a more relevant
philosophical concept in the discussion of immersive aesthetic experiences than the concept of
relational aesthetics, which is also concerned with aesthetic experiences.
Relational aesthetics developed through attempts to analyze and categorize emergent art
of the 1990s. Art critic, curator, and historian, Nicolas Bourriaud coined the term “relational
aesthetics” in his 1998 book of the same name. Bourriaud describes relational aesthetics as a
mode or tendency in art, whose point of departure is human relations and social context. Like the
immersive aesthetic experience, this work involves the creation of a physical space to be used for
an ephemeral experience. However, this is an experience that is first and foremost a social event.
The goal of most relational aesthetic art is to create a social circumstance in which the
experience of the constructed social environment becomes the art. Virtual Reality can be
considered a form of relational aesthetics, as well as immersive experience, but it should be
distinguished from the immersive aesthetic experience. Virtual reality calls for the viewer to
actively engage with an interactive, computer generated system, designed by an artist or artist
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group. The virtual environment is a visual-spatial illusion, the immersion is cognitive rather than
embodied. Virtual reality utilizes intrinsic motivation to encourage a sense of becoming absorbed
in one’s own actions, there is continual awareness of self, rather than a letting go of self, which is
possible through embodiment. Embodiment takes into account the full spectrum of data that is
absorbed and interpreted in order to make sense of the world. Interpretation is intimately
connected to the concept of intertextuality.

Intertextuality
The concept of intertextuality, initially and explicitly addressed in the writing of Kristeva,
developed out of her understanding and interpretation of ideas from Mikhail Bakhtin, Ferdinand
de Saussure and Roland Barthes. Kristeva combines ideas about the social context and relational
features of language. For Kristeva, intertextuality defines text as a dynamic site of relational
processes, an intersection of meanings rather than an object of static meaning. All texts absorb
and transform one another, they are literary and social, an exchange between that which is
presented for interpretation and the interpreter. The interpretation of text always involves another
text. Kristeva describes this as a dialogical structure in which the text elaborates itself as
ambivalent in relation to another text (Desire in Language 87). This dialogical structure, or
dialogism is characteristic of linguistic communication in general (Desire in Language 67).
Dialogism implies a double, distance, and relation; it indicates a becoming, and is a condition of
poetic language (Desire in Language 71). The intertextuality of dialogism involves a logic of
analogy and nonexclusive opposition, like that found in carnivalesque and Menippean forms of
literature. The text of intertextuality, changes, adjusts, shifts according to what the interpreting
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text brings with it. While Kristeva explores the systems of intertextuality, Barthes’ investigates
its effects.
Barthes’ The Pleasure of the Text connects the reading of ‘texts’ with an experience of
pleasure and bliss. Barthes expands the concept of what a text is, “you address yourself to me so
that I may read you” (5). His use of personification of the text, expresses the relational quality of
interpretation. A text is a collection of signs that are not presented through a simple relation of
active writer to passive reader (Barthes 16). The text is a form, a figure, “an anagram of the
erotic body”, and yet the pleasure of the text is irreducible to physiological need (Barthes 17).
The pleasure of the text affects the body, through the mind. Reading the text involves a type of
energy, described variously as intuition, cathexis, or jouissance. What Freud calls cathexis or
libido, a drive that is felt rather than thought, an impulse that affects the body, through the mind.
According to Freud, the ego only superficially shields itself from these primal needs and urges
(Morley 19). Engaging with Barthes’ ‘text’ arouses this energy.

Fig. 2 Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, 2017
Kristeva’s carnivalesque and Menippean discourses are texts of bliss, and involve
participants who are simultaneously actor and spectator. Both entail a discourse that is at once,
comic and tragic, serious, and often disturbing (Desire in Language 80). Damien Hirst’s
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exhibition Treasures from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, which I will discuss in Chapter Five,
participates in this type of discourse that pushes academic problems aside, in favor of problems
of existence (see fig. 2). Its intent is significant, as with carnivalesque and Menippean discourses,
the work involves the destruction of man’s epic and tragic unity, and a belief in identity through
causality (Desire in Language 83). The exhibition in general demands reflection on the ways in
which we develop meaning and determine what is true. Hirst presents the work as historical
artifacts, and includes no disclaimers, it is left completely to the viewer to ascertain the
manufactured nature of the work. Making this task more difficult is the fact that the viewer is
immersed in an environment teeming with authentic historical artifacts. Hirst goes so far as to
include a documentary detailing the supposed discovery of the shipwreck. Like carnivalesque
and Menippean discourses, Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable tends toward the
scandalous and eccentric, is an expression of cynical frankness, and a desecration of the sacred
(Desire in Language 83). Iconic pop-culture figures including Walt Disney with Mickey Mouse
and Barbie doll figurines are presented as mythic statues of ancient worship. They are discourses
whose goal is to exteriorize political and ideological conflicts of the moment (Desire in
Language 83).
This concept of the text as relational, dynamic, and able to evoke a strong emotional
response is essential to the immersive aesthetic experience. In this type of aesthetic work the
artist incorporates elements that operate as texts within the larger text of the experience itself.
The type of texts that Kristeva and Barthes allude to are intertextual, consisting of contingent
signifiers presented in an open relation with each other and the interpreter. For Barthes, what is
important is to equalize the field of pleasure, to abolish what he sees as a false opposition
between practical and contemplative life, pointing to a desire to bring these two modes of being
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into balance (59). Even though his aim is a general one, applicable to everyday experience, art
offers the opportunity to practice approaching experience in a way that emphasizes sense and
involves reflection on how determinations of meaning develop. An integral part of why the
immersive aesthetic experience is successful is the possibility of encountering the sublime.
Absent this possibility the experience amounts to mere entertainment.

The Sublime
The sublime, a concept often associated with Kant’s Critique of Judgement, initially to
express a feeling of being confronted by the immensity of nature or God, developed into a
response to anything whose magnitude surpasses understanding and imagination. In order to
situate a contemporary notion of the sublime, the evolving and complex history of the concept
must be examined. Chapter one of this dissertation addresses this history in greater depth. As I
mentioned above, the sublime deserves attention and is relevant to philosophical discourse as an
aesthetic reaction involving an embodied form of understanding. It is a concept that runs counter
to the purely conceptual nature of logic and reason and can act as a distinguishing factor for
aesthetic experiences. As we will see, reasons for a contemporary concern for the sublime are
varied, but can be seen as reaction to the over emphasis on conceptual thought, reasoning, or
logos responsible for the preoccupation with progress and technology. The sublime is about
emotion, sensing, the not-rational; it is about the limits of reason, an expression of the futility of
endless progress, and technology as the all-encompassing answer. For this work, it will be
crucial to notice that whereas Kant’s view of the sublime is about the failure of imagination and
an assertion of the power of reason to confer a sense of security and control, the contemporary
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sublime is about the power of imagination to reveal infinite multiplicity and connectivity within
the ephemeral nature of the temporal frame.
The concept continues to expand and its contemporary use often includes references to
the mass production and globalization of technology. Simon Morely’s The Sublime
(Whitechapel: Documents of Contemporary Art) offers an anthology of contemporary artists and
theorists exploring ideas of the sublime. These texts explore various notions of the sublime in
relation to art, technology, and capitalism. The book and Morely’s essay are broad overviews of
contemporary art in relation to the sublime. My project will intersect with many of these ideas,
however the focus of my research, the immersive aesthetic experience, requires narrowing the
definition of the sublime in order to demonstrate how this type of work relates to a specific
notion of the sublime. For Morely, the power of technology is more likely to evoke a
contemporary notion of the sublime than nature; he describes the sublime as the destabilizing and
excessive everyday perception of “extreme space-time compressions produced by globalized
communication technologies” (12). While I agree with the description of globalized
communication technologies as excessive and destabilizing, I do not agree that this definition
exhausts every possible experience of the sublime. The sublime referred to in these pages more
closely resembles that of experiences described by Nancy and Barthes, an experience of a type of
pleasure they associate with the French concept of jouissance. The sublime has shifted from an
experience that results from a relation of the exterior upon the interior, to one in which the
interior is seen as one and the same as the exterior. Art is an active reminder that while reason
and logic produce thinking, working, science, and progress; equally important are the products of
imagination and myth; an awareness of body, doing, playing, making, reading, and lingering.
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From Plato onward, western civilization has understood aesthetics as the study and
expression of the beautiful and the sublime. Since my enquiry investigates the immersive
aesthetic experience and involves the sublime, it is important to investigate the ways in which
Plato’s discussion of ‘beauty itself’ eventually leads to a distinction between the art object and
the art experience, and which ultimately reflects the current overemphasis on reason or logos.
Plato emphasizes conceptual thought over sensing. For Plato, understanding and judging are
higher order levels of thinking than sensing and emotion. He is suspicious of the power of art to
elicit emotion. In Aristotle’s Poetics, the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is
more apparent. Plato’s distinction between beautiful things and beauty itself, is the foundation
for Aristotle’s response, in which he affirms the power of Greek Tragedy to provoke empathy
and perhaps even provide catharsis. Let us analyze this more closely.
Aristotle’s catharsis has much in common with an experience of the sublime. Aristotle
describes an aesthetic experience that provokes a brief, yet profound empathy. In Poetics,
Aristotle explains that tragedy is capable of “effecting through pity and fear the purification of
such emotions” (10). This empathy is, in effect, a release of existential anxiety through
recognition of the self in the other, who enacts the tragic outcome and allows the spectator to
safely participate at a distance. This is an experience in which concerns connected to identity are
shed, and the audience feels as one with the tragic lead, whose traumas are characteristic of the
nature of being. According to Aristotle there is pleasure in understanding, in the exercise of any
capacity, and in the relief that catharsis brings. Recognition of both the beautiful and the sublime
produce this pleasure in understanding to different degrees. The pleasure of understanding, as it
relates to the beautiful, feels a priori, it operates as a recognition, while the pleasure of
understanding that is related to the sublime is brief and intense, it is a flash of comprehension.
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And while I have just pointed out a relation between Aristotle's catharsis and the sublime,
the first known study of the sublime is attributed to a 1st century AD author, referred to as
Longinus. Longinus’ text describes effects literature capable of producing the sublime. Longinus
characterizes the sublime as a strong emotional response to depictions of intense experiences,
which lay beyond conscious control and threaten individual autonomy (Morely 15). During the
Enlightenment, the sublime is appropriated as evidence of the supremacy of reason. This
sublime, which is most often associated with Kant, is a response to being in the presence of
something of immense magnitude. A mixture of pain and pleasure experienced when senses and
imagination fail. According to Kant, reason surpasses sense with the recognition of its capacity
to conceive of infinity, as we will see in chapter one. Edmund Burke associates the sublime with
what he considers the strongest emotions, terror and pain. Whatever is terrible, or analogous to
terror, whatever brings pain and danger, is a source of the sublime for Burke. Additional
contributions to the concept of the sublime by Friedrich Schiller and Johann Winckelmann,
epitomize enlightenment thinking that serves to de-emphasize mythos and the imagination.
For Hegel, the sublime is a moment of fusion with the Absolute, in which the divine is
manifested and the beautiful fulfilled (Morely 16). His aesthetic concern is focused on art
objects, especially those constructed and imbued with a delicate perfection forged by man.
Schopenhauer connects the sublime to being, explaining how in certain situations the self can
observe itself in the act of confronting a fearful inner abyss, and yet for Schopenhauer,
contemplation of the beautiful art object surpasses the experience of the sublime in importance
and prestige (Morely 16). According to Morely, Nietzsche “cast the sublime individual as
someone willing to abandon the safe dream of ‘Apollonian’ rationality, where all is light and
sanity, in order to embrace instead ‘Dionysian’ intoxication” (17). In addition to these varied and
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shifting conceptions of the sublime, a contemporary sublime should be included, as put forth
here, a sublime that is intimately connected to the concepts of abjection, irony, comedy and
forgetting.
Both the sublime and abjection are expressions of the impossibility of being. Abjection, a
concept developed by Kristeva that will be investigated in chapter three, relates to an awareness
of the dual nature inherent in the living body, both powerfully recuperative and yet ephemeral
and fragile. Both the sublime and the abject involve the shedding of identity during a brief and
overwhelming recognition of the interconnectedness of being, and of the inevitability of the void.
Comedy, irony, and forgetting are methods of coping with an experience of abjection and the
sublime.
According to Nietzsche the sublime and the comical are interwoven elements, the
comical a balm that can heal, soothe or mitigate the pain associated with the absurdity of tragic
existence. Irony, as Hegel describes it, involves an impartial mode of self-reflection, an
awareness of being, not hampered with concerns of identity. However, Hegel warns that irony,
without practical activity, runs the risk of turning into mere indifference. Forgetting is yet
another mechanism for dealing with the intense awareness of the existential nature of the
sublime.
The sublime is an aesthetic reaction to art that brings about an intense awareness of being
within the universe, while at the same time stripped of one’s immediate sense of identity.
The definition of the sublime as utilized in this research not only relates to abjection, comedy,
irony and forgetting, it is inextricably connected to ideas developed by Nietzsche, and later in the
twentieth century, by Lyotard. This sublime is associated with Nietzsche’s Dionysian, however,
rather than a sublime individual who abandons the Apollonian in order to embrace the
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Dionysian, this sublime is an experience of the Dionysian presented in conjunction with the
Apollonian. The sublime is the result of an aesthetic act capable of conveying the formless,
chaos, and loss of individuation associated with the Dionysian, through Apollonian form and
semblance. The sublime is not an abandonment of the form and semblance of reason, it is a result
of bringing sense and reason into balance.
Unlike Kant’s sublime, in which direct sensory intuition is incapable of a comprehensive
judgement of a thing, whose magnitude is beyond comprehension, this sublime is not out there in
the world, it is an experience dependent on forces typically deemed irrational, feelings and
desires, innate sensing. Lyotard describes an intuition “that something happens”, an intuition
connected to a sublime, which cannot be put into words. Instead of magnitude beyond
comprehension, Lyotard describes the sublime as an attempt to understand the inconceivable
(93). Lyotard’s contribution, like that of Nietzsche, emphasizes cooperation of sense and reason.
According to Lyotard, thought is inseparable from the phenomenological body (23). Because art
draws attention to the limits of representation, to the ambiguous nature of signification itself, it is
capable of evoking a feeling of intense ontological dislocation, and with it an ambivalent
enjoyment through the intensification of conceptual and emotional capacity (Lyotard 101).
Subsequent essays in this dissertation demonstrate the essential nature of lingering, as
foundational to the prospect of encountering the sublime during an immersive aesthetic
experience. The sublime evoked through immersive aesthetic experience is indebted to the quiet
mind and body of Lyotard’s thinking being. Lyotard describes how developing a practice of
quieting the body and mind is necessary in order to really think. His description of the awareness
of the body’s innate role in perception, and recommendation of denying ‘recognition’ in favor of
letting things come as they present themselves, is integral to this research (Lyotard 32). Presence,
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lingering, letting go of all grasping intelligence, going beyond the recognition, category, and
definition of reason is the lesson of the immersive aesthetic experience. Bodies react in ways that
are both voluntary and involuntary, these responses are connected, influence one another, as well
as the development of meaning. The body’s sensing nature is emphasized in the immersive
aesthetic experience. The sublime experience is fundamentally transformative, the contemporary
sublime is an experience of immanent transcendence, occurring within the here and now (Morely
18). In the immersive aesthetic experience the observer, sensing and interpreting ontological
signs, may briefly shed mundane concerns of identity and experience a form of transcendence.

The Immersive Aesthetic Experience
What I call the immersive aesthetic experience is a work of art capable of overwhelming
its audience with both sensory stimuli and ontological signification; an aesthetic practice whose
germinating seeds can be located in and around concepts developed by Nietzsche, MerleauPonty, Kristeva and Barthes. This aesthetic practice has developed out of the concepts of
performative philosophy, embodiment, intertextuality, and the sublime. As a matter of fact, the
active relationship between work and viewer demonstrates the importance of the aesthetic
experience. This contemporary practice can be traced, through a shifting of emphasis, once
located on the work itself, the art object, and currently on the audience’s experience of the work.
Philosophically, this shift first becomes evident in Nietzsche’s performative philosophy that
emphasizes doing. Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment advances this focus on performativity to
include the body’s instinctual reliance on sense and sensing in interpretation. Kristeva
underscores the necessity of recognizing context in interpretation of text, and Barthes describes
how engagement with text can evoke a pleasure associated with the sublime.
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This investigation of aesthetic experience may locate Aristotle’s writing on the effects of
aesthetic experience as a starting point, but it is Merleau-Ponty’s description of the work of Paul
Cézanne that is a major turning point in understanding embodied experience. Merleau-Ponty
describes how Cézanne attempts to share his embodied experience through painting techniques.
A general aim of Impressionism, to visually capture and share fleeting experiences, can be seen
in depictions of light that change with the passing of time, and the ephemerality of urban life.
Painting that attempts to communicate feelings not easily put into words. In the period after
World War II, the desire to evoke sublime feelings of transcendence took on particular
importance for the Abstract Expressionists.
American artists Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko, sought to evoke the sublime
through the illusion of spatial immensity. Rothko extends this illusion further in his color field
paintings, which also create the illusion of a fluctuating picture plane. Standing in front of a
Rothko, the viewer can experience shifts in perception as illusory, and with this, the experience
of the viewer gains attention. The experience of the audience continues to draw attention in
Situationalist art, Happenings, and Op Art. The optical illusions painted by Bridget Riely, create
the experience of undulating picture planes, in a way that is similar to Rothko. However, Riely
manipulates optical perception only on the surface level, the viewer remains situated outside the
work, comes up against the flatness of the picture plane, while Rothko uses color as a way into
another dimension with transcendent aspirations. Both artists create picture planes that play with
perception, and in doing so create a relationship with the viewer, and yet it is apparent that
Rothko is invested in notions of the sublime. More recently, the Light and Space movement and
Installation art, both share the concern for a subjective point of view, and operate fully within the
realm of sensory perception. American artist James Turrell, associated with the Light and Space
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movement that originated in the 1960’s, constructs three-dimensional versions of Rothko's color
field paintings, allowing visitors to literally step inside the picture plane, intensifying immersive
effects of space and light. The immersive aesthetic experience only differs by degree and by
content.
The immersive aesthetic experience not only engages sensory perception, it affects the
body through an engagement with both sense and reason. Sensory impact is intensified by
content that is ambiguously ontological. Sun Yuan and Peng Yu, artists who formed a
collaborative partnership in 2000, incorporate unconventional materials in their large
installations. Works like their 2016, Can’t Help Myself, instigate powerful physical and
psychological reactions in the viewer. The installation consists of an industrial robot, a hydraulic
arm on a turning base, behind clear acrylic walls. The robotic arm works ceaselessly, attempting
to contain a deep red, viscous liquid. Its toiling is unsuccessful, as evidenced by the red smudges
and splashes on the surrounding floor and walls. The work is frightening and visceral, the
content of its communication earthly and crude. In a similar manner, artist Gal Weinstein’s
creation for the Israeli Pavilion at the 2017 Venice Biennale, Sun Stand Still is also an immersive
aesthetic experience that communicates through both sense and reason. Weinstein saturated the
space in mold, real as well as simulated mold. The smell and dampness of the space
communicates before visitors are even aware of it. Immersive aesthetic experiences always
involve interpretation, and ambiguity is vital to these interpretations.
In an immersive aesthetic experience, the work of art is conceived of as a ‘text’, the
audience is immersed within a multitude of excess sensory stimuli and ontological signification.
Sensing and signification demand interpretation. These works offer the opportunity to experience
the sublime through an excess of sensory information and ontological signification. Works of art
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by Kusama, Kapoor, Eliasson, and Hirst, demonstrate how the immersive aesthetic experience
avoids the superficiality associated with many immersive experiences. The art object remains a
place of quiet contemplation and delight in the beautiful; but art as experience involves an active
relationship between the work of art and the viewer, a relationship that emphasizes an experience
rooted in an acute, ephemeral awareness of one’s being in the world. This experience of
awareness may trigger either abjection or pleasure related to the sublime. As we will see in
different ways in the next chapters, it is essential to differentiate between the aesthetic
experience and mere entertainment. Art as entertainment has no power to transform, and without
this nuanced distinction, art in general is seen to have lost its transformative power. Work that
neglects ontological signification is unable to engage an audience in the type of embodied
intertextual thought that is necessary for experiences of the sublime.
It is important to note that the contemporary crisis of imbalanced emphasis on reason
cannot be addressed aesthetically by simply shifting emphasis completely toward experience,
and while the experience aspect of immersion is essential, its effectiveness in providing training
in contextual, embodied modes of thought, depends on intertextual readings of ontological signs.
The increasing popularity of work designated ‘immersive experience’ that has no aesthetic
engagement with philosophical concepts, obscures the real potential of an immersive aesthetic
experience.
Art associated with popular spectacle has a complex history. In the 1800s artists like
Théodore Géricault and J. M. W. Turner drew huge crowds for their large-scale canvases. In the
1970s, museums began touring ‘blockbuster’ exhibitions in order to draw big crowds and hype
merchandise. In recent years, a number of immersive exhibitions have drawn massive crowds,
for example Rain Room, an exhibition created by Hannes Koch, Florian Ortkrass and Stuart
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Wood. Rain Room opened in London at the Barbican Center in 2012, and is an immersive
installation that uses motion detecting sensors to control the flow of water that falls from the
ceiling like rain, so that as visitors walk through the room, water flowing directly above shuts
off. When the exhibition ran at New York’s Museum of Modern Art it prompted unprecedented
lines, and during its run at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, it completely sold out. The
issue with many interactive environments is that like Rain Room, they employ technology to
activate intrinsic motivation and encourage a sense of becoming absorbed in one’s own actions.
This absorption creates an awareness of oneself as opposed to a self-awareness that is constant,
pre-reflective and non-objectifying, an awareness associated with embodiment.
Many museums want to be seen less as timeless monuments to culture and more as hubs
for experiences. Immersive works also tend to draw crowds who are looking for great photo
opportunities they can share online. According to Culture Track, sharing photos has now become
the main driver of the ‘outside-the-home experience economy’, which has far reaching influence
on the design of everything, from event planning to architecture. Social media advertising has
become an important avenue for reaching culture consumers (Schwab). There are currently
nearly seventy-three thousand images and videos posted to the Instagram app with the hashtag
#rainroom. However, having a powerful presence on social media is not a simple equivalence to
superficiality, for many people taking and sharing photos is a way to proclaim what they find
important.
Meow Wolf epitomizes the appropriation of aesthetic engagement for commercial
objectives. Started in 2008 as a small collective of Santa Fe artists, Meow Wolf creates
distinctive immersive environments, consisting of installations that include art objects, video and
music production, a variety of media, architecture, narrative writing and costuming, all in service
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of non-linear storytelling. According to Culture Track there is popular conception that culture
has democratized, nearly to the point of extinction. They claim there is no longer a debate about
high versus low culture, or even culture versus entertainment. The key is relevance, and activities
traditionally considered culturally relevant are now on a level playing field with those that have
not been considered culturally relevant (culture track). However, this can be considered accurate
only if the meaning of relevance relates directly to the amount of money being made, the
numbers of visitors, or social media followers. Meow Wolf has a powerful Instagram presence,
with one hundred sixty thousand images and videos tagged #meowwolf and an official account
with four hundred twenty-one thousand followers.
Meow Wolf describes their work as “Immersive Experiences,” but critics say it ‘amounts
to an interactive haunted house’, full of multi-sensory stimuli. They even include signification in
the form of a backstory. The environments are intentionally structured around the same kind of
science fiction narrative that undergirds the blockbuster movie economy. Meow Wolf studied
what worked in the larger contemporary museum ecology, applying what they learned to their
productions. Meow Wolf explains, “what we did was focus on kids, because the admissionsbased market is driven by kids” but they still want broad audience appeal, so they utilize mature
themes that will not alienate teenagers or adults (Davis). These are experiences that do not
require any “historical knowledge, context, or even patience to be enjoyed” (Davis). They are
works that overwhelm the senses, offer a communal experience as opposed to a personal one,
and provide photo opportunities. The work is superficial, not because visitors are looking at the
art through their phones, but because there is no contemplative or delectative duration.
Felicity Scott, a history and theory of architecture professor at Columbia, noted in a 2013
article in Art Forum, that the popularity of Rain Room is due to its ability to “harness and reflect
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a contemporary desire for seemingly direct ‘participation’ and spectacular forms of exposure.”
Being able to have beautiful photos to share plays a role, however it is the experience that really
matters. But to be an aesthetic experience, the work must not only overwhelm in a multi-sensory
way, it needs to simultaneously engage its audience in an intertextual conversation about being.
This means that in theory and in practice the transformative work of art, as an immersive
aesthetic experience, must originate as a communication from the artist that leaves space for the
viewer to engage with questioning and interpretation. The artist must have something essential to
say about being. However, the interpretation of this message cannot be controlled, in its
presentation it takes on a life of its own. An immersive aesthetic experience should be a marriage
of content and form that disrupts and provokes thought.
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CHAPTER ONE
Aesthetic Experience and the Sublime
Between the surreal intensity of moments that flow ever toward the void and the
inevitable sense of automation it is so easy to slip into, are occasional moments in which time
pauses and perception intensifies. Lingering, however, seems to be turning into a lost art. Most
people have become accustomed to relying on modes of understanding connected to reason and
logic, where data is sorted into categories, in order to increase the rate at which a surface level
comprehension may be achieved and decisions reached rapidly. Information systems and data
processing devices have developed, and are relied upon to increase the speed at which this
happens. But the process of forming deep and lasting connections is a slow one. Lingering is an
experience in which reason and perception are in play. The word experience, as borrowed from
the Latin experientia, “testing of possibilities, participation in events, or skill gained by practice”
and experience is described as “an event which has affected one”. The experience of
understanding through the interplay of reason and perception is transformative, and yet
experience has long been undervalued in the face of reason.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate why immediate experience needs to be
revalued and emphasized for its role in understanding, and show how art offers an example of
the integration of perception and reason working holistically. Further, I assert that the immersive
aesthetic experience exemplifies an ideal example of how this can work. In this chapter, I will
describe how an apparent split seems to have occurred between reason and perception. A split
that is mirrored in the aesthetics of objects and experience. I will discuss why the aesthetic
experience is important today, and how and why the concept of the sublime plays a fundamental
role. Concepts essential to this discussion include sublime, understanding, perception,
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experience, Idea, form, identity and will. While many philosophers have written on this subject, I
will attempt to limit my research to the aesthetic discourse of specific thinkers, including: Plato,
Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Nancy and Lyotard, since these philosophers each,
in their own way, are concerned with human experience, how we understand, and the role art
plays.
The artworks examined in this book are able to provoke a sense of being present or an
enticement to linger, in a way that not a lot of other experiences do. The immersive aesthetic
experience is an aesthetic act, capable of creating an engagement that bridges the gap between
intellectual understanding and sensory experience. As exemplary of this kind of aesthetic
practice, my focus is on the work of Yayoi Kusama, Anish Kapoor, Olafur Eliasson, and Damien
Hirst. While these artists represent a diverse range of work, there are common threads running
through each that help define what I mean by immersive aesthetic experience. These works all
involve a particular and intense relationship between the work and its audience, one that makes
the viewer aware of the subjective nature of the unique and ephemeral encounter with the work.
In this type of work, materials generally emphasize sensory perception through an excess of
stimuli and always include ambiguous signs that reference the ontological. Sensing and
signification demand interpretation, however this is an interpretation that engenders
understanding, and this understanding, based on intensified sensory perception and interpretation
of ontological signifiers may lead to an aesthetic experience of the sublime.
The immersive aesthetic experience involves an active relationship between the work of
art and the viewer, a relationship that emphasizes an experience rooted in an acute, ephemeral
awareness of one’s being in the world. This experience of awareness may trigger the
overwhelming feeling of horror and bliss associated with the sublime. What sets the immersive
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aesthetic experience apart from other immersive experiences, is this involvement with
philosophical concepts and the potential to evoke an experience of the sublime.
It is essential to differentiate between the immersive aesthetic experience and other
immersive experiences, as this phrase is becoming more and more popular. Many immersive
experiences are simply entertainment: these are experiences that emphasize sensory perception,
but lack ontological signification. They engage perception over reason, rather than perception
and reason. Artists and philosophers alike have addressed problems related to art as spectacle,
and the related sensory overload, generated by a consumer culture that attempts to occupy
attention in every waking moment. The spectacle of constant distraction, leaves no room for the
exercise of imagination.
In 1967, Guy Debord describes an image saturated consumer culture in The Society of the
Spectacle, but by the late 1990’s Baudrillard claims the spectacle is no longer possible.
According to Baudrillard, “art substituted itself for life in the form of a generalized aesthetics
that finally led to a ‘Disneyfication’ of the world” (53). The boundary between the spectacle and
the everyday is demolished, everything is spectacle. Baudrillard says that “one day, everything
will be culturized, every object will be a so-called aesthetic object, and nothing will be an
aesthetic object” (Baudrillard 69). There is a loss of signification that accompanies the
inundation of spectacle, or of art as mere entertainment. If all objects are aesthetic, then aesthetic
has lost its meaning. Baudrillard suggests duplicity in art that asserts nullity “asserting nullity,
insignificance, meaninglessness, striving for nullity when already null and void” (27). The
problem with spectacle, and of art whose only concern is perception, is that it engages attention
without regard for imagination. This is art that is easily digested and has no power to transform.
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Without this distinction between art and entertainment, art in general is seen to have lost its
transformative power.
As will be seen in the upcoming discussion of Plato and Aristotle, art requires ontological
signification in order to engage an audience in the type of embodied intertextual thought related
to experiences of the sublime. Ideas developed out of the writings of thinkers such as Lyotard,
Nancy and Barthes demonstrate how an aesthetic experience of the sublime activates a mode of
understanding not reliant on category, logic, rules, or procedures derived out of reason, yet
involving interpretation of signifiers. The immersive aesthetic experience is able to provide the
opportunity to exercise thinking in a way that finds a better balance between logic and sensing,
by establishing an emphasis on perception, interpretation, reflection, and an expectation of
relying on one’s senses.
The bifurcation of reason and perception has been overemphasized, when actually reason
and perception are simply two impulses of the same source, both modes of understanding. From
Plato to Kant, reason and logic have been elevated to a position of all encompassing authority,
while perception, in the hands of Descartes, is considered untrustworthy. However, both logic
and perception can be wrong, and yet feel correct. According to Schopenhauer, aesthetics is a
realm where both modes of understanding are in play. Art provides the opportunity to experience
these two modes of understanding working together, and occasionally does it so intensely that it
can affect the body in the mode of strong emotional response. The sublime is an experience of
this intense understanding in relation to ontological reflection. The sublime is an aesthetic
reaction to art that ignites embodied reflection of an ontological nature. The immersive aesthetic
experience involves lingering, examining one’s perceptions and simultaneously engaging in
ontological reflection.
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In this chapter I map out the movement of this split, between reason and perception, and
trace its effects, in terms of what becomes a mirrored split between the aesthetic object and the
aesthetic experience, initially conceived of as one and the same thing. The value of aesthetic
expression, once rooted in the aesthetic object and the experience of that object, today, often
appears to have lost its connection to the experience of the object. The value of aesthetic
expression can no longer compete with name recognition or a sense of fame and notoriety.
Baudrillard describes the complex situation of art, in the postmodern era:
Warhol went the farthest in abolishing the subject of art, of the artist, by
withdrawing from the creative act. Behind this mechanical snobbery, there is in
fact an escalation in the power of the object, the sign, the image, the simulacrum
and value of which the best example today is the art market itself. This goes well
beyond the alienation of a price as a real measure of things: we are experiencing a
fetishism of value that explodes the very notion of a market and, at the same time,
abolishes the artwork as a work of art. (Baudrillard 44)
Aesthetic value has become rooted in logos, and under the logic of abstract value, in which
beautiful objects must be expensive in order to be protected and maintained across generations.
Aesthetic objects become associated with genius and rarefied even further, increasing their
monetary value. The importance of the aesthetic object should be about the experience of that
object, however, thinking and understanding rooted in logic and reason tends to emphasize
things about the object that make it rare or increase its perceived worth. Many artists struggle
with this notion, for example Bansky takes pains to maintain anonymity, and specifically works
with materials considered worthless. Others, like Brain Massumi and his collaborations with
SenseLab, recognize a need to focus on the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience is
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more likely to maintain freedom from considerations of material value, as they are more difficult
to monetize. When other considerations are stripped away, what is left is the experience, an
experience that involves aesthetic understanding.
The experience of aesthetic understanding is apparent in the example of the immersive
aesthetic experience. Recouping the aesthetic experience is essential, in part because it offers
practice of a critical way of understanding. The immersive aesthetic experience, which lends
itself to a more balanced approach to understanding, is more likely to provoke an experience of
the sublime. The potential transformation of the audience through an engagement with the work
is emphasized over the artists’ role in the creation of the work.
Starting with Plato and reaching a peak with Kant and the enlightenment, the quest to
seek out and prove what reason may achieve, is an ultimate goal. Sense is secondary, at best in
the service of reason, but always untrustworthy. Descartes’ skepticism regarding perception
echoes Plato’s notion that all we know are appearances, which are opposed to reality. According
to Kant, the mind “hearkens now to the voice of reason”, a faculty he states that transcends
“every standard of the senses” (85). As we shall see, the notion that perception and emotion
cannot be trusted, that they are too easily manipulated, is all too common.
In the digital age the seemingly elusive boundary between fantasy and reality makes
fictional narratives about being caught up in a matrix of virtual realities appear prescient. And
yet, the being that is aware, is present, notices the difference. While speaking about his work,
Olafur Eliasson discusses the question “Do I trust my own eyes and my capacity to engage with
the world?” (Abstract: The Art of Design). This is an important question, the ability to trust one’s
own eyes and the capacity to engage with the world, requires critical thinking and constant
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reflection. A better balance between perception and reason can be achieved by analyzing
instinctual responses and reactions, and reflecting on what drives those responses.
Immersive aesthetic experiences can help us learn to trust our perceptions, based on an
extreme awareness of the complexity and contextual nature of existing within time and space.
Developing observational skills and awareness to the effects of being, requires practice. Living is
a daily encounter with situations that cannot be resolved by relying on any specific set of rules or
procedures. We must develop a gut response, an awareness of the complexity of being, and an
engagement with thoughtful reflection regarding the interplay of moving trajectories within time
and space. Kristeva’s intertextuality, Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomes and sediment, Freud’s
libidinal forces, Bergson’s duration and intuition, Nancy’s sensing, and Barthes’ pleasure of the
text, all come into play. These ideas are about how everything is connected, about perception and
understanding through the body, and relate to a practice that describes an awareness of the
moment, of multiplicity of perspectives that continuously shift. The works of art I will describe
explore the aesthetic mode of understanding and provide opportunities to practice this kind of
embodied trusting of one’s perception. The sublime is important because of its connection to this
aesthetic experience, an experience that involves excess sensory perception and elicits reflection
upon the nature of being, a nearly instinctual reflection.

Tracing the split between Aesthetic Object and Aesthetic Experience
In order to define the advantages of an approach to understanding, rooted in methods
essential to art making, aesthetics, and the practice of the artist philosopher, it is necessary to link
together and describe the effects of certain moments of influence within the aesthetic discourse. I
am working in a linear trajectory and begin at a specific location within time and space.
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However, I see these moments in confluence and am aware that many other factors are at play.
The point I indicate, as an initial sign-post along the road of this discussion, is Plato’s concept of
the beautiful and his emphasis on abstract thought. In The Republic, Plato makes a distinction
between beauty itself and beautiful things, a distinction mirrored by Schopenhauer, in The World
as Will and Representation through the concepts of the Idea, and the will. Both pairs of concepts
can be seen to correspond to reason and perception. The perceived splitting tends to emphasize a
distrust of perception, emotion and the body, while reason, logic, and the mind, are elevated in
status. This split is also apparent in the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime.
Plato’s goal is the ability to distill a universal idea of beauty, from particular instances of
beautiful objects. Ultimately, he advocates a quiet contemplation, which eventually transforms
into reasoning, abstracting from particulars, the universal, rather than truly experiencing the
singular. Contemplation rather than experience. A major concern of Plato is the enlightened
man’s ability to reason. Men whose desire flows toward learning will find pleasure in activities
of the mind, and be indifferent to those pleasures that come through the body (Plato 178). He
applies a value judgement to types of pleasure, and value is given to the mind, reason and logic.
Republic, is a hypothetical description of steps, structures, laws and rules, necessary to establish
the ‘ideal’ state. Plato claims that on one side are artists, the lovers of seeing, who are devoted to
beautiful things, yet unable to see the nature of the beautiful itself. On the other side are the
philosophers, and the republic must be ruled by philosophers (169). According to Kant,
“Nothing, indeed, can be more harmful or more unworthy of the philosopher, than the vulgar
appeal of so-called experience” (Critique of Pure Reason, Book 1, Sect 1).
This value placed on reason over perception reaches its zenith during the Enlightenment.
Many thinkers engaged with questions about what we know and how we know it, but the work of
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philosophers such as Descartes, and especially Kant clearly express the continued emphasis on
the value of reason. Descartes is outright skeptical of perception, while Kant emphasizes
operations of understanding and categories of thought, and puts sensory experience at the service
of establishing knowledge. Kant’s use of category and reason are highly influential; examining
or creating structures and systems of meaning is essential, and these thinkers offer revolutionary
ideas in service of independence and power of the individual subject, to the extent of creating an
imbalance. Plato’s concept of beauty itself closely resembles its companion concept, the Idea.
The Idea is ultimately ontological in nature, in a metaphysical sense. In The Symposium,
Plato, through the words of Socrates, describes the difference between beautiful things and
beauty itself, as the Idea, and uses bodies as his example. He states that instead of thinking of the
body as a particular, of one individual, it is wiser to look for the universal, in that the “beauty of
any one body is closely akin to that of any other body, what is beautiful in form is to regard the
beauty in all bodies as one in the same”, here Plato connects abstract form and thinking, to being
(48). Plato explains that after engaging in this realization, the enlightened man will understand
that the “beauty in souls is more to be prized than that of body” (48). To contemplate the
beautiful as it exists in human practices, is to see that the “beauty of it all is of one kind”, and to
realize that what is “beautiful in a body is trivial by comparison” (Plato 48). The enlightened
man will no longer be content with the beauty of any one particular thing, “he will turn towards
the vast sea of the beautiful” (Plato 49), the contemplation of which will lead to beautiful
discourses and a unique kind of knowledge, the knowledge of beauty itself. Plato locates this
knowledge of beauty itself as outside the body, eternal, being as opposed to becoming. He
differentiates between being and becoming, thought and action, reason and perception, while
emphasizing the value of thought. He who contemplates beautiful things, will suddenly perceive
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a beauty that is eternal, it “does not come into being or perish”, it is unchanging, not beautiful in
one respect and ugly in another, but a beauty at all times, by all standards, and in all places (Plato
49). This beauty does not appear as a particular face or hands or any other part of the body, nor is
it like a discourse or a branch of knowledge or anything else. This beauty “exists on its own,
single in substance and everlasting” (Plato 49).
Reason is identified as the essential element of being, distinct from the particular
perceptions of the body. The question arises as to whether reason and perception can be cleanly
severed, “what, then, do we suppose it would be like for someone to actually see the beautiful
itself, separate, clear and pure... single in substance and divine?” (Plato 50). The implication
being that this most important truth is difficult, if not impossible to see. Plato explains his
concept of forms as a difference between appearances and a kind of essence that connects all
particulars to a universal. This universal is the “Idea”, that which is antithetical to perception, to
seeing. It takes a special mind to look beyond mere appearances, but even that special mind
cannot ignore appearances.
In Schopenhauer’s discussion of Plato, he describes the Idea and its relation to the will,
which also emphasizes a split between reason and perception. Schopenhauer describes two
distinct modes of knowledge, the Idea and that which we apprehend by the principle of sufficient
reason. Things understood through the determination of cause and effect, are always in a state of
becoming and rooted in perception. That which is independent of all relations, Schopenhauer
describes as “the only thing really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomenon, that
which is not subject to the flux of time and is known with equal truth for all time, in a word, the
Idea” (108). Schopenhauer’s will is connected to perception and the notion that form and
semblance as surface perceptions are misleading. Both Plato and Schopenhauer describe a
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universal Idea, related to being, and distinct from perception, it indicates the thing-in-itself, a
separate thing. The Idea is pure abstract reasoning, it is the splitting into category, classification,
and distinction. Perceptions of the body are disregarded or disdained, and many reasons to
distrust perception quickly take root.
Appearances, the will, memory, and emotion, all mislead, confuse, and cause chaos, and
demonstrate why perception should not be trusted. Even before Plato, Lucretius writes that
man’s tendency is often to “fail to feel the dust that clings to the body, or powder that strikes and
settles there; to notice the mist at night, or feel the fine web of the spider” (66). However,
obliviousness becomes outright distrust when Plato associates beautiful things with the visible
but not intelligible, and beauty itself with the intelligible but not visible (Plato 202). According
to Plato, appearances are misleading and only reason can result in truth. The body cannot be
controlled and directed the way an enlightened man can control and direct his mind.
The power of will is offered as evidence of why the body cannot be controlled and
directed the way the mind can. Schopenhauer utilizes Plato’s Idea to help delineate his concept
of the will. Schopenhauer is explicit in stating, “these grades of the will’s objectification are
nothing other than Plato’s Ideas” (61). The Idea is abstract being, will is the idea made concrete.
The will is understood as the instinctual force that drives being, the Idea is free from the drives
of the will. The will is inevitable, unavoidable, and affects perception. The will is associated with
identity and subjectivity, both of which obstruct the objective, rational point of view. Perception
is affected by subjectivity and subjectivity is dependent on memory.
Memory, like the will, is inevitable, unavoidable and affects perception. Bergson
describes how our immediate perception of the present moment is comprised of sensory data,
mingling with a thousand details of past experience. At the root of our knowledge of things, are
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particular interpretations, of impersonal perceptions. He explains that in most cases these
memories supplant actual perceptions. Perception is consciousness, and there is no perception
that is not full of memories. Memories and associations are utilized in the process of interpreting
perceptions. The convenience and rapidity of perception are bought at the price of illusion, when
perceptions are interpreted through the lens of memory. Memory adds to or subtracts from
perception, which becomes a “a kind of interior and subjective vision” (Matter and Memory 25).
The subjectivity of sensible qualities happens through a kind of contraction of the real, affected
by memory (Matter and Memory 26). There is no pure perception because all sensible data is
absorbed through the filter of subjective memory. Along with will and memory, emotion is a
physical force that influences perception. Aesthetically, emotion is regarded as one of the more
powerful influences on understanding through perception. Emotion shapes understanding and
understanding arouses emotion.
Plato is leery of emotions, one of his complaints about poetry is that it arouses emotions,
and may even increase our tendency to be emotional. Plato states it would be better, were we to
bring our emotions under control. There is no doubt that Plato associates emotional response
with the potential power of the aesthetic act. During the course of his hypothetical construction
of the ideal state, the problem of emotional response to art appears throughout. The young are
unable to distinguish what is allegorical from what is not (Plato 59). Lamentations are for women
and cowardly men (Plato 68). And the guardians must not be lovers of laughter (Plato 69). All
these acts, so intimately connected to the body, suggest a fear of lack of control and loss of
power.
Art is capable of evoking strong emotional response, and disrupting calm and reasoned
thinking. Plato understands the power art has to disrupt, and because of this, he explains it must
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be constrained, trained, and restricted. Art can reveal the Idea, according to Plato, and teach good
moral character, it should be used to model good and beautiful character, and it needs rules. Plato
admires a moderate, educated passion for order and beauty, and believes art can serve man well
as an example of the Idea, when it relates to contemplation of beauty, and follows laws and rules,
rather than emotions (86). Plato recognizes the power of art to elicit emotional response and
decrees it must be excluded from the republic in order for society to function properly, and artists
are considered agitators of an otherwise peaceful, orderly existence.
Aristotle’s Poetics, can be read as response to Plato’s advice, to avoid the chaos of
emotion and perception. Poetics describes methods used by writers to provoke the power of
emotion through empathy, and the possibility of providing catharsis through metaphysical
solace. Poetics describes the elements needed in an aesthetic act, which can create empathy and
the pleasure of cognition. It is as though Aristotle is creating a guide book for future playwrights.
Aristotle explains that the “function of the poet is not to say what has happened, but to say the
kind of thing that would happen...and for this reason poetry is more philosophical and more
serious than history” (16). Art’s function is to provide connection, empathy, action, experience
and catharsis.
Aristotle’s view is that emotions are not irrational impulses, rather they are grounded in
our understanding, and understanding produces pleasure. Emotions are indicators from our body
that relate to our circumstances. He sees an intimate link between emotion and virtue (Aristotle
xxxviii). Aristotle describes how the playwright must facilitate empathy for the characters, who
should be relatable, not too virtuous, and certainly not pure evil. Aristotle writes that “character
is the kind of thing which discloses the nature of a choice” (12). Choices often lead to errors,
especially when made in ignorance or through misjudgment and may include moral errors of a
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kind which do not imply wickedness (Aristotle xxxiii). For Aristotle, art is where the viewer can
experience the intensities of existence, the results of ignorance and misjudgment, from the safe
distance of the audience. The viewer relates to the aesthetic work, whose subject matter is
ontological and vicariously experiences the highs and lows of being. According to Aristotle the
best tragedy is a complex work that provokes emotion (20). The empathetic experience results in
a purification of tragic emotions (Aristotle 10). This purification is catharsis, the pleasurable
relief of excess emotions (Aristotle xxxviii). Aristotle’s reference to healing and relief imply that
catharsis can put right something wrong within us, an excess of self-pity and fear. Tragedy
discharges the tendency to excess, relieving pressure (xxxix).
Where Plato calls for the control and subduing of emotions, Aristotle calls for their pent
up release. And while this is certainly a different take on the role of emotion, in both cases
emotional responses are thought to be provoked or manipulated, effectively emphasizing distrust
of emotion and perception. And yet Aristotle’s response to Plato’s mistrust of art, artists, and
emotions is a defense of art. Between Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Poetics is the issue of
body and soul, mind and matter. The texts represent opposite poles, of mind and body, thinking
and feeling, control and catharsis. From Plato’s text, we arrive at the aesthetic object of
contemplation, quiet reflection that recognizes universal form at the root of the particular. From
Aristotle’s text, the aesthetic experience, in which the particular sheds their individual
perception, to share in an experience of a universal, through empathy, that may result in
catharsis, an experience I would describe as closely related to the sublime.
Catharsis is a release or emotional discharge, of existential angst, experienced from the
safe distance of the aesthetic intervention. Existential angst results from the perception of being.
The sublime, as used in defining the immersive aesthetic experience, is also connected to
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existential angst. Sublime as defined in this research is an aesthetic experience that involves an
intense understanding of ontological signification, through an interplay of perception and reason.
The emphasis, in both cases, of catharsis or the sublime, has generally been on man’s ability to
return to reason after the brief and intense experience. The notion that emotion is an experience
of the body, while reason somehow floats above the body, detached, striving for independence is
evidenced in the philosophical problem of the relation between soul and body. On one side
theories are content to state the union of soul and body as an irreducible and inexplicable fact,
body as an instrument of the soul, and yet body and soul are consistently described as separate
entities, often in conflict (Matter and Memory xvi). The distinction of body and soul, or
perception and reason, is mirrored in the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime.
In the same way that mind and body are connected and contingent, so too are the
beautiful and the sublime. Reflection and experience are intimately connected, and yet
referenced as distinct categories, they mirror an evolving focus on the split between aesthetic
objects and aesthetic experiences, as seen in the writing of Plato and Aristotle. Plato’s notion of
beauty results in an object based aesthetics, grounded in rational, ordered form, through
symmetry, and harmony, whose techniques develop through mimesis, evolve into depictions of
perspective, and run into a wall with modernism’s self-referential examination of material and
technique. This is what object based aesthetics becomes, the beauty of form, style, quiet
reflection.
Aristotle’s technique engages empathy, through experience. When technique is used
properly, the aesthetic act is capable of resulting in an experience of catharsis, or, as I argue, the
sublime, which involves a shedding of identity that occurs in the face of chaos and the void of
Being. Aristotle’s aesthetic experience involves the relationship between the audience member
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and the performance. The aesthetic experience develops into a sharper awareness of this
relationship and the blurring of any boundary between them. There is a long and varied history
of artists concerned with the aesthetic experience. The immersive aesthetic experience is a
current iteration.
The chasm between the aesthetics of Plato and Aristotle is clearly seen in the study and
expression of the beautiful and the sublime. Plato’s discussion of ‘beauty itself’ eventually leads
to this distinction between object and experience, which ultimately reflects our current
overemphasis on reason or logos. Plato favors the beautiful, an ideal that activates quiet
contemplation and reasoning. According to Plato the power of man’s ability to reason is nature’s
paramount achievement. The sensing body is nothing compared to the reasoning mind. Plato
professes that when, “desires flow toward learning...the pleasures that the soul experiences just
by itself...will be indifferent to those that come through the body” (Plato 178). Plato emphasizes
conceptual thought over sensing and claims this as the more difficult task “those who are able to
approach the beautiful itself and see it by itself are rare” (169).
Conceptual thinking, abstraction, is a skill that requires practice and a good mind. Plato
prescribes a difference between ‘beautiful things’ and ‘beauty itself’, beauty itself is an
abstraction, an essential form, a moral trait. It is a notion of ought, of how one should act in the
world. Beautiful things are simply pleasurable, delightful, and inconsequential. The beautiful is
connected to contemplative looking, the objective, the other, a thing’s formal attributes, structure
and symmetry. Plato’s discussion of beauty itself supports a grand narrative of the noble
intellect. For Plato understanding and judging are higher order levels of thinking than
imagination.
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It is in Aristotle’s Poetics that the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime
becomes apparent. In it he affirms the power Greek Tragedy can have over an audience,
provoking empathy and catharsis. Aristotle’s aesthetics connects the emotional response of the
body to virtue. He describes an aesthetic experience that provokes a brief, yet profound empathy
and explains how this aesthetic experience of pity and fear, allows for the “the purification of
such emotions” (Aristotle 10). Catharsis is a result of feeling connected to the tragic lead, whose
traumas are emblematic of the nature of being. The sublime involves an overwhelming intuition
concerning the nature of being. Catharsis, as previously stated, has much in common with the
experience of the sublime, important because both depend on an aesthetic mode of reflection that
involves perception and reason, both involve an intensified experience of being, and both are
experiences in which internal, superficial concerns of identity are shed.
The production of a tragic play, with its component parts of music and spectacle,
provides an excess of sensation and signification which is extremely pleasurable. Aristotle
specifies that when these works are presented as multi-sensory, vivid, and concentrated, they can
be a source of intense pleasure (47). Intensity, appealing to multiple senses, and the ability to
astonish or shock, are characteristics of the kind of productions that may provide catharsis, as
well as of immersive aesthetic experiences that may evoke the sublime. In addition to intensity,
sensory appeal and astonishment, interpretation of ambiguous ontological signs is necessary to
evoke the sublime.
Aristotle describes the beautiful object as composed of parts in proper order, and
possessing a certain magnitude, “beauty consists in magnitude as well as order. For this reason,
no organism could be beautiful if it is excessively small…or excessively large” (14). In the
development of my definition of the sublime, I argue that Aristotle’s beautiful object that can be
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fully comprehended, suggests a sublime that is excessive and gives pleasure through
astonishment, a sublime that is about the irrational, feelings, and emotions. Etymologically the
sublime can be traced to the Latin sublimis, as elevated or lofty, beyond a threshold, a boundary
or limit. In the Middle Ages sublimis was a word commonly used by alchemists to refer to
‘sublimation’, a mystical alchemical connotation, in which purification also entailed
transmutation to higher states of spiritual existence (Morley 14). Aristotle explains that the
irrational is the most important source of astonishment (41). Beautiful objects make sense, they
are to be understood rationally, the sublime is an irrational astonishment.
The sublime is an intense experience of aesthetic understanding involving awareness of
being. According to Aristotle the exercise of any capacity is in itself pleasurable, both the
beautiful and the sublime produce a kind of pleasure in understanding. On one hand, there is a
passive contemplation that occurs when faced with the beautiful, on the other a sense of
involvement and even of physical reaction when one encounters the sublime. The beautiful is
generally revealed through the art object and the sublime evoked as experience.

Experience, The Body, Perception, and Understanding
Even though the aesthetic concept of the sublime is a recognition of the importance and
power inherent in the experience of the body, reason remains generally overemphasized.
Conceptual thought neglects its relationship to immediate being and is therefore unable to
account for contextual contingencies. Understanding requires perception and sensation is
necessarily local, this is why according to Aristotle, the body experiences pleasure associated
with understanding. Understanding involves the body, doing, sensing and perceiving.
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Understanding is pleasurable and the aesthetic mode of understanding, which involves
disinterestedness, is extremely pleasurable.
The sublime may act as enticement, but what is of consequence is consideration of the
body and perceptions' role in understanding. Bergson considers the problem of attempting to
distinguish mind from body. Perception of the universe, he explains, depends upon the mind, and
a mind content in the particular-ness of things is isolated from the rest of the universe (Matter
and Memory 12). Notions of absolute truth and pure sensation are in a state of opposition.
According to Bergson, aesthetic sensing occupies a border position between the idea that an
ultimate eternal truth exists, and becoming so lost in relativism that no meaning can exist at all.
Understanding happens through the body. To perceive, means above all, to know.
Understanding, according to Bergson, involves the threefold problem of matter, consciousness,
and their relation (Matter and Memory 20). Being is contextual.
The brain is an instrument of analysis and selection. It analyzes received sensations and
selects producible sensations. The mind’s function is to receive stimulation, to provide motor
apparatus, and to present the largest possible number of reactions to a given stimulus (Matter and
Memory 23). The mind is an instrument of analysis and selection, the body an instrument of
doing. The Greek word têkhne is generally translated as craft, skill or art, it involves action,
doing. Aristotle’s definition of têkhne is also active, he describes “a productive capacity
informed by an understanding”, têkhne develops out of a concern for producing necessities of
existence, evolves into a concept that includes recreational arts, and eventually refers to activities
which satisfy the desire to know (ix). This is a knowing that involves doing.
According to Aristotle, poems can be a têkhne and poets must be skilled in eliciting
empathy, they must be able to project themselves into the emotions of others (x). Têkhne in the
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hands of poets becomes the desire to know the emotions of others. This is an aesthetic
experience, a communication between the poet and the audience, an experience of connection.
Aristotle’s descriptions involve action, doing, and being, rather than thinking, “tragedy is not an
imitation of persons, but actions and of life. Well-being and ill-being reside in action, and the
goal of life is an activity, not a quality” (Aristotle 11). Sensing the emotion of others is a
knowing that happens through the body.
Schopenhauer connects knowledge and knowing, directly to the body, describing a
reciprocal relation between knowledge, the body, and the will. Every act of the will is a
movement of the body, will and body “do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; but they
are one and the same” (Schopenhauer 32). The drive of “the will is knowledge a priori of the
body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will” (Schopenhauer 33). Schopenhauer
further claims that the Idea is to be understood only through a perceptive knowledge, a kind of
intuition or sensing, rather than rational or abstract knowledge (113). Sense, sensing and intuition
are important threads in the tapestry of being, addressed by thinkers such as Husserl, MerleauPonty, and Nancy. Husserl’s hyletic sensing involves a type of intuition aroused by sensations
that constitute the basis of our awareness of sensuous exteriority. Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment
also emphasizes an essentially involuntary response to the body’s aesthetic sensing. And
according to Nancy, there is a dire need to re-engage sensing in contemporary processes of
understanding. Sensing counters the exteriority of logic and reason, and yet demands analysis of
how understanding develops through a continuous process of sense data interpretation of the
immediate environment. All this can help us better understand the implications of Bergson’s
Position. As a matter of fact, in addition to doing and sensing, Bergson explores the important
role memory plays in understanding.
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Bergson shows that memory is the foundation for identity and subjectivity, which impact
perception, and thus understanding. Memory creates identity, and both narrow the perceptual
horizon, emphasizing a subject-object relationship, wherein the subject perceives objects as
circumscribed in space, according to the ease with which the body can touch and move them. As
the perceptual horizon widens, objects which surround the subject seem more uniform and
become more indifferent (Matter and Memory 111). Bergson distinguishes between realist and
idealist perspectives in the development of perception. A realist perspective, he explains, situates
the origin of a perception at the center of an aggregate of images governed by mutual relations,
fixed laws, causes and effects. All perceptions are interpreted in a constant relation of cause and
effect (Matter and Memory 17). The idealist interprets all perceptions in relation to a specific
identity anchored in time and space. In the idealist perspective, perceptions depend on a single
image, around which all others arrange themselves on different planes, transformed by the
slightest modification of the central image (Matter and Memory 17). However, in both
perspectives, perceptions are determined by subjective identity, influenced by memory.
Bergson explains that perception itself, should be understood as a vision of matter both
immediate and instantaneous, free from every form of memory, and obtained by being absorbed
in the present. Pure perception should not be considered the same thing as concrete and complex
perceptions enlarged by memory (Matter and Memory 26). Bergson’s theory of pure perception
is in dialogue with the concept of the sublime, a brief and intense experience, so absorbed in the
present, that for a moment subjective identity is shed. After which, complex perceptions develop
through reflection and recall.
Understanding through perceptions of the body, informed by memory and lived
experience, demonstrates the connection between interior and exterior aspects of being. Thought
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and action, thinking and doing, being. Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment and Heidegger’s presencing
and Nietzsche’s performative philosophy, each explore the connection of the interior with the
exterior. These ideas emphasize an awareness of experience. However, the contemporary crisis
of imbalanced emphasis on reason cannot be addressed aesthetically by simply shifting that
emphasis entirely on experience, or sensation.
What is needed is a more balanced approach that values sense and reason. There must be
cause to pause, to linger in a state of awareness and reflection. The immersive aesthetic
experience creates opportunities to linger, engaging sense and reason. The works’ effectiveness
in providing training in contextual embodied modes of thought, depends equally on sensory
experience, and the active interpretation of ontological signs. When this moment of aesthetic
understanding involves pure perception of ontological signs, there is potential to encounter the
sublime. In these works of art, sensory data and signification are experienced immediately and
appear connected, related. These works re-engage the role of sensory experience in the
interpretation of being. The sublime acts as a seduction, an enticement to engage with an
awareness of being present and acting in relation to that awareness.
The increasing popularity of work designated ‘immersive experience’ that has no
aesthetic engagement with philosophical concepts, obscures the real potential of an immersive
aesthetic experience. There is a public hungry for immersive experiences, lining up to engage
with everything sense related, from virtual and augmented reality media to auto sensory meridian
response recordings, or ASMR. However, these perceptions bending entertainments are not
intended to engage the participant in reflective thought. The immersive aesthetic experience is
the location of a middle ground between the absolute rule of logic and the chaos of mythic
creation. These are works that operate differently than the traditional art object, occurring at a
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specific place, within time and space, immersing the viewer in an excess of sensation and
signification, which engage an embodied contextual interpretation that is always singularly
correct. The experience of understanding, connected to excess sensation and signification is
capable of evoking strong emotional response. The sublime is that strong emotional response
often associated with pleasure or disgust, which can emphasize an awareness of being and the
present moment that is distinct from the quiet contemplation of the aesthetic object.

Aesthetic Understanding: The Interplay of Sense and Reason
In distinguishing the immersive aesthetic experience from other immersive experiences
the word aesthetics points to the role of art within the discussion of perception and
understanding. Art involves a special kind of understanding, one that utilizes both sense and
reason. The immersive aesthetic experience is grounded in this type of understanding. According
to Schiller, an aesthetic education is a necessary component of a meaningful existence.
Reflecting on art is one of few events that does not engage the will. This will-less-ness or
disinterestedness involves loosening the grip of subjective identity. Art has the power to disrupt,
to cause one to linger and occasionally to elicit a strong emotional response. Even though Kant
and Schiller conceive of a twofold conception of man, as sensuousness and reason, as having two
distinct modes of understanding, both agree that art is a realm where balance between these two
modes can be achieved.
In the age of reason, man is described as occupying a particular condition under
limitations, he understands through sense or reason. Schiller ascribes to perception, man’s
sensuous powers, and to reason, his spiritual powers, explaining man can only fall short of
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perfection in either, through a lack of harmony or through lack of energy. According to Schiller
it is Beauty that affords a balance between perception and reason:
Both of these opposite limits are, as I shall now shew, removed by means of
Beauty, which restores harmony in the tense man and energy in the languid man,
and in this way, in accordance with its nature, brings back the condition of
limitation to an absolute one and makes of Man a whole, complete in himself.
(Schiller 86)
He offers the example of classical Greek art, created, Schiller explains, in a period before the
split between reason and perception occurs. He describes classical Greek art as “combining
fullness of form with fullness of content, at once philosophic and creative” (Schiller 38).
According to Schiller, this aesthetic balance was possible for the ancient Greeks because the
senses and the mind were not yet considered strictly separate entities. He contrasts this to the
mind of his modern man, which already distinguishes these faculties (Schiller 38).
Schiller addresses the aesthetic concern for balance between sense and reason, while
further encouraging their distinction. He explains that man, in his ultimate tendency, is a
sensuous being, however “nature should not rule him exclusively, nor reason conditionally. Both
systems of law should subsist in complete independence, yet in complete accord with one
another” (Schiller 119). Perception and reason are considered two distinct operations that must
be trained to work together, through an aesthetic education. Without this training, an imbalance
occurs. Reliance upon reason alone requires one “to seize the fleeting appearance” within the
fetters of rule, and to “dissect its fair body into abstract notions, and preserve its living spirit in a
sorry skeleton of words” (Schiller 24). Reason is static, requires category and definition, it is
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unable to accommodate nuance. This thinking, Schiller explains, is counter to natural feeling and
makes truth appear as paradox (24). The flow and movement of becoming do not stop at being.
However, the distinction of reason is still the ultimate goal for Schiller, who wants man
to pass from the merely physical condition, through the aesthetic condition, and subsequently
achieve the moral or rational condition (12). According to Schiller, man in his physical condition
is subject to the power of nature alone; he shakes off this power in the aesthetic, and he controls
it in the rational condition. Without passing through the aesthetic condition man is “eternally
uniform in his aims, eternally shifting in his judgments, self-seeking without being himself,
unfettered without being free, and slave though serving no rule” (Schiller 113) The feeling of
universal agreement associated with reflection of beauty is a sensing of singularity. The
experience and understanding of the aesthetic condition, enables man to distinguish the particular
in the totality of the sensuous impression, as well as the ability to see the totality that arises from
all its parts (Schiller 89).
Sense and reason are fundamental impulses, and focusing on only reason or sense to the
exclusion of the other requires constraint and force. Schiller explains that freedom consists solely
in the cooperation of both, man’s nature when he is under the constraint of sensations, and his
mind when he is under the force of ideas (86). According to Schiller the aesthetic condition of
beauty provides this cooperation or balance. In contemplation of the beautiful, the “sensuous”
man, one-sidedly swayed by feelings, imbalanced toward sense, and neglecting reason, is righted
and set free by form and thought. The “spiritual” man, one-sidedly swayed by laws, abstraction
and logic, imbalanced toward reason, is relaxed and set free by matter, restored to the world of
sense. Beauty appeals to sense and reason (Schiller 87). Beauty reveals singularity, Schiller says
it transports us into an intermediate condition, between reason and perception, between the
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particular and the universal (88). According to Schiller, the demand of beauty is not the
exclusion of certain realities but in the absolute inclusion of them all, not restriction but infinity
(90). For Schiller contemplation of the beautiful involves the sensing of a universal.
The pleasure of beauty stems from the loss of distinction between reflection and feeling.
Beauty is form because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time, life, because we feel it
(Schiller 122). Schiller believes man occupies two worlds, driven in opposite directions, “toward
the empirical, contingent, and the subjective; and toward the free, the necessary, the objectively
valid” (122). Schiller explains that the aesthetic condition satisfies and brings these two drives
into harmony, uniting matter and form, sensuousness and reason. And it is not, as Schiller
explains, “until he has achieved that harmony he is free; he is a slave so long as he obeys only
one of the impulses” (13). Harmony of these impulses is the play of imagination. Schiller
describes this play as impulse that requires the reciprocal operation of perception and reason.
According to Schiller, the aesthetic creative impulse can only develop, once the play
impulse is in easy and habitual action. Schiller explains that contemplation is man’s first free
relation to the universe which surrounds him. In the contemplation of beauty, drives, desire,
identity are abandoned, an instantaneous calm ensues, time stands still, and “the dispersed rays
of consciousness are gathered together, and form an image of the infinite, reflected upon the
transient foundation” (Schiller 120). Aesthetic contemplation allows for brief shedding of
subjectivity, while delight in appearance, and a disposition towards ornament, indicates the play
impulse in action (Schiller 125). As the play impulse becomes active, and finds pleasure in
appearance, imagination follows.
Importantly, Schiller notes the development of the “aesthetic artistic impulse depends on
the degree of fondness with which man is capable of lingering at mere appearance” (127).
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Schiller says that those who seek only the ‘real’ and are insensible to mere appearance, share a
certain affinity which is either extreme stupidity or extreme intelligence. The contemporary
overemphasis on the value of reason and logic makes experiencing the loss distinction between
reflection and feeling, once associated with contemplation of the beautiful, less powerful, less
disruptive and less likely to occur, thus no longer fulfilling the role of enticement to linger.
The fondness for lingering in thought and sensation, associated with the enjoyment of art,
is a key component of the immersive aesthetic experience. And while the contemporary art lover
may enjoy the simple pleasure of contemplating the beautiful, there currently is a search for, if
not an expectation of, an intensification of one’s conceptual and emotional capacity. The
experience of an ambivalent enjoyment, intense and associated with ontological dislocation, no
longer particular, nor yet universal, but for a moment, singular. According to Schopenhauer,
lingering and the experience of art are connected. Art “pauses at this particular thing; it stops the
wheel of time, for art the relations vanish; only the essential, the Idea, is its object”, the
contemplator of art experiences disinterested delight (Schopenhauer 108). The will-lessness and
disinterest involved in the experience of art is essential to aesthetic understanding. Unlike
scientific understanding, aesthetic understanding happens outside and independent of the
principle of sufficient reason, it is free from the constraints of cause and effect.
Schopenhauer’s ‘Idea’, is perceived and communicated by those who possess artistic
genius. The Idea is not reliant on reason, on apparent causes directly connected to specific
effects. One senses the Idea. It involves neither plurality nor change, the Idea is eternal and like
aesthetic understanding, independent of the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer 97).
Schopenhauer explains that artistic genius involves a special kind of understanding. Artistic
genius requires imagination, in order to see in things “not what Nature has actually fashioned,
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but what she tried to fashion...the imagination then extends, both in quality and quantity, the
intellectual horizon of the man of genius” (Schopenhauer 110). Allowing a vision of what could
be, what may be.
Schopenhauer describes artistic genius as a mode of understanding, free from the
limitations of reason and the will. I argue that this mode of thinking can be developed through
intentional practice. According to Schopenhauer, the nature of genius consists in a preeminent
capacity for a contemplation that requires self-oblivion, genius is complete objectivity, as
opposed to subjectivity, which is directed toward one’s self, to the will. He argues that genius is
a capacity to maintain oneself in the state of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception, and
for a time to be a pure knowing subject (109). Further, the artist is able to then communicate the
Idea once grasped.
What Schopenhauer and others have described as artistic genius is in fact a kind of
understanding that has the potential to develop its strength. Artistic genius is ultimately
confidence in one’s ability to interpret and react to the perceptual world, logically and
reasonably. Schopenhauer and others describe artistic genius as something you have or do not. A
temperament. No doubt natural aptitude plays a role, but this mode of thinking, like all biological
functions related to being, is inherent in beings.
As far as Schopenhauer is concerned, the ordinary person is not capable of considering
things “in a way that is in every sense wholly disinterested” (111). The ordinary person is driven
by will, and turns attention to things only insofar as they relate to the will. Schopenhauer notes
that “ordinary man does not linger over the mirror of perception, does not fix his attention long
on one object” (111). Reason and logic assist in satisfying need and necessity as rapidly as
possible, become habitual and devalue lingering.
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Schopenhauer describes artistic genius as a mode of thinking that balances sensing and
logic. The artistic genius is extremely sensitive to their perceptions, able to distill these
perceptions, and able to communicate the Idea. This balanced understanding relates to an Idea
that is ontological, and understanding through a balance of sensing and logic is a better way of
understanding ontological issues. Both Schiller and Schopenhauer describe two distinct modes of
understanding that reference perception and thinking, or sense and reason. Schiller describes
these modes as drives or inclinations and calls them the sensual and the spiritual, for
Schopenhauer, the forces are the will and the Idea.
Both see an imbalance between these modes of understanding, and believe that the
intervention of art is a positive one. Aesthetic understanding, according to Schiller, brings
balance between the sensuous and the spiritual, and is a necessary passage into the spiritual
mode. For Schopenhauer, aesthetic understanding involves the Idea and a state of will-lessness.
Both describe these modes of understanding as difficult, if not impossible to control.
Understanding happens one way or the other, through sense or through reason. Those who are
able to grasp the Idea, as well as express it, are endowed with natural artistic genius. However, I
assert this ability, the exercise of this faculty, is not simply a trait that one is, or is not born with.
This approach to understanding exists as a potential, to be developed with intention, and practice
in all.
For too long perception has been discounted as unreliable, even though this is the primary
way that beings engage with the world. This research examines works that I designate as
immersive aesthetic experiences. These works exemplify an aesthetic approach to providing
experiences that combine intense sensory perception and ontological signification. The
interpretation of which, results in the pleasure of understanding, that has the potential to be
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sublime. These are experiences free of personal concerns related to identity, that offer the
opportunity to practice the aesthetic mode of understanding, which relies on sense and reason at
play. The aesthetic task is to engage the audience in ontological reflection. The immersive
aesthetic experience encourages lingering, reflecting upon the individual’s ephemeral,
infinitesimal place, within the constantly changing immensity of the universe, from the safety of
a conceptual distance. This momentary recognition of the continuous state of flux, and one’s
place within it, is overwhelming, terrifying, and yet oddly reassuring.
The immersive aesthetic experience not only overwhelms in a multi-sensory way, it
simultaneously engages its audience in ontological reflection. This means that in theory, and in
practice, the transformative work of art must originate as an ambiguous communication from the
artist, leaving space for the viewer to engage with questioning and interpretation. The artist must
have something significant to say about being. However, the interpretation of this message
cannot be controlled, it is presented and takes on a life of its own. An immersive aesthetic
experience should be a marriage of content and form that disrupts and provokes thought. Art can
overwhelm, it can disrupt thinking patterns, create discontinuity, and act as a way of training us
to think in a multi-sensory contextual way. The immersive aesthetic experience provides
practice, for the viewer, who becomes the participant, thinking and seeing in an embodied way.
Immediate sensory information, perception and sensing, need to be attended to with as
much urgency as reason and logic. The immersive aesthetic experience addresses this by shifting
emphasis toward a praxis of embodied contextual interpretation. Overemphasis on reason and
logic has resulted in the neglect of immediate concerns of the body. In Introductory Lectures on
Aesthetics, Hegel posits art as the middle term “between pure thought and what is external,
sensuous and transitory”, art acts as a bridge between conceptual thought and sensing (10). Hegel
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goes on to explain that art presents itself to sense, feeling, perception, and imagination. He says
that art is outside the sphere of scientific thought, it eludes the laws of reason, and in both the
creation and contemplation of it, we “appear to escape wholly from the fetters of rule and
regularity” (Hegel 7). Art is the realm where balance between sense and reason may be regained.
According to Hegel, the task of art is in the same sphere as religion and philosophy, it is a
mode of revealing to consciousness, and bringing to utterance, the Divine Nature (9). Its task is
ontological. Aesthetic understanding involves the free play of sense and reason, when this
aesthetic experience of understanding is intense and ontological it is sublime. The sublime is an
aesthetic experience, a recognition of the boundless nature of the universe; simultaneously
forgetting oneself, while recognizing an unavoidable connection to the infinite.

The Sublime as Aesthetic Experience of Ontological Understanding
This chapter began with an orientation of the concept of the sublime, evolved into a
discussion about the body and perception’s role in understanding, zeroed in on how aesthetic
understanding relies on sense and reason equally, and now shifts focus to the ontological task of
aesthetics, as it relates to provoking the sublime. My method here, is not the exposition of
specific theories, rather I intend to intertextualize the ways in which these various theories speak
to one another. The sublime is a concept that runs counter to the purely conceptual nature of
logic and reason, and can act as a distinguishing factor for immersive aesthetic experiences. The
sublime is ontological, it involves the interplay of sense and reason. It is an experience in which
the operating principle of the universe is intuited as one in which all things are part of a continual
cycle of life and death. As an aesthetic experience, the sublime involves an intense interplay of
perception and reason, perceiving sensory stimuli and interpreting ontological signification. In
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this section, the sublime is shown to be an aesthetic experience that involves ontological
understanding.
I remind the reader that an aesthetic experience involves the interplay of reason and
perception in order to engage a particular type of understanding, as discussed in section three,
Aesthetic Understanding: The Interplay of Sense and Reason. An experience of the sublime
involves aesthetic understanding of an ontological nature. The sublime is ontological in nature
because it is intimately connected to the power and immensity of the universe, to human frailty
and the shedding of identity.
In his Critique of Judgement, Kant explains that the sublime is not the object, but an
experience, not “a delight in the object, for the latter may be formless, but, in contradistinction to
what is the case with the beautiful...a delight in an extension affecting the imagination by itself”
(Kant 80). The delight, according to Kant, is in an experience of aesthetic understanding. The
sublime has been used to exalt reason, however, the mere fact of the sublime emphasizes the
importance of the interplay of perception and reason. The sublime refers to an experience, to an
exceptional state of being. The immersive aesthetic experience is a work of art capable of
overwhelming its audience with both sensory stimuli and ontological signification, setting the
groundwork for this exceptional state.
On the Sublime, the first known study of the sublime, attributed to a 1st century AD
author referred to as Longinus, is a text that describes the sublime as an effect capable of being
produced by literature. Longinus characterizes the sublime as a strong emotional response to
intense experiences which lay beyond conscious control and threaten individual autonomy
(Morely 15). Leading up to and during the Enlightenment there is a renewed interest in the
sublime. This sublime is most often associated with Kant. Kant’s sublime involves a mixed
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feeling of pleasure and pain felt in the presence of something of immense magnitude, an
experience where senses and imagination fail. Reason is said to surpass sense with a recognition
that we are nonetheless capable of conceiving infinity. Kant appropriates the sublime as evidence
of the preeminence of reason. Kant’s view of the sublime is about the failure of imagination and
an assertion of the power of reason to confer a sense of security and control.
Sublime in the age of enlightenment is related to ideas that enable man to recognize the
importance of his faculties. The sublime came to represent that which cannot be commanded or
controlled, perceived as being grounded in an awareness of lack. Consequently, this awareness
suggests an inaccessible form of excess and a recognition of limitations. Enlightenment thinking
connects the sublime to formlessness, but prefers the beautiful, which it connects with form.
Form, structure, and symmetry are linked, and their emphasis demonstrates man’s ability to
create perfectly harmonized compositions. The overemphasis on reason has influenced an
overemphasis on the art object, in part, because the object may stand as evidence of man’s ability
to utilize reason. The sublime, however, is an experience, connected to strong emotion and
sensing, both of which are thought to be too easily manipulated.
Longinus says that “sublimity and the expression of strong emotion are, therefore, a
wonderfully helpful antidote against the suspicion that attends the use of figures. The cunning
artifice remains out of sight, surrounded by the brilliance of beauty and sublimity, and all
suspicion is put to flight” (Longinus 138). Longinus instructs writers on how to achieve aesthetic
effects likely to provoke the sublime. Kant says that there is nothing else quite like the sublime,
“It is a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence it comes that the sublime is not to be looked
for in the things of nature, but only in our own ideas” (Kant 80). The sublime is not a thing, it is
an experience of ambiguous interpretation, shocked and unsure.
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Enlightenment thinking describes aesthetic manipulation of emotion, as suspicious and
cunning. The prevailing view is that perception and emotion cannot be trusted, they are too
easily swayed by subjectivity. Edmund Burke (1729-97) shifts the emphasis in discussions of the
sublime, toward aspects of nature that are likely to fill us with a degree of horror (Morely 15).
Burke emphasizes what he considers the strongest emotions, terror and pain, and in doing so
affirms the ontological nature of the sublime. According to Burke, “the passions which belong to
self-preservation turn on pain and danger...they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and
danger, without being actually in such circumstances...whatever excites this delight, I call the
sublime” (Burke 30). Like the experience of Aristotle’s tragedy, Burke describes the safety of the
conceptual distance. Whatever excites ideas of pain and danger, whatever is terrible, or
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime for Burke. These are ideas that are inescapably tied
to being alive, through their promise of death.
Like empathy and metaphysical solace, the sublime is an aesthetic experience of an
existential reality at the safety of a conceptual distance. But for the enlightenment thinkers it is
not this brief awareness that matters, it is the power of the reasoning mind that is capable of
contemplating. According to Burke “when without danger we are conversant with terrible
objects; the mind always claiming to itself some part of the dignity and importance of the things
which it contemplates” (30). The aesthetic contemplation of the sublime is brief and intense, but,
the mind that has contemplated it, is stronger. Even in the descriptions of the power of the
sublime, enlightenment thinking consistently works to elevate logic and reason, while deemphasizing imagination and perception.
The emphasis on reason and logic as preeminent, and the view that aesthetic
understanding and artistic genius are intractable, can be countered within these same texts.
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Longinus’s text, like Aristotle’s, is an instruction manual for writers, and both offer methods to
be utilized in works that aim to provoke aesthetic understanding. Longinus suggests that the
common refrain, genius, “is innate; it is not something that can be learnt” is wrong, that in fact
he makes “a case for the opposite point of view” (115). Artistic genius can be achieved with
practice and awareness, according to Longinus. In order for practice and awareness associated
with understanding, to be effective, the reflecting subject must first comprehend that all
knowledge is subjective.
Schopenhauer explains that “in origin and by its nature, knowledge is subject to the
will...it is only objectified will” (100). The will, as the driving force of the living body, affects all
understanding. According to Schopenhauer, “the individual finds his body as an object among
objects, to all of which it is related and connected according to the principle of sufficient reason
… all investigations of these relations and connections lead back...to his body, and consequently
to his will” (100). The body is essential to understanding, and especially so, to the intense
aesthetic understanding of the sublime. According to Longinus, “the true sublime uplifts our
souls; we are filled with proud exaltation and we sense vaunting joy” (120). This is because the
ontological nature of the sublime acts as a powerful reminder of the experience of living. If the
sublime is ontological it is related to all things having to do with being, including coming into
being, leaving being, and the void, the acknowledgement of those things and the simultaneous
letting go of their seeming importance. The sublime is about the power and immensity of the
universe, about frailty and the shedding of identity, it is about the joy of being, the disillusion or
disgust associated with death, and the utter terror of the void.
Kant initially describes the sublime as having to do with magnitude. He explains that in
order to express size, there must be comparison, thus affirming the subject-object relation:
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Now, since in the judging of magnitude we have to take into account not merely
the multiplicity (number of units) but also the magnitude of the unit (the
measure), and since the magnitude of this unit in turn always requires something
else as its measure and as the standard of its comparison, and so on, we see that
the computation of the magnitude of phenomena is, in all cases utterly incapable
of affording us any absolute concept of a magnitude, and can, instead, only afford
one that is based on comparison. (Kant 79)
In order to judge an objects’ magnitude there must be additional objects to compare. Kant calls
the magnitude associated with an experience of the sublime, absolute. It is a magnitude, he
explains, that cannot be understood either solely in terms of an understanding through sense, nor
by reason, alone (Kant 81). Kant describes the conflict between sense and reason as a “striving in
our imagination towards progress ad infinitum, while reason demands absolute totality” (Kant
81). Their conflict is at the root of an inability to estimate the magnitude of being, in an
experience of the sublime, the “feeling of a supersensible faculty” awakens. Kant says this is
“the attunement of the spirit evoked by a particular representation” and aesthetic experience,
“and not the object, that is to be called sublime” (81). Kant uses this reflective judgment as
evidence in his argument for the power of the reasoning mind. The fact that the sublime may be
intuited at all demonstrates the powers of the mind. But what is intuited, is set aside in favor of
focusing on the capacity of reason. What is intuited is, the frailty of man in the face of the power
of the universe and the endless cycle of life and death.
This intuition regarding man’s frailty and the power and cyclical nature of the universe, is
not an uncommon subject of philosophy. First century Roman philosopher poet Lucretius, writes
of a universe in a constant state of flux. He describes the universe at an atomic level, energy in
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constant flow, everything composed of particles, which continuously transform. Lucretius
declares, “time, like matter and void, is infinite; the universe, in all its aspects and ramifications,
has always existed, there was no beginning and there will be no end” (xi). Lucretius’ particles
transform constantly and dramatically throughout the universe, beyond the control of any
individual. The individual, simply an ephemeral coalescence of a particular combination of
atoms. According to Lucretius the totality of atoms is eternal, because new atoms do not come
into existence, nor do atoms cease to exist, in order for anything new to exist, something else
must first be destroyed. The sublime may be regarded as a momentary recognition of the
implications of this continuous state of transformation.
For Lucretius, the universe itself, has no limitations of time or space, and is never
diminished or destroyed, but is subject to constant change. Lucretius states that “the death of one
thing becomes necessary for the birth of another” (xvii). Life and death become two parts of a
whole, being and the void. The void, or death is not locked away “but gapes and stares, wide
open, monstrous, vast” (Lucretius 121).
When Nietzsche describes the intoxication of suffering and the beautiful dream,
conveyed through Greek tragedy, as a recognition of “the fearful drive to exist and at the same
time the perpetual death of everything that comes into existence” he is describing this knowledge
as an uncanny intuition (126). An experience of the sublime should be understood as that brief
awakening, or intense awareness of being and the void. A Nietzschean response to the sublime is
an acknowledgement of transformation as the characteristic force generating existence, that
being and the void are in a constant state of exchange, an ontological acknowledgement. The
sublime is an experience of aesthetic understanding that simultaneously engages perception and
reason, in dialogue with being and the void.

65
Much later, when Lyotard’s “spontaneous analogical field of the perceiving body”
encounters the void, that which cannot be grasped analytically, causes a fear of being
overwhelmed or annihilated, of becoming part of the continuous flow of transformation (23).
Like Lucretius, Lyotard describes matter as an arrangement of energy, in a constant cycle of
creation and destruction (9). And like Nietzsche, Lyotard associates the void with oblivion and
forgetting. The human body as matter is temporal, Lyotard explains, “matter considered as
‘mass’ is infinitely divisible, and the unity it can produce is only phenomenal” (40). This
phenomenal, ephemeral, nature relates being to the void. According to Lyotard, “thought is
inseparable from the phenomenological body” (23). Sensing and thinking are as one, and share in
a nature that is phenomenal and ephemeral.
Lyotard’s conception of the sublime is connected to works of art that attempt to elicit that
which cannot be shown or presented, a conception of the inconceivable (89). That which cannot
be presented is the relation between being and the void, the understanding of which, is lost to the
oblivion of the void. Being only understands void once it is in it, but then it too is void.
According to Lyotard, that awareness emphasizes the present, the ‘now’, which “dismantles
consciousness, what deposes consciousness, it is what consciousness cannot formulate, and even
what consciousness forgets in order to constitute itself” (90). The now cannot be shown or
presented, is not suited to representation.
The now is present in the unfolding of the moment, the now is unable to determine the
past or anticipate the future. When the now intersects with a conception of the inconceivable, one
encounters the sublime. Lyotard describes the experience of the sublime as a questioning. The
question ‘Is it happening?’ senses transformation all around, and in this sensing, the possibility
of nothing happening is associated with a feeling of anxiety. According to Lyotard, anxiety is a
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term that has “strong connotations in modern philosophies of existence and of the unconscious”
(92). The anxiety associated with the possibility of nothing happening, is an awareness of
nothing happens, as an equivalence of death. Lyotard says the sublime is kindled by the threat of
nothing further happening, by the terrifying anticipation that the ‘It happens’ will not happen, or
will stop happening (99). The impermanence of being is confronted in an experience of the
sublime.
According to Schopenhauer, the sublime is about recognizing and rising above whatever
is hostile to the will, whatever threatens being, and is only “possible with pure will-less knowing,
and the knowledge… of Ideas” (126). Personal concerns must be released, or momentarily
forgotten, in order to comprehend the interminable process of life. For Schopenhauer, knowledge
of the Idea can only be attained through disinterest, not as a particular individual, with concerns
and desires, but as the perfectly will-less knowing subject. He sees strength in the ability to
release the grip of willing and to understand through will-lessness.
Burke’s sublime is even more explicitly existential. Burke states that “whatever is fitted
in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger...is conversant about terrible objects, or operates
in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime” (22). Accordingly, Burke associates
the sublime with “the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling” (22). For Burke,
the fear of death, the reference to pain, and danger to the body, of dying, relate to an
overwhelming sublime recognition of the frailty of being, but overcoming it through the superior
faculty of the reasoning man.
The emphasis, for Burke, in the sublime, rests in the recovery of reason following the
experience. The fact that reason prevails is the important aspect. Both Burke and Schopenhauer
favor quiet contemplation of the beautiful, to the intensity associated with an experience of the
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sublime. The sublime as an intense experience that disrupts the will. The notion of will-lessness,
or a shedding of identity, that relates to an experience of the sublime, can be traced back to
Aristotle. Aristotle’s empathy, as an experience of the other, involves a loosening of personal
identity in that moment of connection to the characters of Greek Tragedy. This empathetic
connection allows the audience to experience intense existential emotions from the safety of a
conceptual distance.
The disinterestedness of the aesthetic mode of understanding is ontological in that it also
involves freedom from the grip of identity. The moment of reflection, and interplay of sense and
reason, occupies the entirety of one’s attention. These experiences of a will-less, shedding of
identity are said to lead to an understanding that is extremely pleasurable. The experience of
understanding in general, is said to be pleasurable. Aristotle roots the visual arts in the human
desire for knowledge, explaining that the act of recognition involves an exercise of our capacity
for cognition; and that the exercise of any capacity is pleasurable (xii). He explains that
understanding is pleasant, that people delight in seeing images because, as they view them they
come to understand what they are looking at (Aristotle 7). This is a pleasure aroused by the free
play of perception and reason.
Aristotle explains that astonishment over the tragic production also gives pleasure (41).
This pleasure is a reaction whose arousal can be intensified by spectacle, especially so, when the
production is concentrated, brief and intense. If the production is drawn out, is too long, or too
watered down, it is less pleasurable (Aristotle 47). At its best it is brief, intense, and saturated
with sensory stimuli. The intense pleasure of the sublime, a mode of aesthetic understanding, is
not only ontological in its association with an experience of empathy, or the shedding of identity,
but also in its association with the void.
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Nietzsche writes of the void and chaos, that both are part of the Dionysian. The
Dionysian instinct is capable of creating a simultaneous feeling of enormous horror, and blissful
ecstasy. This concept, when expressed, and working through, the Apollonian, is capable of
evoking the sublime. According to Nietzsche, an encounter with the void seizes the individual,
leaving him confused and without “faith in the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world”,
ultimately leading to the breakdown of individuality, or a shedding of the ego (17). In this
encounter, “personal experiences from the past are submerged” and usual “barriers and limits of
existence are destroyed” (Nietzsche 40). When confronted with the void, personal concerns and
desires are sloughed off.
Schopenhauer writes that art permits the practice of contemplation free from will, and
that in disinterested contemplation we come closest to understanding Plato’s Idea. According to
Schopenhauer, the appreciator of art becomes disinterested or easily slips into a disinterested
state, in which a shedding of identity or will occurs, and an awareness of the universal, of Plato’s
Idea may arise. Schopenhauer says that this brief awareness is experienced in moments of
understanding that are accompanied by intense sensory perception (124). In the best immersive
aesthetic experiences, intense perception, accompanied by reflection free from will, outweighs
the limitations of reason, and may result in an experience of the sublime.
According to Schopenhauer pure knowing, freed or released from all willing, is
extremely pleasant, and constitutes a large part of aesthetic enjoyment, the sublime is simply an
intensification of this experience. Schopenhauer explains that an experience of the sublime
transports one into the state of pure perception, when objects “by their manifold and yet definite
and distinct form, easily become representatives of their Ideas” (124). Objects become signs.
Ideas become objects of knowledge only on the condition that the individuality of the knowing
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subject is suspended, the subject who contemplates the object does so without regard for want or
use (Schopenhauer 98).
The artistic genius, Schopenhauer explains, has “the capacity to maintain oneself in the
state of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception” this pure perception is accompanied by
“the power of leaving one’s own interests, wishes and aims out of sight, of divesting oneself of
one’s own personality for a time...not merely at moments, but for long enough...to reproduce by
deliberate art what has thus been apprehended” (109). When Schopenhauer states that in art,
relations vanish, he is speaking of the experience of will-lessness or disinterested delight, as Kant
would have it. Disinterested delight is that same shedding of identity that is an aspect of the
sublime, when the viewer contemplates without considering utility or desire.
An important component of identity is memory. Memory and will are two ingredients of
subjectivity, and impact the ontological. Both are dismissed during an encounter with the
sublime. Bergson associates memory and identity, he describes a perception free of memory “as
pure perception, possessed by a being absorbed in the present and capable, by giving up every
form of memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous” (Matter and
Memory 28). In giving up memory, identity vanishes. I think all of these distinct voices
representing a huge span of time would agree that whatever ties the subject to subjecthood, is
released in an experience of the sublime.
Will, memory, subjectivity and identity are concepts that are intimately connected and
share blurred borders. In much the same way, the sublime is intimately connected to other
similar states of being. Aristotle’s catharsis, Nietzsche’s marriage of Apollonian and Dionysian
instincts, Kristeva’s abjection, Barthes’ jouissance and Nancy’s sensing, all involve an aesthetic
understanding that in its intensity affects the body. Connected to intense, embodied, aesthetic
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understanding are the companion concepts of comedy or irony, and forgetting, which involve
sensing, and assist in processing the experience.
Catharsis is the pleasurable relief of excess emotions, through a meaningful identification
with an ‘other’, and is capable of happening, according to Aristotle, as an intensely concentrated
sensory aesthetic experience. Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian instincts are related to
catharsis directly through Nietzsche’s focus on Greek tragedy. Nietzsche describes two different
drives that “exist side by side, mostly in open conflict, stimulating and provoking” (14). These
drives are instincts and they speak to the instincts toward life and death.
When the Apollonian and the Dionysian come into balance, as seen in tragic myth,
Nietzsche says a work of art is produced that affirms, “all that is fearsome, wicked, mysterious,
annihilating and fateful at the very foundation of experience” (7). In this experience that is
closely related to the sublime, “all divisions between humans give way to an overwhelming
feeling of unity”, a feeling that provides metaphysical solace (Nietzsche 39). Nietzsche's text
speaks to Aristotle’s, a dialogue involving solace, catharsis and the sublime. Nietzsche says the
experience of contradictory forces coming into balance brings with it a feeling of becoming
“entirely at one with the primordial unity, with its pain and contradiction” (30). When the formal,
ordered, Apollonian comes together with the chaotic, exuberant, Dionysian, in an aesthetic
experience that overwhelms the senses and involves ontological signification, a brief and intense
embodied reflection, may lead to an aesthetic understanding I refer to as the sublime.
Abjection, as described by Kristeva in Powers of Horror is also closely related to the
sublime; both are expressions of the impossibility of being. The sublime is a confrontation with
the infinite and the void, in which identity is shed and there is a momentary recognition of the
ephemeral and interconnected nature of existence. Abjection is an awareness of the power and
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fragility of the human body, the inevitability of death, and the cyclical nature of life. Both
concepts evoke an intense awareness of the phenomena of being. According to Deleuze
“abjection becomes splendor; the horror of life becomes a very pure and very intense life”
(Johnson 127). Darkness and light, joy and sadness, birth and death, opposite states that
accentuate one another.
Kristeva’s concept of abjectioni reinterprets the sublime within a framework of Freudian
and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and structuralist semiotics. The experience of simultaneous
pleasure and pain associated with the sublime becomes jouissance and revulsion in abjection.
Kristeva explains, “abjection itself is a composite of judgement and affect”, it involves reason
and perception (Powers of Horror 10). Kristeva says that abjection refuses a single definition,
and instead consists of a cluster of meanings (Powers of Horror 12). Both abjection and the
sublime involve brief moments of understanding, an awareness of being and the void, in which
identity is absent (Powers of Horror 54).
According to Kristeva, the loss of identity that occurs during the sublime, is mirrored in
abjection, in a state of being that precedes what Lacan refers to as the ‘mirror stage’. The mirror
stage is when a child first recognizes their own reflection, before the mirror stage the child
inhabits a psychic space that has yet to distinguish between self and other, subject and object, the
child experiences itself as undifferentiated (Johnson 127). Kristeva explains that abjectection is a
fear of the archaic mother, a primal memory of birth, of being ripped from the maternal body and
abandoned to the world (Johnson 77). This is a fear of the generative power and immensity
involved in the cyclical nature of being (Powers of Horror 12).
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The Sublime Enticement to Engage in Aesthetic Reflection
For Kristeva, literature is the aesthetic mode best suited to expressing the abject. In
literature, she explains, one is able to imagine the abject, “to see oneself in its place and to thrust
it aside only by means of the displacement of verbal play” (Desire in Language 16). Kristeva
sees the aesthetic task as “a descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct”, aesthetic
reflection as an examination of unconscious determining thoughts (Desire in Language 18). She
explains that this is an essential task of literature, because of its role in the coding of our crises
and its ability to unveil the abject, elaborate on it, and allow for catharsis or discharge (Desire in
Language 208). It is an aesthetic understanding that requires lingering. And while Kristeva
connects the abject to literature, her description of specific discourses connects the abject to the
sublime and to the immersive aesthetic experience.
Kristeva describes carnivalesque and Menippean texts as discourses, composed of
distances, relationships, analogies, and non-exclusive oppositions that involve participants who
are both spectator and actor. They are, in effect, immersive. Within the carnivalesque, the subject
is reduced to nothingness (Desire in Language 78). Personal identity of the subject is shed.
These discourses are both comic and tragic, yet serious, and often politically or socially
disturbing (Desire in Language 80). They are discourses that involve strong emotional responses.
Kristeva explains this form of literature is similar to painting, in that it is capable of transmitting
its essence through form without ‘realist’ pretensions. According to Kristeva, in an examination
of the “ambivalence of the spectacle (realist representation) of a lived experience (rhetoric), one
might perceive the line where the rupture (or junction) between them takes place”, reason’s
representation combined with sense’s experience may result in aesthetic understanding (Desire
in Language 89). The immersive aesthetic experience is an aesthetic discourse that requires
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lingering, involves sense and reason and may evoke an abject or sublime aesthetic
understanding.
In order to further cement this comparison, the notion of text should be understood as an
aesthetic creation, intended to engage its audience in interpretation. These texts are intertextual,
full of ambiguous signifiers, presented in open relation with each other and the reader. Barthes
says these texts will always contain “a margin of indecision; the distinction will not be the source
of absolute classifications...meaning will be precarious, revocable, reversible, the discourse
incomplete” (Barthes 4). Barthes describes the text as a fetish object that desires and chooses its
reader, through “a whole disposition of invisible screens, selective baffles, vocabulary,
references, readability” and texts always include the other (27). This description of mutual
engagement between the text and its audience can accurately be used to describe the immersive
aesthetic experience.
In The Pleasure of the Text, Roland Barthes connects the reading of ‘texts’ with an
experience of pleasure or bliss. The pleasure and bliss of text are aesthetically equivalent to the
beautiful and the sublime as discussed here. Barthes draws on psychoanalysis to define an
opposition between a text of pleasure, which can be expressed in words, and a text of bliss,
which is unspeakable (21). The pleasure of text relates to reason, representation, and quiet
contemplation of the beautiful. Bliss is sense, sensing and intuition, being overwhelmed by, it is
sublime. Whether the opposition is about the beautiful and the sublime, pleasure and bliss, or the
conscious and the unconscious, ultimately these pairs develop out of, and connect to, reason and
sense.
The aesthetic task of the text, of the immersive aesthetic experience, is to bring to light an
underlying unconscious awareness of being, to be disruptive. Barthes claims that when
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successful in its task, the text is capable of granting euphoria, imposing a discomforting state of
loss, or unsettling the reader (14). Barthes describes this as a kind of pleasure, a “site of loss, the
seam, the cut, the deflation, the dissolve which seizes the subject in the midst of bliss” (7). Bliss
is intensified pleasure, and can be compared to an experience of the sublime, as an
overwhelming desire or impulse to present the unpresentable. Kristeva describes the experience
as “a time of oblivion and thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts
forth”, the role of bliss, abjection, or the sublime, is to allow a deeply buried understanding,
usually undermined by forgetfulness and laughter, to break through (Desire in Language 9).
Forgetfulness and laughter are coping mechanisms for the intensity involved with
experiences of the sublime or abjection. According to Nietzsche the sublime and the comical are
interwoven elements, in which the comical unburdens one from disgust resulting from an
awareness of the absurdity of existence (120). Sublime awareness always brings with it a certain
forgetting that allows one to approach the experience as new each time it is encountered. For
Nietzsche, forgetting is related to the semblance and form of the Apollonian instinct, it is a
necessity of existence. The oblivion of forgetting is a reaction to the chaos of the Dionysian
instinct. The Apollonian represents a state of forgetfulness and the familiarity of the beautiful
dream. The Dionysian refers to the brief and intense awareness of the infinite void (Nietzsche
122).
According to Nietzsche, we live within concepts, semblance, illusion and delusion, and in
order to achieve authentic experience we must break free from them. Nietzsche explains that
reason relies on categories, which are arbitrary, and lead to rigidity of laws and concepts.
Concepts and laws are highly subjective and relational, they “refer only to one another and are
incomprehensible in their essential nature” (Nietzsche 149). Concepts are based on metaphor but
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different, in that metaphor relies on seeing similarities (Nietzsche 147). For Nietzsche, a tension
manifests in the play between semblance and authenticity. He uses Greek Tragedy as an example
of how this works, and calls the forces Apollonian and Dionysian.
The Apollonian involves the gaze, the beautiful, or semblance and must include measured
limitation, and freedom from wild impulses (Nietzsche 127). Nietzsche explains that “will and its
symbol - harmony - are both, ultimately, pure logic!” (136). An imbalance toward logic and
intellect immerses man in dissimulation, illusions and dream images (Nietzsche 142). According
to Nietzsche, it is because of our reliance on metaphor and its making equal of the nonequivalent,
that we unconsciously lie and because of this unconsciousness, because of this forgetting, we
arrive at a feeling of the truth (146). Because man can forget himself, he is able to live with some
degree of peace, security, and consistency (Nietzsche 148). However, Nietzsche warns that
eventually semblance is no longer enjoyed as semblance, instead, semblance becomes a symbol,
a sign of truth (133). Immersed in dissimulation and illusion, man begins to abstract his own
actions, Nietzsche says he is “no longer able to tolerate being swept away by sudden impressions
and sensuous perceptions”, he is only able to comprehend forms which adhere to static laws
(146).
Nietzsche points out that metaphor begins with sensation, with the goal of
communicating that which is sensed. Sensation results in the artistic production of metaphor
(Nietzsche 150). Every metaphor that stands in for a sensuous perception is individual and
unique, therefore able to escape the static laws of classification (Nietzsche 146). The ability to
escape the illusion of category and classification is powered by the Dionysian. The Dionysian
involves what Nietzsche calls the intoxication of suffering, and represents a state of ecstasy that
brings man to the self-oblivion of intense intoxication, wherein subjectivity disappears (120).
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Nietzsche says, borders, laws, divisions and arbitrary power relations between men also
disappear, there is a loosening of the control of will (120). However, it is important to note that
according to Nietzsche, Dionysiac art manifests itself, “not in the alternation of clear-mindedness
and intoxication, but in their co-existence” (121). The sublime effect of Dionysiac art results
from bringing the forces together, where they form a middle world between beauty and truth
(Nietzsche 130). For Nietzsche, art acts as a mediating force between the two spheres.
Forgetting, oblivion, and the beautiful dream offer respite from the realities of existence,
one’s sense of humor is another mode of managing these realities. Irony relates to contradictions
and the tension of holding incompatible things together. Irony is humorous and serious. Hegel
explicitly associates irony with art, describing the artistic genius as one who “sets no value on his
relation to his determinate reality and particular actions, or to what is universal in its own right;
that is, he assumes an ironical attitude towards it” (72). He is able to hold the contradiction of
particular and universal together, comprehending “the futility of all that is matter of fact...the
nothingness of all that is objective” (Hegel 72). Both Hegel and Nietzsche address the subject of
humor as it relates to art, for Nietzsche comedy offers relief from the tragic, and for Hegel irony
is self-reflective. Existential aesthetic reflection can result in an intense ontological
understanding that is sublime, an understanding that emphasizes presence.
Heidegger associates forgetting with what he describes as falling prey to everydayness
and curiosity, of looking, simply for the sake of looking. He asserts that authenticity of being is
only achieved through the presencing of Dasein, which is accompanied by circumspection and
lingering, and is a mode of awareness (Heidegger 111). The forgetting of everydayness starts
with the distinction and isolation of the ‘I’ from those distinguishable from oneself, but also
“those among whom one also is”, what Heidegger refers to as the They or theyness (115).
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Superficial semblance is part of the they and like the beautiful dream, the they is familiar
(Heidegger 55). Heidegger’s everydayness is a state that creates averageness, priorities are
squashed, everything original is flattened down and mystery loses its power (127). The desire to
see within everydayness is expressed as curiosity, however curiosity is not a reflective staying,
rather it seeks restlessness, excitement, and distraction, “curiosity and has nothing to do with
contemplation”, it is looking rather than seeing (Heidegger 166).
According to Heidegger, the self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which is
distinguished from the authentic self, the self that has explicitly grasped itself (125). Heidegger
associates the authentic being of Dasein with what he describes as presencing. Being “as it is
initially and for the most part, in its average everydayness”, is capable of discovering the world
and bringing it near through presence (Heidegger 16). Heidegger says that in presencing
everyday being “discloses its authentic being to itself”, by clearing away coverings and
obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Dasein cuts itself off from itself, escaping
the oblivion of forgetting (125). For Heidegger, the antidote to curiosity is care. Care, when it
rests, turns into circumspection (166). Nietzsche and Heidegger both recognize the role
forgetting plays in coping with the awareness of existential reality, as well as how an over
reliance on methods of escaping this awareness result in a disconnect from the lived experience
of being.
Forgetting, like irony and comedy, is a mechanism for dealing with the intensity of the
sublime aesthetic experience. When the body receives intense sensory data, conceptual thought
becomes difficult, if not impossible. Conversely, when deeply concerned with conceptual
thinking, attention avoids investigation of sensory stimuli. The aesthetic experience of the
sublime, is an understanding that results from engaging both types of thinking, simultaneously. It
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is an intense awareness of being in the universe, while at the same time being stripped of one’s
immediate sense of identity. However, as soon as the experience has passed it slips away.
Forgetting keeps us from becoming desensitized to the power of the sublime.
Through the successful crafting of excess sensory stimuli, and ontological signification,
the immersive aesthetic experience has the capacity to evoke the sublime. These are works in
which signification points toward questions of being: the infinite, the void, the earthly and man.
Ontological dislocation and the unpresentable are in an ongoing relationship with the sublime.
Barthes explains that a problem of many productions of contemporary art, is that they “exhaust
their necessity as soon as they have been seen”, because to see them is to immediately
understand, they contain no “contemplative or delectative duration” (Barthes 18). The immersive
aesthetic experience includes both contemplative and delectative duration: delectative through its
exuberant use of sensory stimuli, contemplative through its employment of signification related
to questions of being. It is my assertion that the artist’s task is to engender the interplay of
perception and reason in new and unexpected ways. Work that is relational, dynamic, and able to
evoke a strong emotional response is essential to increasing the viewer’s capacity for aesthetic
understanding.

Contemporary Use of The Sublime
In tracing a movement of thought, from Plato’s beauty itself and Aristotle’s experience of
catharsis, via empathy, to a contemporary expression of the sublime, it becomes apparent that
aesthetic understanding plays a crucial role in the satisfactory expression of being. Aesthetic
understanding, as the free play of sense and reason, is an essential aspect of art, and the area that
most clearly displays this significance is that of the aesthetic experience. As defined in this
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research, the sublime is an intensely explicit manifestation of this type of understanding. The
split between the aesthetic object and the aesthetic experience has become increasingly apparent,
while the contemporary use of, and emphasis on, immersive experiences demonstrates the need
to regain balance between reason and sense. There is a renewed focus on the sublime, my
research is an investigation into how and why aesthetic understanding is crucial to the definition
of sublime, as it relates to key philosophical concepts and the immersive aesthetic experience.
The shift toward an emphasis on aesthetic experience is evident in Cézanne’s attempts to
share his embodied experience through painting techniques. This marks a point in an evolving
aesthetic intention, once located in the work itself, but slowly shifting toward a focus on the
audience’s experience of the work. A general aim of Impressionism, to visually capture and
share fleeting experiences, can be seen in depictions of light that change with the passing of time,
and the ephemerality of urban life. In the period after World War II, a desire to evoke sublime
feelings of transcendence took on particular importance for the Abstract Expressionists.
American artists Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko sought to evoke the sublime through
the illusion of spatial immensity. Rothko’s color field paintings, which create the illusion of a
fluctuating picture plane, create a relationship between the viewer and the canvas. His large
canvases nearly encompass the viewer’s horizon line. Rothko’s use of color emphasizes this
relation, colors pulse forward or recede into space. Aesthetic experiences that emphasize shifts in
perception as illusory begin to gain attention. The experience of the audience continues to draw
attention throughout the 1960’s and 70’s in Situationalist art, Happenings, Op Art, the Light and
Space movement and Installation Art are all concerned with the subjective point of view of the
work’s audience, on the experience of the viewer.
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There remains a need for beautiful art objects upon which to quietly contemplate,
however, the transformation toward critical thought that is necessary today, requires the intensity
of a sublime experience. A sublime experience requires both reason and sense. Nancy explains
that the traditional subject object relationship of reason can no longer satisfy understanding.
According to Nancy, “as long as the world was essentially in relation to some other (that is,
another world or an author of the world) it could have a sense...there is no longer this essential
relation, and that there is no longer essentially (that is, existentially) anything but the world
‘itself’” (8). And yet Nancy says that “it is a total waste of time to try and rediscover, behind the
logos that has governed our twenty-five centuries, something like a ‘mythical’ dimension or
sense” (6). A return to the relation between logos and mythos is impossible. The contemporary
sublime is about the power of imagination to reveal infinite multiplicity and connectivity within
the ephemeral nature of the temporal frame.
A contemporary reference to the sublime often includes references to technology through
mass production and globalization. Simon Morely writes about a contemporary sublime, and
believes the power of technology is more likely to evoke the sublime than nature. He describes
the sublime as the destabilizing and excessive everyday perception of “extreme space-time
compressions produced by globalized communication technologies” (Morely 12). While I agree
with the description of globalized communication technologies as excessive and destabilizing, I
do not agree that this definition exhausts every possible experience of the sublime. My interest is
in a definition of the sublime that conveys an overwhelming aesthetic understanding related to
the nature of being.
The contemporary notion of the sublime employed throughout this dissertation is
inextricable from ideas developed by Nietzsche and later in the twentieth century, by Lyotard.
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This sublime is associated with Nietzsche’s Dionysian, not an abandonment of the Apollonian in
favor of the Dionysian, but as a sublime experience of the Dionysian presented through the form
of the Apollonian. The Apollonian should be seen as an expression of logos related to form and
semblance. The Dionysian is formless, chaos, an experience of the loss of individuation.
Nietzsche seeks to bring these two drives into balance through the aesthetic act. He does not
advocate one over the other, instead he encourages us to “look at science through the prism of
the artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life” (Nietzsche 5). When the Dionysian is
expressed through the Apollonian “all divisions between one human being and another, give way
to an overwhelming feeling of unity”, providing what Nietzsche calls metaphysical solace (39).
Metaphysical solace is the comfort taken in the realization that despite this new awareness of
one’s infinitesimally small role in existence, life is still indestructibly mighty and pleasurable
(Nietzsche 39). The form and semblance of reason are necessary components of existence, but
the spark of chaos inherent in imagination is equally necessary.
Lyotard is essential to this conversation, as he posits thought as inseparable from the
phenomenological body (23). He draws attention to the limits of reason through his focus on the
‘differend’ii, which he associates with the sublime. According to Lyotard an emptying of the
mind is necessary in order to really think, and he connects this practice of emptying the mind
with the type of severe self-discipline normally associated with religious practice (19). A practice
of quieting the body and mind is reminiscent of meditation and points to an awareness of the
body’s innate role in perception and a denial of ‘recognition’ in favor of letting things come as
they present themselves (Lyotard 32). Lyotard advocates letting go of all grasping intelligence,
and reminds us that “the living body is an agent of the transformation of things and all perception
induces action” (41). Perception motivates and is sensed in a multitude of ways, bodies react in
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ways that are both voluntary and involuntary. For Lyotard art has the ability to reveal the
differend and evoke the sublime by calling attention to the limits of representation.
Perception of the inevitable approach of death is an example of a limit of representation;
it is a feeling “that soon nothing more will take place” (Lyotard 84). According to Lyotard the
sublime is the feeling that despite this innate perception of nothing happening, we
simultaneously feel that something will happen, that everything is not over (84). The sublime is
an experience of forces deemed irrational, such as feelings and desires. Lyotard explains that the
sublime is not out there in the world as immensity beyond comprehension, but in that innate
sensing “that something happens” (84). Lyotard says that because “the event happens as a
question mark ‘before’ happening as a question”, a feeling may be evoked, a feeling that nothing
might happen, an awareness of the nothingness of now, this contradictory feeling, of pleasure
and pain or joy and anxiety, is associated with the sublime (92).
The sublime, like bliss cannot be put into words, it is an attempt to understand the
inconceivable (Lyotard 93). Lyotard’s ‘differend’ is an experience of attempting to present the
unpresentable. He analyzes this experience in reference to Kant’s sublime, in which direct
sensory intuition is incapable of a comprehensive judgement of the idea of the thing, an idea that
surpasses our sensory abilities. According to Lyotard, art is able to convey an experience of the
sublime from a safe distance, and by distancing “procures a pleasure of relief, of delight...the
soul is returned to the agitated zone between life and death” (100). The sublime for Lyotard is an
intensification of conceptual and emotional capacity, an ambivalent enjoyment, an intensity
associated with an ontological dislocation (101).
Art is able to convey an experience of the sublime because it engages a special type of
understanding. Aesthetic understanding requires the interplay of sense and reason. The sublime
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experience involves a self-awareness that is constant, pre-reflective and non-objectifying;
absorbed in an intense interplay of perception and reason. According to Nancy, “there is no sense
except in relation to some ‘outside’ or ‘elsewhere” (7). Therefore, the interplay of sensing and
reflecting in aesthetic understanding, must necessarily reflect the multiplicity and connectivity of
being. Aesthetic understanding requires the intentionality of the artist, and the potential to
provoke the sublime demands that the artist has something to say about being. Post-object
aesthetics must refer to the intentional communication of ontological questions. Lyotard advises
artists, motivated to express the aesthetics of the sublime, in whatever mediums they work, to
search out intense effects, to give up imitating models of the merely beautiful and to “try out
surprising, strange, shocking combinations”, because shock is evidence of something happening,
rather than the suspended privation of nothing happening (100). The shock is the sublime, an
experience of intense aesthetic understanding, which has the potential to transform.
According to Nancy “what art does is to please: and so it is neither poiesis nor praxis, but
another kind of ‘doing’ all together that mixes together both of the other kinds” (135). When
Nancy explains that art is neither poiesis, the act of creation, nor praxis, the act of a practice, he
is indicating that it is both, in the same way that understanding does not occur through reason or
perception, but through their interplay. Art is a special kind of doing that involves the interplay
of creation and practice, it involves presence. Art has the potential to transform the experience of
being into one of becoming. Nancy announces that this transformation should mean “to change
the sense of sense, that is, once again, to pass from having to being. Which means also that
transformation is... an act that effects the agent, not the work” (Nancy 9). Intense engagement
with aesthetic understanding of the sublime is an important part of the immersive aesthetic
experience.
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This intensification of conceptual and emotional capacity associated with ontological
dislocation, is key to understanding the sublime within the immersive aesthetic experience. In the
immersive aesthetic experience, the participant, sensing and interpreting ontological signs, may
briefly shed immanent concerns and experience a form of transcendence. Like Kristeva’s
carnivalesque, the immersive aesthetic experience has no stage, no theatre, it is “both stage and
life, game and dream, discourse and spectacle” (79). Self-consciousness is affected and
motivated by consciousness of the environment; immersive aesthetic experiences involve art
objects, but their emphasis is on the physical and mental reaction to the work, rather than its
perceived value, technique, or materials. However, these works are about more than pure
perception, they also involve the interpretation of ambiguous ontological signs within a nonegoic sphere. This interpretation of excess sensory data combined with ontological signification
can facilitate an experience of the sublime. These are works of art that address the transformative
nature of existence and strive to create aesthetic experiences that unveil the present moment,
revealing the now at the ultimate site of the singular. This experience may engender a moment in
which the viewer experiences a transformation of conceptual understanding at the level of the
phenomenological body.
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CHAPTER TWO
Yayoi Kusama
In order to address a contemporary imbalance favoring logic and reason, the act of
lingering must be revalued. Pausing to allow for an interplay of thought and sensation, context
and connection, is a skill that requires practice. The immersive aesthetic experience provides
training in this mode of thought. By simultaneously exposing the viewer to intensive sensory
stimuli and ontological signification, immersive aesthetic experiences provide opportunity to
engage this mode of thought. Aesthetic understanding involves the interplay of perception and
reason. This is an aesthetic experience with the potential to evoke the sublime, especially when
its audience takes the role of participant, rather than passive viewer. The immersive aesthetic
experience is a work of art that requires a certain level of participation, a thoughtful engagement.
Yayoi Kusama, a contemporary Japanese artist, born in 1929, creates work that
exemplifies this definition of immersive aesthetic experience, and this chapter demonstrates
‘how’ and ‘why.’ Kusama’s immense body of work is centered around dots, as image and
concept, and the implication of what those dots may mean. She has put dots on paintings,
sculptural objects and bodies, she uses small colorful stickers and LED lights to create dots in
her installations. Her mirrored infinity rooms immerse the participant within an aesthetic space
and time, an illusion of the infinite, made up of tiny dots of light. This is an experience of intense
sensory play. These works provide opportunity to practice a mode of thinking informed by
creativity, a mode of thinking that is more balanced, an understanding that occurs through the
interplay of reason and perception, in other words, an aesthetic understanding. Her work does
this by provoking ontological questions through immersive elements. Kusama’s well
documented psychological trauma informs her work, and needs to be addressed. However, the
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ultimate focus here is on the participant’s experience of the work. The central aim of my research
being the experience of the work, rather than the conditions of its existence.
All artworks begin as a communication from the artist, the communication may be
elusive, easy to read, or somewhere in between. A work of formalism often appears to
communicate either surface level compositional explorations, or such mysterious symbolism that
it escapes any sense of understanding. When there is no message to communicate, or the
message too inscrutable, the work cannot maintain engagement with its audience, once surface
features are digested the process of understanding appears to have run its course. Works whose
message is unambiguous, inform an engagement that ends in agreement or disagreement.
Immersive aesthetic experiences, and especially those of Kusama, are works whose
sensuous space involves an indeterminacy that carries the potential to conjure a variety of
meanings. These works begin with a communication from the artist, expressed in such a way, as
to allow for multiple interpretations, a communication once articulated, no longer under the
control of the artist. How the message is interpreted and reinterpreted may change dramatically
according to what the participant brings to the experience.
What is it that is experienced during encounters with Kusama’s work? The ontological
questions that arise from her work begin with the notion of self-obliteration and evolve to
encompass broader notions of infinite space, time and multiplicity. I will link discussions by
Henri Bergson, Julia Kristeva and Gilles Deleuze, among others, whose focus on these concepts
reflect an awareness of the need to reassess commonly accepted standards of thought that
emphasize reason, logic and contemplation over perception, experience and being. The version
of a sublime that is sometimes evoked through the experience of Kusama’s work, manifests as a
delightful surprise accompanied by laughter, or jouissance. The effect is similar to that of the
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carnivalesque, as described by Julia Kristeva. Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experiences are like
the carnivalesque in that there is no stage, the viewer does not stand in front of it, it is both stage
and life at once, both discourse and spectacle, as participant you are in it (Desire in Language
79). Kristeva also reminds us that “the laughter of the carnival is not simply parodic; it is no
more comic than tragic; it is both at once, one might say that it is serious” (Desire in Language
80). By approaching this work through hermeneutic, phenomenological and formal
methodologies, I will show how Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experiences communicate ideas
related to self-obliteration, the illusion of time and space, and a specific form of multiplicity, in a
way that encourages the act of lingering in the participant. The immersive aesthetic experience
challenges the logocentric, reason idolizing, structure of thought, by engaging sensory play and
interpretation of ontological signification.
Kusama’s work is informed by visions she began having in early childhood, of
multiplying dots and nets, which she gradually came to see as comprising everything in the
universe. This early preoccupation with dots is attested to in a drawing created by Kusama at the
age of 10. These visions have influenced her paintings, sculptures, performances, and immersive
aesthetic experiences. According to Kusama:
A polka-dot has the form of the sun, which is a symbol of the energy of the whole
world and our living life, and also the form of the moon, which is calm. Round,
soft, colorful, senseless and unknowing. Polka-dots become movement…a way to
infinity. (Yayoi Kusama, Manhattan Suicide Addict)
Finding a way into infinity through the infinite is the common thread that connects Kusama’s
multidisciplinary art practice. Her internationally recognizable mirrored infinity rooms include
her famous dots, in the form of LED lights, which reflect endlessly in mirrored space. Kusama

88
has been exploring the creation and use of mirrored spaces, in which light reflects off mirrored
surfaces to create an illusion of infinite space, since the early 1960’s, and by 1966 she was
experimenting with room size, freestanding installations. These Infinity Mirrored Rooms are
immersive aesthetic experiences that entice the participant to linger in thought.

Fig. 3. Every Day I Pray For Love, 2019
Kusama’s Infinity Mirrored Room, Every Day I Pray For Love was exhibited in New York City
in the winter of 2019 (see fig. 3). And while photos of the installation are lovely, and share much
visual information about the space, I can attest that photographs are just unable to capture, or
fully express, the experience of the space. After numerous attempts, I was successful visiting the
work in Los Angeles, at the Broad. There is a certain theatricality to these installations, that
involve everything from anticipation of waiting in line, to the act of stepping briefly into an
‘other’ world of illusion. Mirrored infinity rooms require the physicality of perception in order to
experience the illusion of infinite space.
In Every Day I Pray For Love, the participant steps into the room, closing the door
behind, positioning their body inside the space of mirrors. Even Kusama’s smaller boxes require
the participant to bend, stoop and peer through small openings. Seen from the outside, the work
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is a room, a cube or box, but from inside, space appears to recede into the infinite. Not empty
space receding into the infinite, but an infinite space filled with sparkling dots of light. Once the
participant has gained entry, they encounter a dimly lit platform that appears to float in an
endless universe of stars. In the brief confusion of light and dark, reflection of self is lost. Before
eyes can even fully adjust and attempt to focus, the door reopens, the visitor is hauled back,
outside the space once again. Museum docents time each visitor's forty-five seconds inside the
work.
Kusama creates experiences of space and time that provide opportunities for aesthetic
understanding, developing out of ideas connected to the relationship between infinitude and self
oblivion. Kusama has been making art since childhood and has had an often rocky relationship
with the art world. But this is really her time to shine. The David Zwirner Gallery in New York
has represented the artist since 2013. In 2017, the Hirshorn Museum in Washington, DC, had a
50 year retrospective of her work and her infinity mirror rooms are making worldwide
appearances. As appreciation for Kusama’s work continues to grow, and the sheer popularity of
these works increase, it is important to not acknowledge the work’s susceptibility to Guy
Debord’s notion of the spectacle.
In 1967, Guy Debord in conjunction with Situationist International (1957–1972), a group
of avant-garde artists and political theorists, produced The Society of the Spectacle, a manifesto
of sorts that consists of 221 short theses or aphorisms, divided across nine chapters. According to
Debord, the spectacle is capitalism’s instrument for distracting and placating the masses, and he
establishes a connection between the spectacle and the economy by paraphrasing Karl Marx. In
fact, the first thesis reworks the opening line of Marx’s Das Kapital (1867). The spectacle
describes a machination of capitalism, to reduce life to an endless supply of commodifiable
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fragments, while encouraging a focus on appearances. Debord describes three varieties of
spectacle, the focus here is on what he calls the diffuse spectacle, a manifestation of the spectacle
that thrives in the abundance of commodities commonly associated with wealthy democracies.
Debord conceives the spectacle in relation to commodity fetishism and alienation, for the
film, advertising, and television age, in which the absolute rule of market economy produces
commodities that come to rule over consumers who contemplate this reified spectacle. The
diffuse spectacle appears to empower individuals through the illusion of consumer choice and
effectively placates the masses. Debord sees an intimate connection between the spectacle and
capitalism. He describes the spectacle as a mode of production that takes on a variety of specific
forms; information, propaganda, advertisement, or entertainment. The most conspicuous
manifestation of which is mass media and here contemporary parallels are drawn to the internet
and social media.
Ultimately, the objective of the spectacle is the appropriation of subversive ideas, their
trivialization and finally their recuperation back into mainstream society where they can be
exploited in order to further maintain social control. The spectacle lulls its audience into
complacency. According to Debord “the spectacle presents itself as something enormously
positive, indisputable and inaccessible. It says nothing more than, that which appears is good,
that which is good appears”, the spectacle inundates all who look upon it with the appearance of
inevitably (3). What is inevitable, what can we not go without, and how do we present ourselves
within the living spectacle? Social exchange increasingly takes place over the internet, where
self-curated avatars stand in as integral aspects of identity. To these ends, social media
destinations are indisputably hard to avoid, to the point where influencing others interests
through social media posts has become a coveted career choice, popularly dubbed ‘the
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influencer’.
According to Debord, art has also been subsumed by the spectacle, where it becomes
“congealed past culture” and is understood only in terms of category and limit. Debord describes
the spectacle as “the existing order’s uninterrupted discourse about itself, its laudatory
monologue” (5). The spectacle only thinks about itself, all other ideas and concepts become
secondary, mere window dressing. The spectacle freezes the freedom of movement, activity and
action, into images for contemplation. The spectacle creates an image of what art is, what it
means, far removed from any concept the actual work of art may be engaged with.
The popularity of Kusama’s work is, in some respects, a double-edged sword. Great work
should be popular, but perhaps in part, because they are just so pretty, these works can fall prey
to the spectacle. They are works that can be appreciated as a kind of social commodity. Even
though this is not an issue of cost or paying, rather one of reserving, planning and waiting to
experience the works, there are obvious connections to Debord’s spectacle. Visitors wait in long
lines to get their chance to step into the mirrored rooms for a few short seconds, often spending
the brief experience attempting to capture the moment in a photograph. A quick image search
brings up a seemingly infinite number of photos captured in the infinity mirrored rooms. How
many of these visitors are participants, and how many solely focused on the image to be obtained
and shared on social media? Debord explains that the spectacle stands in for lived experience
with “contemplation of the spectacle”, and further, that Being is replaced by having, and having
is replaced by appearing (2). Many who wait in line to visit Kusama’s infinity mirrored rooms,
are waiting for the photo, not the experience. The photo which when posted on social media
creates the appearance of having been somewhere everyone longs to be. Ultimately the spectacle
is a social relation among people, that is mediated by images (Debord 2).
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Interestingly, both The Society of the Spectacle and Kusama’s first infinity mirror rooms
came to fruition around the same time. Both works are a call to arms against the consumerism of
spectatorship, and ask those who encounter these works to occupy the role of participant. While
Kusama’s work is indeed very photogenic, the work’s engagement with both perception and
reason help ensure the work avoids being subsumed by the spectacle. The spectacle relies on
passive spectatorship, so it is important to consider the passive spectator, the consumer of
spectacle.
The consumer of spectacle looks, quietly reflects, utilizing modes of thought that include
logic, reason and contemplation. These are modes of thought that rely on category, limit,
delineation, counting and a homogeneous concept of space and time. Debord even refers to
‘Spectacular Time’, which he relates to the quantitative, and to commodification. The concept of
reason and perception as distinct faculties, often portrays these modes of thought as being
opposed rather than bound, with reason and logic elevated in importance. Reason demands quiet
contemplation, pinning elements of thought in place, arranging thoughts and organizing ideas.
Perception requires the body, it is a constant state of change, thoughts are slippery and
ephemeral. But the two are bound.
Reason loves to delineate, to distinguish. And in the parsing out of function and rationale,
lines are drawn, and attempts to distinguish reason from perception, precipitate conceptual
dyads. Bergson, Deleuze and Kristeva each address various ways in which sense and reason are
bound rather than opposed, emphasizing the importance of recognizing the fundamental role of
sense. Referenced in the following pages, philosophical discussions on the relation of reason and
sense include; Bergson on quantitative and qualitative, homogeneous and heterogeneous,
Deleuze on extensive or intensive, and difference versus repetition, and Kristeva on the symbolic
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versus the semiotic, and cursive, linear time versus monumental time. Each recognizes the
essential nature of participation. To escape subjugation of the spectacle, Debord states “there can
be no freedom outside of activity” (7). Rather than in the abstract concept of a homogeneous
space time that allows for counting and placing, freedom exists in action, in duration, in change
and transformation, all concepts that can be considered ‘other’ and exist in the realm of
perception.
Each of these writers are creating alternatives to the western narrative regarding science,
empiricism and a ‘correct’ way of understanding space and time. Their alternatives are not
opposed or in conflict with a standard conception of space time, rather they are bound, and
appear along a sort of spectrum. Important to the aesthetic experience of understanding in
Kusama’ works are the concepts of duration, repetition, and monumental time. Duration is
directly linked to perception, it is qualitative and involves movement. Repetition, according to
Deleuze, is in every respect, a transgression, “it expresses at once a singularity opposed to the
general, a universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an
instantaneity opposed to variation and an eternity opposed to permanence” (2). Repetition
involves the paradox of every iteration being both same, and simultaneously different. Kristeva
explains monumental time as a massive presence, “without cleavage or escape, which has so
little to do with linear time (which passes) that the very word ‘temporality’ hardly fits,
monumental time is all-encompassing and infinite” (Desire in Language 16).
Kusama’s work evokes these ‘other’ conceptions of space time that parallel that of pure
reason. Throughout her work these concepts reappear, playing a role in her creation of
encounters with perception. Kusama thus avoids being subsumed by the spectacle, by addressing
philosophical concepts and by providing participants with an opportunity to experience aesthetic
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understanding, through the interplay of perception and reason. Her work is not just about
perception, or just about reason, both are essential, her immersive aesthetic experiences are about
the interplay of perception and reason.
Yayoi Kusama turned 91 on the 22nd of March, 2020. Kusama is very open about her
life, her inspirations and what it is she wants to communicate. She has spoken often of her
experiences as a child:
One day I was looking at the red flower patterns of the tablecloth on a table, and
when I looked up I saw the same pattern covering the ceiling, the windows, and
the walls, and finally all over the room, my body and the universe. I felt as if I had
begun to self-obliterate, to revolve in the infinity of endless time and the
absoluteness of space, and be reduced to nothingness (Kusama, MOMA press
release, 1998)
This memory, often described as hallucination, imbues every work Kusama creates. Interviews,
autobiographies and biographies never fail to mention Kusama’s tumultuous childhood, the war,

Fig. 4. Untitled, 1939
and the influence of her maternal and paternal relationships. As a young woman, she was
diagnosed with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, but long before that she was consumed by this
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vision of the universe, composed of dots, small particles in motion, at constant risk of
dematerializing. At 10 years of age, Kusama drew a portrait of a woman, said to be her mother,
entirely covered in these same dots (see fig.4). In the drawing, not only the subject, but the
subject's clothing, and all the surrounding sky, are also filled with the dots. There is
directionality and movement in the lines and dots, a sense of energy, particles moving through
space, a momentary suspension of starlight.
Kusama has been thinking about these dots for over 80 years, but even before the dots,
prior to, or simultaneously, exists another childhood memory of great significance to her.
Kusama describes memories of a powerless father and a controlling mother, as a child caught
between them, an agent of her mother, spying on her cheating father. In light of her own
stressing of the importance of these memories and the fact that at the age of 48 she decided to
live voluntarily in a psychiatric institution in Tokyo, where she still resides today, it is difficult
not to get hung up on some kind of Oedipal scene. The young child in the role of voyeur in the
midst of castration. Caught in the act of looking, frozen, in a primal scene. A scene that
traumatized and made her neurotic. Kusama’s well documented psycho sexual trauma bolsters a
nearly archetypal image of the artist who suffers madness, dreams, and visions. But instead of
stopping at Freud’s Oedipal scene of castration or hysteria, both Kristeva, and Deleuze and
Guattari’s, go beyond that moment. Kristeva detects a pre-Oedipal moment, while Deleuze and
Guattari’s describe alternatives to interpretation and identification.
In Matter and Memory, Bergson describes the demands perception makes of memory,
and how both dreams and insanity occur during a breakdown in the relationship between
perception and memory. According to Bergson, distinct perception and memory image are to be
considered “a dynamic progress by which the one passes into the other” (162). In recalling a
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memory, the individual disconnects from the present in order to situate them self within a region
of the past; recalling a memory is “a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a
camera” (Memory and Matter 171). Focus and attention to disturbances or stimulations from the
external world result in reflexive action and help ensure equilibrium of the body, and its ability
to adapt to circumstances.
However, Bergson explains “relax this tension or destroy this equilibrium: everything
happens as if attention detached itself from life. Dreams and insanity appear to be little else than
this” (227). In other words, a disturbance of the psychic life appears to Bergson to be an
unloosening or a breaking of the tie which binds psychic life to its motor accompaniment, a
weakening or impairing of attention to corporeal demand. And as such, dreams imitate insanity
(Memory and Matter 228). Both of these states of mind relate to the experience of losing self, a
shedding of identity, or a self-obliteration. A disconnect between mind and body that arises when
so lost in thought and memory that the senses are neglected.
Rather than a disconnect between mind and body, Kristeva’s pre-Oedipal moment is
instead, an elaboration of the semiotic. It is a moment before identity is constituted. Kristeva
describes the semiotic as a state of being, still porous, without clear borders or limits, propelled
by the anarchic, heterogeneous, rhythmic flow of drive energy “which has no thesis and no
position” (26). A state without identity. The semiotic is a creative drive that has the potential to
slide into obsession and madness. The creator may become so consumed with creation that there
is a complete loss of identity or disconnect from the ego, and considered to be in a state of
mental disturbance. Kristeva says the poetic utterance is a result of a particular articulation
between symbolic and semiotic dispositions (Desire in Language 7). The poetic utterance is an
interplay of reason and sense.
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To recover from the moment of self-obliteration, psychoanalysis says, “stop, find
yourself again”, while Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “let’s go further still, we haven’t found our
BwO yet, we haven’t sufficiently dismantled our self” (Deleuze and Guattari 151). Deleuze first
uses the term Body without Organs in his book The Logic of Sense, 1969, where the Body
without Organs is described as a relationship between a unified assembly of fully functioning
parts and a deeper reality intertwining it. At the same time, it also describes a relationship to
one's literal body. Later, in collaboration with Guattari the meaning of the term expands,
referring to an undifferentiated, nonhierarchical realm that lies beyond the world of appearances.
They compare the BwO to the egg, as possessing future potential. For Deleuze and Guattari, the
BwO is a collection of potentials, a vast reservoir of potential traits, connections and movements.
When they suggest making “oneself a body without organs”, they mean to actively experiment,
to attempt to draw out and activate potentials (Deleuze and Guattari 157). They challenge
psychoanalysis with a new approach, one that substitutes anamnesis with forgetting and replaces
interpretation with experimentation (Deleuze and Guattari 151).
Their BwO, or Body without Organs, is a concept that signifies many things in different
contexts. The BwO is what remains when you take everything away. They explain that
psychoanalysis translates everything into fantasies, and when the fantasy is taken away, when
significations and subjectifications as a whole are gone, then you have the idea of the body
without organs (Deleuze and Guattari 151). The body without organs does not assign function,
does not specify rule and category. The body without organs is a process of self-obliteration, and
a state of self-obliteration is a necessary element in the process of creation.
It is clear Kusama is in dialogue with these concepts and that the conversation occurs
within poetic language. Kusama puts that energy, that creative drive to work. However, while it
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is important to consider these ideas about the artists’ state of mind in order to gain a more
thorough understanding of the work, they are not as relevant to the participants’ experience of
the work. While the artist imbues the work with a message, a communication, the artist is unable
to predict how the work will be interpreted by those who encounter it. Kusama has said, “When I
was a child I experienced this state of self obliteration”, in which she saw the world around her
as composed of moving dots (Rietti). Kusama has spent her entire life painting and recreating
this motif. She describes an intense vision of everything, including herself, as particles, dancing,
endlessly transforming. Her description echoes that of first century Roman philosopher poet
Lucretius. Lucretius wrote of a universe in a constant state of flux. He describes the universe at
an atomic level, comprised of energy in constant flow, transformation and retransformation;
everything comprised of particles and waves. This vision has had a fundamental impact on all of
Kusama’s work and the attentive participant intuits this.
Early in Kusama’s artistic career her dot motif expanded to include what she refers to as
infinity nets (see fig. 5). These large canvases are all connected to yet another memory, this time
of fishing nets being flung out over the water. While peering out the window during a flight
above the Pacific Ocean, Kusama had a vision. In it she saw light reflecting off water. The points
of light became nets, spreading throughout the universe. Her large scale canvases are
compositions, in a minimal palette, of designs that appear neither accidental nor methodical.
Impasto, crescent shaped brush strokes repeat, filling the pictorial plane without a central focus,
an effect that emphasizes the correspondence between the materiality of the painted net and the
illusion of space behind and arrested within the net. She has said of the vision, that she felt
trapped, strangled by the nets, and has described her Infinity Nets as paintings “without
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Fig. 5 Yayoi Kusama, Infinity Net Paintings, 1961
beginning, end, or center” (“The Art Story, Kusama”). There is another correspondence, that of
being the net while also being caught up in the net. Entanglement with the infinite net that
connects all things, without beginning, end, or center, a recognition, an intuition of the entirety of
the universe, as endlessly recurring energy. To recognize the immensity of an infinite universe
and see the transitory and ephemeral nature of all beings, is to face the void, and to momentarily
lose track of identity. In an encounter with the infinite self is obliterated.
In 2012, the Tate London presented Kusama’s The Obliteration Room, originally
conceived as a project for children, and first exhibited at the Queensland Art Gallery in 2002 (see
fig. 6). Kusama's interactive The Obliteration Room begins as an entirely white room filled with
white furnishings, in which participants are invited to position colorful dot stickers throughout
the space. The room transforms over the course of the exhibit. The concept of self-obliteration is
explicit in this immersive aesthetic experience. What is important is not the room, or the dots, it
is the experience of taking ownership of your dots and determining their particular placement,
while reflecting on identity and universality, on difference and repetition. What is the relation
between sticking colorful dots throughout an empty white space and Deleuze’s concept of
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repetition, and how does it relate to self-obliteration? These dots and the activity of placing
becomes an expression of singularity, in that there is a universal aspect to the colorful dots
against the empty white space, and yet through positioning, each dot experiences particularity,
the dot is both universal and particular. As such, each dot is an example of the singular. The act
of placing the dot stickers while moving throughout the space is emblematic of shedding one’s
identity. By the end of the experience the colorful card, once full of dots, is empty, the blank
white space has exchanged position. The perception of breaking down into dot’s or particles, a
breaking down that suggests the dissolution of body and identity.

Fig. 6. The Obliteration Room, 2012

At issue is the entanglement of the symbolic and the semiotic, the semiotic exists
prior to the symbolic, and in attempts to express the semiotic urge through symbolic means
language acts as a trap. The realm of the symbolic, of language, order and reason is
consistently pitted against that of the semiotic, the poetic utterance, sense and perception.
Further, exaltation of the notion that reason and logic are distinct faculties advances a
specific characterization of how thinking ‘ought’ to be done, creating a foundation of
presumptions upon which so-called truths are built. Identity is associated with a specific
interpretation of difference and repetition that relies on quantitative generalities and language
that supports them. Deleuze zeros in on this issue in his 1968 account of the western critique
of identity, Difference and Repetition, a philosophical text Kusama’s The Obliteration Room,
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calls to mind. Repetition is an essential component of Kusama’s work. Deleuze describes the
complex relation between difference and repetition and how their interpretation is split into
either the language of science or lyrical language.
The experience Kusama’s work is an engagement with lyrical language, a language of
qualitative generalities, which inhabit an ‘other’ notion of difference and repetition. Repetition as
Deleuze would describe it:
Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and
non-substitutable singularities. Reflections, echoes, doubles and souls do not
belong to the domain of resemblance or equivalence; and it is no more possible to
exchange one's soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another. (Deleuze 1)
Deleuze asserts that repetition is a transgression, and explains that if repetition is even possible,
it is a miracle. Repetition, as described by Deleuze, and as utilized by Kusama, “expresses at
once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular” (2).
According to Deleuze “physical, mechanical or bare repetitions (repetition of the Same)” hide
the more profound structures of repetition, disguising and displacing difference, variation is then
a condition or constitutive element of repetition, which provides difference without negation.
Deleuze takes inspiration from Nietzsche’s Eternal Return and states that Nietzsche’s
“leading idea is to ground the repetition in eternal return on both the death of God and the
dissolution of the self” (11). Thus, repetition grounded in lyrical language relates to the
obliteration of self, as the poetic utterance, the semiotic, originates in a state devoid of identity.
Kusama’s The Obliteration Room can be interpreted in relation to Deleuze’s comparison of “the
language of science, dominated by the symbol of equality, in which each term may be replaced
by others; and lyrical language, in which every term is irreplaceable and can only be repeated”
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(2). Looking at, positioning, and reflecting on, these dots is an experience of the impossibility of
repetition and equivalence. It is a small leap toward identity. When the determining
characteristics of identity, based on quantitative factors, are shed, what is left are those
generalities of the qualitative order. Deleuze puts into question the traditional image of thought,
and how this image determines the goal of thought. He explains how “generality presents two
major orders: the qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalences”,
cycles and equalities, are their respective symbols (Deleuze 1). Deleuze points out the western
tendency toward exaltation of an accepted standard of thought and calls attention to this mode of
thought’s other.
Science and mathematics, understanding through reason and logic, empirical thought, are
identified with the possibility of truth. This is a mode of thought that involves counting, quantity,
extensivity, and a space/time conceived of as a homogeneous medium. Bergson identifies two
different kinds of reality, the heterogeneous, which includes sensible qualities, and the
homogenous, namely space. Homogeneous space is conceived and enables us to use distinctions,
to count, to abstract, and perhaps even to speak. Bergson sees the extraordinary conception of an
empty homogeneous medium as a reaction against heterogeneity, which grounds experience (Key
Writings 58). Understanding through reason depends on otherness, juxtaposition, delineation,
and category. The other mode of thought, while bound to that of reason and logic, is the mode of
sense and perception, understanding through quality, intensity, connection and cyclical time.
Quantitative and qualitative modes of understanding have a direct relation to the objective of this
research, which involves the practice of a more balanced approach to understanding, not
abandoning reason, but intentionally employing sense and perception. The practice of an
aesthetic understanding, in which the two modes of thought are in play, specifically when
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engaged in the deciphering of ontological clues, is valuable. The immersive aesthetic experience
is a type of art especially effective in engaging participation in a reflection of being, by
immersing participants in an excess of sensory data and ontological signification. Kusama’s
works are excellent examples of immersive aesthetic experiences that provoke this mode of
interplay and reflection. Kusama creates experiences that are capable of manipulating the
participants' experience of space and time, while demanding the participant, at the very least,
consider the infinite. What follows is a limited discussion of conceptions of space and time and
how Kusama’s work is emblematic of what I refer to as the other way of considering space and
time.
Reason’s clutch on contemporary society must be acknowledged. The glorification of
empirical thinking and its perceived sacred relation to truth, has developed into science as
religion. Many philosophers have considered this observation. In a 2011 interview about their
book Hermeneutic Communism, Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala suggest “abandoning truth
in favor of interpretation, history, and event”, noting that early in the twentieth century “Karl
Popper, Hannah Arendt, and Theodor Adorno warned us about the imposition of scientific
objectivism on all disciplines” (Columbia University Press Blog). Progress and technology are
very much associated with quantitative understanding, which is based on counting, extensivity
and linear time. The breach between the reason of minds and the perception of bodies has
become a chasm. Debord says that representation overcomes lived experience and reality takes
on the appearance of an “object of mere contemplation” (1). As thinking man continues to
emphasize and praise reason and logic, his “activity becomes less and less active and more and
more contemplative” (Debord 8). But the glorification of empirical thinking is built upon the
senses. According to Debord:
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The spectacle inherits all the weaknesses of the Western philosophical project
which undertook to comprehend activity in terms of categories of seeing:
furthermore, it is based on the incessant spread of the precise technical rationality
which grew out of this thought (Debord 4)
Everything is now spectacle, or has the potential to slip into the state of spectacle. Too much
emphasis on the quantitative, and the contemporary privileging of reason and logic, influence
understanding of space and time. The empirical knowledge of math and science focuses on
understanding space through quantity and extensivity and lends to a concept of time that is
essentially the same as that of space.
For Bergson, the contemporary conception of space and time is greatly influenced by,
and has not changed much since, Immanuel Kant. Bergson explains that “the solution given by
Kant does not seem to have been seriously disputed since his time: indeed, it has forced itself,
sometimes without their knowledge, on the majority of those who have approached the problem
anew” (Key Writings 56). In Bergson’s exposition of duration, he explains how reason and
perception affect conceptions of space and time. Reason makes space a homogeneous medium in
which objects are in juxtaposition to one another. Language distils in order to communicate, to
come into agreement. The subject contemplates a relation to all objects within the field of vision.
Precisely, within the subject’s field of vision. All the characteristics of reason and logic come
together in support of the quantitative, the symbolic and a notion of identity.
In Bergson’s description of the role of the subject, in conceiving space, it is the ‘I’ that
notes “size, shape, even the color, of external objects” are altered in relation to ‘my’ body
(Matter and Memory 6). Objects surrounding the subject’s body reflect the subject’s possible
action upon them, Bergson explains, “objects which surround us represent, in varying degrees,
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an action which we can accomplish upon things, or which we must experience from them”
(Matter and Memory 185). Generalities with quantitative characteristics lend themselves to the
project of identification. Identification through quantitative generalities assumes equivalences,
which are capable of being set side by side in space and counted. This space is “the conception
of an empty homogeneous medium” (Key Writings 57). A space that radiates outward
indefinitely from the subject’s point of view. Debord, in describing Spectacular Time, hits upon
what has become a standard conception of time, as a relation to space. Spectacular Time is, “the
time of production, commodity-time, it is an infinite accumulation of equivalent intervals. It is
the abstraction of irreversible time, all of whose segments must prove on the chronometer their
merely quantitative equality” (Debord 46). Debord’s Spectacular Time is the result of reason’s
obsession with the quantifiable.
The problem of emphasizing quantifiable aspects of time ignores how crucial it is to
acknowledge different concepts of time. Without a sense of time it is impossible for society to
function, and without the structure of time everything changes, the good and the bad. Time gives
us memory, that allows us to learn and develop identity. Bergson’s answer to Spectacular Time
is the concept of duration. Bergson explains how the concept of time, which develops out of
reason’s love for counting, becomes a secondary notion of space, a congealed concept of
spacetime, “time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count,
is nothing but space” (Key Writings 56). However, as Bergson explains it, at the threshold of
space and time lies duration, which is other than spacetime.
If reason produces the quantifiable concept of spacetime, then it is perception that relates
to a qualitative concept of time, which Bergson refers to as duration. The concept of spacetime is
the result of a symbolic representation of time derived from space, where time also assumes the
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illusory form of a homogeneous medium, the connecting link between space and time appearing
as simultaneity (Key Writings 64). Bergson explains that “duration and motion are mental
syntheses, and not objects” and although the moving body occupies one point after another on a
line, motion itself has nothing to do with the line (Key Writings 64). The positions occupied by
the moving body vary with the different moments of duration, creating distinct moments by
occupying different positions, duration has no moments which are identical or external to one
another. Thus, duration is essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and has no analogy to number
(Key Writings 68). Bergson points out that it is necessary to make a distinction between
simultaneous positions of moving bodies, which are in space, and their movements, “which
cannot occupy space, being duration rather than extent, quality and not quantity” (Key Writings
66). Bergson describes duration as motion, movement, a state of transformation that is
antithetical to the concept of space. He says:
We cannot make movement out of immobilities, nor time out of space. In short,
just as nothing will be found homogeneous in duration except a symbolical
medium with no duration at all, namely space, in which simultaneities are set out
in a line, in the same way no homogeneous element will be found in motion
except that which least belongs to it, the traversed space, which is motionless
(Key Writings 66)
In order to identify, to count or to categorize, objects are conceived of as located in space, but to
understand duration is to consider intensive qualities that elude strict category and identification.
Without the gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness, the outer circle of
psychic states are deprived of the faculty of perceiving a homogeneous time, which it uses as a
balance-wheel. According to Bergson the loss of this faculty is what occurs during dreams, “here
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we no longer measure duration, but we feel it; from quantity it returns to the state of quality”
(Key Writings 71). The perception of time as a homogeneous medium is indispensable in
situating the subject within real time. However, there is a tendency toward over emphasis of the
quantifiable characteristics associated with reason.
The significance of duration, and its connection to immersive aesthetic experiences,
especially those of Kusama, is its correlation with the now and real experience. Bergson’s
duration is intimately connected to both Lyotard's now, and Deleuze’s real experience. In the
first chapter of this research I indicate how Lyotard’s description of the now, as caught between
the fleeting past and an approaching future, is associated with the ontological aspect of an
experience of the sublime (90). Like duration, the now is a moment ‘out’ of time, a state of
continuous transformation. The now is sensed, it is felt, through the body, which as temporal
matter, is an arrangement of energy, in a constant cycle of creation and destruction. The now and
duration are more lucidly understood through qualitative perception, than quantitative reason.
Both the now and duration are present in the unfolding of the moment.

In his exposition on difference and repetition, Deleuze is in search of temporal, real
experience, rather than theoretical conditions of experience. He is interested in the
experience of the concretely existing individual, here and now. Attempting to understand
experience through quantifiable generalities associated with reason focuses on past and
future experience and tends to miss the present. Eckhart Tolle writes that now is all there is,
“the now is the only point that can take you beyond the limited confines of the mind. It is your
only point of access into the timeless and formless realm of Being” (49). Kusama’s immersive
aesthetic experiences offer participants an encounter with the now by engaging duration and
accentuating real experience.
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What sets the immersive aesthetic experience apart from other immersive experiences is
their propensity to evoke the sublime through aesthetic engagement with questions of ontology.
Kusama’s works successfully combine sense and symbol to elicit reflection on the participant’s
experience of the now. Bergson explains that “distance in space measures the proximity of a
threat or of a promise in time”, space provides a diagram of future possibilities, and because the
future appears to extend indefinitely, “space which symbolizes it remains, in its immobility,
indefinitely open”, the subject’s immediate horizon appears as if surrounded by wider
unperceived concentric circles, extending outward on an infinite plane (Matter and Memory
186). Bergson concludes that “it is, then, of the essence of our actual perception, inasmuch as it
is extended, to be always only a content in relation to a vaster, even an unlimited, experience
which contains it” (Matter and Memory 186). Concepts of space and time affect understanding
of self.
Kusama creates experiences in which the participant steps out of everyday engagement
with quantitative, determining, time and space and into a qualitative experience of space and
time. In The Obliteration Room, infinitely extended space is indicated by the completely white
walls and furnishings, but Kusama also uses mirror as a medium to create the illusion of
infinitely extended space. Kusama’s work invites the participant to explore the role of perception
in understanding the ‘other’ conception of space and time. This is an understanding that flows
from the initial idea of obliteration of self, toward the infinite and the singularity of being within
the infinite. Kusama’s Mirror Infinity Rooms incorporate a control of linear time and the design
of light and space to create an immersive experience of endless, transgressive repetition, which
signals the obliteration of self. Kusama utilizes light and mirror to suggest the universe extending
out in all directions, signifying the infinite. During this brief experience the participant is
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provided the opportunity to reflect on singularity.

Fig. 7. Aftermath of Obliteration of Eternity, 2009
The title of Kusama’s 2009 infinity mirror room, Aftermath of Obliteration of Eternity recalls
previous works concerned with obliteration, the disillusion of all things, including self (see
fig.7). Here the participant encounters the moment following the shedding of identity. The work
might suggest a night sky, endlessly full of sky lanterns, Japanese paper lanterns used in
traditional festivals of mythical origin. Or perhaps a magical dark wood filled with fireflies?
When the participant is in the midst of interpreting and simultaneously experiencing the other
conception of spacetime, duration, they are engaged in the interplay of reason and perception that
is aesthetic understanding.
This type of immersive aesthetic experience fulfills what Deleuze indicates as lacking,
while referencing Nietzsche on the need to engage performative perception. Deleuze points out
that Nietzsche is among those in philosophy who sought a new means of expression, one in
which movement is the issue, putting “metaphysics in motion, in action” (8). He describes how it

110
was not enough for Nietzsche to simply outline “a new representation of movement” (Deleuze
8). The true task is the performative production of movement within a work, movement capable
of affecting the mind. Deleuze aims to make “movement itself a work, without interposition; of
substituting direct signs for mediate representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings,
gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind (8). The poetic utterance that appeals
to sense. The performative doing, experiencing the now, being present, this is what Deleuze
describes, and that is exactly what the work of Kusama is about. Visual representation may have
lost some of its power due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of engaged interpretation, due in
part to the ceaseless flow of images inherent in the digital age. In order to maneuver successfully
within this ceaseless flow, assumptions and decisions are made based upon identity, category and
memory. As a reliance on reason developed, the experience of perception has become neglected.
It is held that reason stands the test of time, while perceptions are fleeting.
Yet, as Bergson points out, “however brief we suppose any perception to be, it always
occupies a certain duration” (Matter and Memory 25). Scientific understanding, associated with
reason “cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential
and qualitative element of time, duration, and of motion, mobility” (Key Writings 66). Time in
terms of scientific understanding, relates to a homogeneous medium, one in which even
“conscious states are ranged alongside one another in space, so as to form discrete multiplicity”
(Key Writings 55). However, a distinction should be made between perception and pure
perception. Perception should be understood as complex and augmented by memory. Whereas
pure perception, according to Bergson is “a perception which exists in theory rather than in fact
and would be possessed by a being...absorbed in the present and capable, by giving up every
form of memory, of obtaining a vision of a matter both immediate and instantaneous” (Matter
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and Memory 26). Because perception includes both duration and memory, several conscious
states permeate one another, organized into a whole. Perception, gradually gains a richer content
through commingling. Reason constructs the trap inherent in language in order to communicate
and is evidenced in the very use of the word ‘several’ to describe conscious states, it betrays a
deeply ingrained habit of mentally setting out in time and space, in isolating and externalizing,
compelled by the use of language (Matter and Memory 69). Pure perception, of sensations which
are unextended and simply qualitative, only reach extensity through synthesis (Matter and
Memory 57). Brain function is synthesis, and communication is a fundamental condition.
Reason and perception are sources of two processes of language, the symbolic and the
semiotic. According to Kristeva the symbolic process is that of reason, it identifies, quantifies
and categorizes. But associated with perception, sensation and the qualitative, is the semiotic
process. Kristeva connects this ‘other’ process to a female subjectivity that retains repetition and
eternity (Desire in Language 16). Cyclical and monumental time are two types of temporality
traditionally linked to female subjectivity. She explains:
There are cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm which
conforms to that of nature and impose a temporality whose stereotyping may
shock, but whose regularity and unison with what is experienced as
extrasubjective time, cosmic time, occasion vertiginous visions and unnamable
jouissance. (Desire in Language 16)
Kristeva describes monumental temporality as a massive presence, without cleavage or
escape, that has “so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the very word
‘temporality’ hardly fits” (Desire in Language 16). All-encompassing and infinite are the
words Kristeva chooses to describe this other conception of time. While the semiotic
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process occurs in cyclical and monumental time, it also relates to the semiotic space of
the chora, a term meaning “receptacle,” which she borrowed from Plato.
Plato is credited as describing the chora as “an invisible and formless beam which
receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most
incomprehensible” (Desire in Language 6). The chora is a space anterior to the space of
reason (Desire in Language 6). The chora, Kristeva’s conception of semiotic space, is a
space attributed to ‘woman’, a space of religious significance, a “matrix space,
nourishing, unnamable, anterior to the One, to God and consequently, defying
metaphysics” (Desire in Language 16). The ‘other’ conception of space, based in
qualitative perception is, according to Kristeva, a feminine, generating and creative
space. The semiotic process, which involves cyclical and monumental time and the space
of the chora, occurs before the symbolic process. Kristeva describes how sequences of
linked instants form rhythms, which are immanent to the chora, chora and rhythm, space
and time, coexist (Desire in Language 286). Kristeva states that “the permanence and
quality of maternal love condition the appearance of the first spatial references which
induce the child’s laugh and then induce the entire range of symbolic manifestations
which lead eventually to sign and syntax” (Desire in Language 15). The echolalia of
infants, the babbling and cooing in response to the nearness of the face and sounds of the
mother situate the child and quickly evolve to communication.
Kusama evokes this qualitative experience in her manipulation of space perception. Her
mirror infinity rooms provide opportunities for immersive aesthetic experience of the semiotic
moment, a generative duration, that emphasizes the now. Whether the participant bends over and
peeks in, pokes their head through a hole, or steps into the mirrored space, physical engagement
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is necessary (see fig. 8). The experience is designed to be limited, brief, the participant only
marginally in control. How long can you really keep a head poked through a hole in the wall?
The mirrored rooms are scheduled and you wait in line for your 45 seconds. The brevity of the
experience, combined with the anticipation of getting inside combine to emphasize the moment.
There is just enough

Fig. 8. Promotional images for Kusama exhibitions
time to focus on what appears to be infinite space, extending outward in all directions, and then it
is over. Kusama’s mirror infinity rooms emphasize the ephemeral ‘now’ which Lyotard
describes as always “dragged away by what we call the flow of consciousness, the course of life,
of things, of events, whatever - it never stops fading away. So that it is always both too soon and
too late to grasp anything like a ‘now’ in an identifiable way” (25). This inability to identify,
through reason and quantity, is due to the fact that the now is more closely associated with
duration and intensity.
In the perception of pure duration, Bergson announces a specific connotation of
multiplicity that derives from the qualitative characteristics of perception, a multiplicity of
connectedness. Bergson asserts, “outside ourselves we should find only space, and consequently
nothing but simultaneities”, this is an idea expressed visually in the mirror infinity rooms (Key
Writings 67). Simultaneity is emphasized through the illusion of an endless repetition of points
of light. This simultaneous appearance suggesting the infinite obscures the fact that there can be
no concept of succession without memory. In space “nothing is left of the past positions”, it is in
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duration where the process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states happens (Key
Writings 63). According to Bergson, “pure duration is the form which the succession of our
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present
state from its former states” (Key Writings 60).
In the mirror infinity rooms the repeating points of light have no point of origin, no
location of starting or stopping can be found, stepping into this space creates a brief experience
of stepping ‘out’ of time and into duration. Bergson explains that while reason and quantitative
thinking deal with expressions of things already done, “it is of the very essence of duration and
motion, as they appear to our consciousness, to be something that is unceasingly being done”
(Key Writings 68). Duration is essentially “a succession of qualitative changes which melt into
and permeate one another” (Key Writings 61). The perception of duration as an intermingling of
states, forms what Bergson calls a “continuous or qualitative multiplicity”, a multiplicity that
does not reference number, rather a multiplicity of connectedness (Key Writing 62). This
describes the multiplicity that is at the core of Kusama’s work. Bergson says of this multiplicity:
If the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether it is that which is
unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply
expressed this probable similitude when I speak of a center from which worlds
shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display - provided, however, that I do not
present the center as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. (Creative
Evolution 271)
It is difficult not to see a connection between this description of an array of fireworks, with
Kusama’s mirror infinity rooms. Both as simultaneous sparkling points of light, filling the field
of vision, at once an unmaking and a remaking, an obliteration. Bergson traces a path from
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duration to a multiplicity that reveals connectivity and shows how space perception is able to
reveal this multiplicity. Kusama emphasizes infinite connection in her message of love and hope.
The multiplicity of duration is qualitative and not connected to number, it is of perception, and
the ‘other’ which escapes language, ultimately revealed as connection. This concept of
multiplicity as connection is explicit in Kusama’s intent, “eternal unlimited universe, love for
humanity, and longing for peace in the world—these concepts become increasingly serious
through the development of my philosophy of life and art” (Kusama). Love is an ambiguous
goal, does this love for humanity emphasize human existence, or is it a reminder that
connectivity includes all life. In the experience of the mirrored infinity rooms the notion of ‘love’
can be associated with a joyful feeling of an ontological recognition of multiplicity. Kusama
helps the participant associate the infinite with the ontological, by creating an experience of the
infinite, through spatial disorientation and exquisitely lavish lighting design. The joyful laughter
of the participant who steps into the room and is immediately lost within the beauty of an endless
universe of stars, for Kusama, is an expression of love for life.
Bergson describes two types of multiplicity, one connected to reason and number, the
other, a multiplicity of sensing and intensity, as the states of consciousness which permeate one
another. The multiplicity of material objects relies on progressive determination, differential
thinking rooted in number, and it looks for origin, demanding that either “everything is given
once for all, from all eternity either material multiplicity itself, or the act of creating this
multiplicity, given in block in the divine essence”, the origin of being as either an instantaneous
occurrence or an eternal state (Creative Evolution 263). The introduction of number implies
“intuition of a multiplicity of parts or units, which are absolutely alike. And yet they must
somehow be distinct from one another, since otherwise they would merge into a single unit”
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(Key Writings 49). Number is then defined as the synthesis of the one and the many (Key
Writings 49). The multiplicity of pure duration is an idea of multiplicity without relation to
number or space (Key Writings 70). This is a multiplicity of states of consciousness, which
cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of symbolical representation, the introduction
of space (Key Writings 54). Kusama introduces space as a symbolic representation of the
multiplicity inherent in pure duration. As we will see this is also the multiplicity Deleuze
describes as assemblages, and the body without organs.
The multiplicity of perception and duration, is of the semiotic and relates to ideas about
connectedness, lines of a flight, deterritorialization, and becoming. Bergson points toward this
when he expresses how life is movement, materiality the inverse movement, and each of these
two movements are in simple, undivided flux (Creative Evolution 272). Bergson states that”
We shut our eyes to the unity of the impulse which, passing through generations,
links individuals with individuals, species with species, and makes of the whole
series of the living, one single immense we flowing over matter, but each
individual itself seems to us as an aggregate, aggregate of molecules and
aggregate of facts. (Creative Evolution 273)
Not simply the universal, nor the particulars, but the singular, in which the smallest grain of dust
is bound up with the entire solar system, the universe itself, an assemblage of analogous solar
systems. Before the infinite complexity of interwoven presuppositions this entails, our
understanding recoils (Creative Evolution 272). Bergson explains that the understanding has a
choice, “either to regard the infinitely complex (and thereby infinitely well-contrived)
organization as a fortuitous concatenation of atoms, or to relate it to the incomprehensible
influence of an external force that has grouped its elements together” (Creative Evolution 273)
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But either option, complexity or incomprehensibility, are both the work of the understanding.
What is necessary, according to Bergson, is understanding that occurs through more than just the
intellect alone. With sense and intellect in interplay, a deeper understanding of how everything is
bound up is achieved.
Deleuze, in collaboration with Guattari, approaches this deeper understanding of
multiplicity through the sensing of potentials. Their book A Thousand Plateaus describes the
connected concepts of assemblage and body without organs that relate to a qualitative
multiplicity. The multiplicity of assemblage occurs in its connectivity and through duration.
What this means is that because everything is connected and in a constant state of change,
potential is unlimited. They explain, “in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity,
strata and territories; But also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and
destratification...All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes assemblage” (Deleuze and
Guattari 3). It is connectivity, as well as movement, the assemblage contains no “individual
statements” and is described as “fundamentally libidinal and unconscious” or better yet, I assert,
of the semiotic (Deleuze and Guattari 36). Assemblage is creative drive, the unlimited potential
of the body without organs. Kusama’s mirrored infinity rooms can be seen as examples of
assemblage, as poetic utterance, the immersive aesthetic experience is singular, at once
consisting of the particular, the participant, who momentarily sheds identity and recognizes the
universal. The body without organs is the potential which dismantles “the organism, causing
asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it
leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari 4). The
body without organs is process, and can be described as a process of obliteration, not unlike
stepping into a mirrored infinity room, where characteristics of the particular are shed in favor of
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a recognition of the unlimited potential inherent in the infinite connectivity of multiplicity.
Like Kusama, Deleuze and Guattari explore the connection between obliteration of self
and a multiplicity of connection, both necessitate the shedding of identity, as an essential aspect
of understanding this multiplicity. A Thousand Plateaus asserts that the “multiple must be made,
not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways… the only way the
one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted”, a multiplicity in which identity and category fall
apart (Deleuze and Guattari 6). They describe multiplicity as a semiotic evocation “libidinal,
unconscious, molecular, intensive multiplicity” composed of particles whose nature is to change,
to “constantly construct and dismantle” (Deleuze and Guattari 33). Intensity is characteristic of
particles of this kind of multiplicity. A multiplicity of qualitative perception, in which the subject
becomes so engrossed, that just for a moment, the subject stops thinking about individual
subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari refer to a multiplicity that is not based on number, “it is a
problem not of the One and the Multiple but of a fusional multiplicity” (Deleuze and Guattari
154). They explain that it is in the “operation of depersonalization” that the instantaneous
apprehension of a multiplicity is possible (Deleuze and Guattari 37). I argue that it is also in this
instantaneous apprehension of multiplicity that the sublime may be found.
Both the apprehension of a fusional multiplicity and the sublime, are brief experiences
that are always in some way forgotten. The unity inherent in multiplicity becomes obscured.
Bergson explains that consciousness is “goaded by an insatiable desire to separate” substituting
symbols for reality in order to better adapt to social life and language, consequently losing sight
of a fundamental self grounded in multiplicity (Key Writings 72). According to Bergson
“perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur under two aspects: the one clear and precise,
but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot
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get hold of it without arresting its mobility” (Key Writings 72). Language, born of symbol, is
grounded in reason and because it is easier to see the immediate consequences of outer, social
life, it appears to be more practically important than inner, individual existence. Hence, the
difference between perceiving and recognizing, between learning and remembering, escapes
attention. In order to communicate efficiently a reliance on what is already known develops,
thoughts turn toward the recall of similar circumstances or relationships in order to make quick
associations and determining categories, rather than investigating the feelings aroused in each
new and unique encounter. It is instinctive to solidify impressions in order to express them in
language, and because of this there is confusion between “the feeling itself, which is in a
perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word
which expresses the object” (Key Writings 73). Bergson describes a “violent love or a deep
melancholy” as “a thousand different elements which dissolve into and permeate one another
without any precise outlines”, which are distorted (Key Writings 74). Emotions, feelings,
especially strong ones are often a shifting mixture, what might be described as anger, may in fact
be some combination of fear, loss, and anxiety. Pursuit of identification fundamentally changes
the state of being.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a sharp focus on qualitative multiplicity
because it is always changing, and it is challenging to define because it is antithetical to the
concretization of symbols necessary in language. Multiplicity performs syntheses, resulting in a
unification that “forgets” opposition (Desire in Language 48). This is a multiplicity more readily
available to the understanding through the poetic utterance. When the qualitative nature of
ontological connection is revealed through the poetic utterance, aesthetic understanding that
relates to a recognition of the unity inherent in infinite multiplicity results in an experience of the
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sublime. The immersive aesthetic experience of Kusama’s mirrored infinity rooms provide the
opportunity for lived expression of this type of poetic utterance. The mirrored infinity rooms
encourage exploration of space perception and its relation to identity. This experience, in which
the participant engages both perception and reason in ontological reflection, is capable of
evoking a sublime that appears in the form of jouissance.
Jouissance is a term that plays a pivotal role in psychoanalysis. The word is associated
with vastly different interpretations, and the jouissance employed in this discussion, as a form of
the sublime, includes an overwhelming, yet playful and exciting recognition that provokes a
laughter of surprise. Glossalalia: An Alphabet of Critical Keywords defines jouissance as
“indivisible, refractory to linguistic distinctions and logical partitionings”, a definition that is also
applicable to a qualitative multiplicity (Wolfreys 165). Deleuze and Guattari describe jouissance
as “the orgasmic plenitude of union”, which indicates the dissolution of the constitutionally split
subject (Deleuze and Guattari 532). The subject, eternally split between the particular and
universal, experiences singularity. This shedding of identity reveals the multiplicity of the now,
and is an experience of duration. Neither particular nor universal, the singular, like reason and
sense, cannot be one or the other, not split, but bound, embodying both aspects simultaneously.
In the recognition of this fundamental self, the subject is brought back to singularity, undivided,
and multiple, and experiences the sublime.
The immersive aesthetic experience always involves the interplay of sensory perception
and the interpretation of ontological signification in a way that may evoke an experience of the
sublime. Kusama’s mirrored infinity rooms are immersive aesthetic experiences, in which sense
is engaged in illusions of infinite space, a space that elicits reflection on the connectivity of
multiplicity. These rooms, with mirrors facing each other from every angle, a space filled with
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suspended points of light, emphasize an endless repetition of the same and the individual’s place
within the universe. Instead of seeing differences, the participant is struck with simple
multiplicity. Kristeva affirms the power of “aesthetic practices” to counterbalance and demystify
the use of language as a universal and unifying tool. The experience of art should underscore
singularity and multiplicity in order to express the relativity of existence and to impress
responsibility for putting fluidity into play (Desire in Language 35). Jouissance can be seen as a
result of these elements coming together in an instant, and is described as a “unique undivided
substance where fantasy is redoubled (and undone) by the articulated work of art” (Wolfreys
165). Jouissance is an aesthetic experience of existential understanding from the safety of a
conceptual distance.
This experience, as described by Kristeva, is a period of indistinction between ‘same’ and
‘other,’ infant and mother, or subject and object, where no space has yet been delineated, the
source of the semiotic chora. She explains that this semiotic process arrests and absorbs the
awareness and mobility of fetishes, drives and desire, providing relief and producing laughter
(Desire in Language 284). This laughter is important because it is the laughter of jouissance that
may be experienced through Kusama’s work. Kristeva describes the perception of “the imprint of
an archaic moment, the threshold of space, the chora” as capable of producing laughter. The
laughter produced by this perception is of “a joy without words”, before words (Desire in
Language 283). According to Kristeva “laughter is the evidence that the instant took place”
(Desire in Language 286). An instant before words, before distinction, a moment of duration in
which an awareness of being creates intense joy. Kristeva says that jouissance is “sexual,
spiritual, physical, conceptual at one and the same time” (Desire in Language 16), it shares much
in common with a qualitative multiplicity. This is an experience that demonstrates the
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importance of aesthetic understanding produced through the interplay of reason and perception.
The contemporary imbalance that favors logic and reason, while discounting the human
necessity to linger, can be addressed through practice and awareness. Immersive aesthetic
experiences are works of art that provide the opportunity for what Deleuze refers to as an
encounter. He describes a sensation that avoids definition and cannot be recognized under
empirical category, a sensation that can only be sensed. Aesthetic understanding is not one thing
or another, it is ‘other’, there is no opposition of terms. Reason and perception are double and
Kristeva says of the double, that it should be thought of as “communion or symmetrical
reunion”, expressing “the solidarity of rivals”, in the same absolute way as life is opposed to
death, love to hate, virtue to vice, good to bad, or being to nothingness (47). One does not exist
without the other. Encounters in which the faculties, sensibility, imagination, memory and
thought communicate from one to another demand the luxury of lingering.
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CHAPTER THREE
Anish Kapoor
I have nothing to say
and I am saying it
and that is poetry as I need it
― John Cage
While it may be difficult for the conveyor of an experience of interior knowledge, a
feeling, to find the right words to express this insight, it is even more problematic for the receiver
to fully grasp the depth of meaning behind mere words alone, often only the poetic utterance
may suffice. The immersive aesthetic experience is an example of this mode of communication.
Aesthetic understanding, that may result from such an experience, is more deeply felt and
understood than if simply read in a straightforward statement. Anish Kapoor creates work that
serves as a paradigm of what the immersive aesthetic experience should be.
Kapoor is a studio artist who makes sculptures and installations on a large scale. Kapoor
has a history of using materials such as stone, pigment, wax and polished stainless steel. His
sculptures and installations are clean and minimal, while at the same time exuberant and suffused
with ontological content. Immersive aesthetic experience is a practice that emphasizes the
experience of aesthetic understanding through sensory perception and engagement with
ontological signification, while allowing for the much needed practice of a more balanced
thinking, through an awareness of sense in collaboration with reason. In immersive aesthetic
experiences, aesthetic understanding of ontological signification may result in an experience of
the sublime.
The previous exploration of Yayoi Kusama’s work demonstrates how sensory perception
of infinite space and the accompanying loss of identity may result in an experience of the
sublime, in the form of jouissance. Kapoor offers another example of the immersive aesthetic
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experience. He creates opportunities for the engagement of sensory perception in a reading of
ontological signifiers. Whereas Kusama’s focus is on calling forth the infinite, Kapoor creates
experiences in which the participant is drawn toward the void. This chapter demonstrates how
the concepts: void, nothingness, absence, emptiness and transformation, serve to evoke a sublime
abjection. Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences are a confrontation with absence that serves
to emphasize presence. This is an absence that is both connected to, and distinct from presence.
Kapoor’s void and Kusama’s infinite are intimately connected, eternally bound as absence and
presence.
This chapter is an inquiry into the philosophical implications and underpinnings of the
writings of Wilhelm Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Julia Kristeva and Jean Luc Nancy among
others. Absence accentuates presence and emphasizes the body’s ephemeral nature, the
continuously alternating shift between absence and presence insists on a recognition of ‘other’ or
alterity. This recognition of the relationship of other and same marks ascension, transformation.
If the discovery of being, as one with the infinite, is joyous and unexpected, the instantaneous
understanding of the material and earthly nature of being is creeping and anxiety ridden. A fully
engaged experience of Kapoor’s work has the potential to evoke a sublime, in the form of
abjection.
Like John Cage, Kapoor often insists he has nothing to say, and yet the fact of content is
imminent in his poetic utterances, the creation of immersive aesthetic experiences. In a 2006
conversation with Marcello Dantas, Kapoor clarifies that while he feels very strongly about
politics and the environment, as an artist, he is looking for “the interaction between the process
of making and the meanings that arrive out of that process”, his interest is in dialogue and
juxtaposition, the emphasis on ‘meanings’ rather than meaning. Kapoor is interested in the
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possibility of narrative without storytelling (Morely 91). Art is communication, at its best when it
is a system of signs and symbols that can be interpreted in a multitude of ways, the fertile ground
of ambiguity and singularity. Art loses its ambiguity when its message becomes explicit, when it
is grounded in logos and reason; at which point it becomes either advertising or propaganda.
Kapoor is successful in creating ambiguous signification, open to interpretation. He believes it is
not his role to be expressive, but “to bring to expression...to define means that allow
phenomenological and other perceptions which one might use, one might work with, and then
move towards a poetic existence” (Hossenally).
The notion of a poetic existence brings to mind Heidegger’s assessment of the ancient
Greek term ‘poiesis’, to make, to bring forth. A major concern for Heidegger is the role of
poiesis in manifestations of thought. The Question Concerning Technology is a warning that
while reason and analytical thinking are important, they do not fulfill man’s thinking nature.
(Heidegger 309). In order to satisfy man’s thinking nature he needs calculative thought, but he
also requires another kind of thinking, elusive and yet aware of its own movement and direction
(Heidegger 367). In poiesis lies the mysterious unnamed force that calls forth thinking, and
provides creative inspiration, the ‘I know not what’ that comes from, ‘I know not from where’.
This is thinking in accord with ambiguity and singularity. Thinking that relies on an openness to
a multitude of correspondences, in which there is no one and defining truth, no one and defining
translation. Poiesis is rooted in the arriving of something, from out of itself, bringing forth.
Heidegger notes that what is brought forth by the artist, belongs to the bringing-forth, not in
itself, but in another. In the work of art, poiesis as the potential to bring forward, occurs within
the audience, as an effect of contemplating the art object. The artist does not control the bringing
forward, or what is brought forward, the artist simply facilitates the bringing forward (Heidegger
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317). Kapoor’s works of art are communications that involve the contemplation of complex
networks, associations and outcomes. Kapoor, like Heidegger, believes it is the artist’s task to
develop work that is grounded within these complex networks of correspondence, which help
initiate contemplation.
Kapoor’s poetic existence is a correlative of Heidegger’s poetic habitation, a mode of
being he describes in the essay What Calls for Thinking, as a process of revealing. Both poetic
existence and habitation entail dwelling, lingering, presence, being present and aware both in
terms of sense and mind. Heidegger also identifies an important aspect of dwelling is the
recognition of death and the possibility of one's own non-existence. This type of ontological
reflection is the desired outcome of the immersive aesthetic experience. Kapoor creates
opportunities to linger, and he hopes, “the narrative makes viewers feel uncomfortable at
times…the dialogue between the work and place has to remain speculative and poetic. It’s about
how you relate to it” (Hossenally). Poetic existence is about the experience of understanding
through sense in collaboration with reason, and when the content of aesthetic understanding is
related to existential questions, the sublime may be evoked. The aesthetic experience can be
many things, playful, beautiful, repugnant or simply thought provoking, but the sublime is a brief
existential revelation.
Kapoor thinks the interplay between the phenomenological, the perceptual, and the
psychological is at the heart of what makes art, and he quotes Marcel Duchamp, asserting that
the effect of art is more important than the art object. However, the conceptual nature of
Kapoor’s work, his ‘saying’, is grounded in, and supported by an intensely formal architecture.
The formal, as well as the phenomenological, emphasis of Kapoor’s work lies in light, space, and
movement. Kapoor’s objects and environments refuse to fold up, or relinquish space. Sky Mirror,
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2020 on display at Houghton Hall, offers an example of how these elements come together and
allow the participant to discern a geometry of higher dimensions, of space emerging and
receding, emptying out and filling up (see fig. 9).
Like many of his works, Sky Mirror plays a strange game with symmetry. Symmetry is
embedded within the structure of the work, while at the same time the work is busy distorting
and disjointing all it reflects. Light, shadow, and multiplicity are all important components of the
work and combine to emphasize the element of space. The hand of the artist is made to be
invisible. This work contains no brushstrokes, no chisel marks. The surface is alien, hard and
deeply polished. Kapoor works to create the illusion of auto-generated objects, expending
considerable effort to remove any evidence of the hand of the artist.

Fig. 9. Sky Mirror at Houghton Hall, 2020
In Kapoor’s work the fictions of origin play an important recurring role. Kapoor’s
attraction to concealing the imprint of the artistic ‘hand’ helps satisfy his desire to deeply engage
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the participants' mind. The inscrutable perception of this continuously transforming object insists
on seeking reference and origin. Conceptually, this practice refers to artistic mythologies, where
‘fiction’ is an operative term, indicating “the sui generis or self-generated nature of the Divine”
(Bhabha). Kapoor refers to “Svyambhuv, the Sanskrit word for the ‘self-born’ aesthetic (as
distinct from rupa, the man-made form imposed through human artifice)”, as a concept that
alludes to a transition which occurs between the material and the non-material (Bhabha). The
description of this concept feels strongly connected to Heidegger’s description of poiesis, as a
mode of being in the state of bring forth. The effect in Kapoor’s work is a continuous fluctuation
between impressions of the object, at one moment self-generated, divine, and in the next,
incontestably manmade. This psychological movement suggests reflection, and indicates
Kapoor’s metaphysical concerns. According to Kapoor, “the polished surface is in fact not
different from the pigment. In the end it has to do with issues that lie below the material, with the
fact that materials are there to make something else possible; that is what interests me” (Bhabha).
The viewer’s perception of the work continuously shifts, as the viewer moves in relation to the
work, the work changes, engaging participation. The work is conceptual, it can be referenced or
read as a sign, in multiple ways and it is interactive because the form continuously changes in
relation to the position of the participant. The object, its environment, and the participant, are at
once connected and yet cleft. The way Kapoor addresses objects in space, corresponds
beautifully with Jean Luc Nancy’s description of Stanley Kubrick’s’ 2001: A Space Odyssey as a
subtle lesson, one that “takes space seriously” (Nancy 39). Nancy describes how the film
proposes an instance or indication of sense, a description that could easily be applied to work by
Kapoor:
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The monolith is not God, and it is not present except by virtue of its smooth, hard
surface, as the presence of an absence… The monolith, by means of its
impeccable parallelepiped form, presents itself rather as if it were itself already a
product of technology, a factory-made product. (Nancy 39)
This description prepares the reader for Nancy’s ‘philosophy of confines’ that is
presented in his essay Space: Confines. He relates this monolithic, factory-made object to
his philosophy of confines, in which the gaze “touches its limits on all sides”, poking and
prodding notions of the finitude of the universe, and “the infinite intangibility of the
external border of the limit” (Nancy 40). Taking space seriously involves sense and
requires “the values of on the edge of, beyond, across and along, the values of touching
and detachment, of penetration and escape, transitive and intransitive at once” (Nancy
40). Here sense is how one navigates the confines of space.
The shifting relationship between participant and the work is indicative of the
participation that is characteristic of the immersive aesthetic experience. Sky Mirror draws the
participant’s gaze into its beam and directs the line of sight into the dish, then releases its grasp.
The immersive aesthetic experience involves the engagement of sense and reason in the
interpretation of ontological signification. This ontological content is a question, posited by the
artist in the form of poetic utterance. Kapoor is deeply concerned with this question, a question
without answer. He explains, “I am doing the same things that I was doing when I first thought
that it might be possible to work as an artist. Some interests have deepened, but really the central
issues have remained the same” (Bhabha). Kapoor says that he repeats processes, reworks,
listens, looks and reiterates. Revisiting the same problems in such a way that the repeating “is a
kind of a meditation on a particular condition” (Adajania). In Kapoor’s practice and in the
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participants’ experience of the work, there is an element of ritual, an impulse toward movement,
which elicits the sensation of ritual. The participant experiences the work through repetition of
movement, side to side, forward and back, a nodding of the head, a small dance with the work
that may dissolve into a meditation on multiplicity of the sacred (Adajania). The works have a
mythological, psychological and philosophical coherence.
While it is clear that Kapoor has been influenced by his diverse background, he counts an
early teacher, Romanian born artist Paul Neagu, as a major formative influence. Neagu saw the
artist as a generator of a philosophical world view; his work is figural and references meditative
states, the sacred and the oneiric, as with Kapoor, there is an interest in a “productive tension
between the discursive and the unsayable” (Adajania).
Kapoor is a contemporary of sculpture based artists, including Robert Morris and Donald
Judd, whose practice begins in the period of time after modernism. The modernist focus on the
relational properties of constituent parts, emphasizes quiet contemplation of the art object,
distinct from the subject. The sculpture based art after modernism includes work which is
variously called, literalist, 3-Dimensional and minimalism. In the 1967 essay Art and
Objecthood, Michael Fried takes a modernist position in his critique of this new work. There is a
clear connection between these bodies of work and the immersive aesthetic experience. It is here,
in these early works, where the attention to presence and participation become pivotal in regards
to ends, and the end of, art. In the slow shift from object toward experience, this work
emphasizes the presence of the object. Presence may only be experienced. Presence and absence
are linked, emphasizing one recalls the other. Since the 1960’s Kapoor has been interested in
treating sculpture “as a way of marking the absence rather than the presence of an object”
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(Adajania). Presence and absence are primary ontological concerns. Kapoor’s immersive
aesthetic experiences create opportunities for the interpretation of these ontological signifiers.
Fried’s problem with this new work is its apparent focus on experience. If the focus shifts
from object to experience, he worries that all experience will become art, and there will be no
means of distinction. Fried wants art to remain in its own absolute realm, self-contained, with
categories that describe painting, sculpture and so forth. He thinks this work is out of line with
current trends:
The real distinctions…are displaced by the illusion that the barriers between the
arts are in the process of crumbling…and that the arts themselves are at last
sliding towards some kind of final, implosive, hugely desirable synthesis.
Whereas in fact the individual arts have never been more explicitly concerned
with the conventions that constitute their respective essences. (Fried 843)
Fried’s reference to essences implicates thought rooted in the logos of Kant, Plato and a crusade
for an ultimate ‘truth’ which requires category. Fried calls the work ‘literalist’ and claims
literalist work makes a “case against modernist painting and modern sculpture”, conceiving of
itself “as neither one or the other and is motivated by specific reservations about both” (836).
Modernist work, whatever the medium, aims to be self-contained and outside of time, whereas
this new work is concerned with the encounter of the work. Fried considers this encounter to be
theatrical and is opposed to theatricality, stating “art degenerates as it approaches the condition
of theater” (841). He insists, “theater and theatricality are at war today, not simply with
modernist painting…but with art as such...with modernist sensibility as such” (Fried 843). The
literalist work emphasizes the experience and is thus temporal and dynamic, more difficult to
define and categorize. Fried’s concern is emblematic of the overemphasis on reason and logic,
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apparent today.
Fried sees the relation between object and beholder as the source of theatricality and
describes it as “a symptom of the decadence of literalist art” (835). According to Fried “the
experience of authentic modernist art involves the suspension both of objecthood and of the
sense of duration” (835). Suspension being the key here, the modernist art object is thought to be
eternal, an encounter with it, outside of time. Modernist work is thought to remain the same,
whenever or wherever one encounters it. Alternatively, Fried says that what excites the literalist
sensibility is “a presentment of endless, or indefinite, duration” and that this endlessness is really
about “being able to go on and on, even having to go on and on” (844). Listeralist work is not
outside of time, it emphasizes an experience in time and relies on shifting perception.
Fried explains that because literalist work is concerned with the actual circumstances of
the encounter, it is theatrical (838). This is a theatricality that involves a participant, no mere
spectator. Kapoor has been described as a “conductor of a theatre of inquiry into behaviour by
means of compelling objects that are intensely themselves yet point beyond, to forms of attention
not yet manifest” (Adajania). The ‘theatrical’ experience of a dynamic relation between work
and participant is underscored by formal elements that many of the ‘literalist’ works share in
common. The works invite this engagement, as immersive aesthetic experiences, through formal
sensory data as well as ontological signification. Formally, Kapoor, Morris, and Judd, each
create works that embody wholeness, any constituent parts appearing invisible. The works
typically include “symmetry, lack of traces of process, abstractness, non-hierarchic distribution
of parts, non-anthropomorphic orientations, general wholeness” (Morris 833). In Morris’s Notes
on Sculpture 1-3, he describes how many of these structural pieces are produced, explaining that
“specialized factories and shops are used” (Morris 833). The works are made with materials, and
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through techniques, that amplify the perception of wholeness. Sky Mirror for example is huge,
solid, and seamless. The enormous dish has a mirrored surface that reflects everything in its
vicinity, the sky above, the ground and its figures below.
Judd simply states that “it isn’t necessary for a work to have a lot of things to look at, to
compare, to analyze one by one, to contemplate. The thing as a whole, its quality as a whole, is
what is interesting” (827). Morris explains further that “simplicity of shape does not necessarily
equate with simplicity of experience” (830). These concerns address the modernist proposition
that “art objects have clearly divisible parts that set up the relationships”, and Morris wonders
what the result of a work with only one property might be, especially since, as he points out,
“nothing exists that has only one property” (829). This trajectory of thought leads Morris to the
concept of Gestalt, a psychological concept developed in Germany and Austria during the early
twentieth century.
Gestalt describes an immediate apprehension, a sensing, Morris describes it as an
experience in which, “one sees and immediately ‘believes’ that the pattern within one’s mind
corresponds to the existential fact of the object. Belief in this sense is both a kind of faith and
spatial extension and a visualization of that extension” (Morris 829). The principal attributes that
engender this apprehension include wholeness, the ability to distinguish the object in space,
continuity, proximity, similarity, and symmetry or order. Later the concept expands to include
additional elements, like common fate. Morris believes gestalt is stimulated by forms in which
individual parts are obscured (829). The forms Morris sees as most successful in evoking Gestalt
are simple polyhedrons, which are shapes that if inflated, produce a sphere, and have “maximum
resistance to perceptual separation” (829). Because constituent parts are indistinguishable, these
simple forms evade reason. Reason relies on distinction and category, while works employing
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these forms distill and limit components.
Kapoor uses this type of singular form, with an intense awareness of color, in fact Kapoor
is so clearly associated with his use of pigments, that he has been granted an exclusive contract
to use ‘Vantablack’, the blackest pigment around. Morris explains that “intense color, being a
specific element, detaches itself from the whole of the work to become one more internal
relationship” (832). There is a clear pursuit of singularity. Kapoor states that he is uninterested in
composition, he is looking for what he calls ‘absolute conditions’. Singular forms and absolute
color, reflect the formal use of organic materials such as rock, wax, and pigment. In conversation
with Marcello Dantas, Kapoor states, “when I make something red it's not red in relation to
something else. It's red in the same way that when you put your hand into the water it is wet. So I
want the red as red as water is wet” (Dantas). This quest toward singularity is about perception
and sensation. Morris describes how the best sculpture, “takes relationships out of the work and
makes them a function of space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision” (829). The emphasized
relationships are not the compositional elements, rather they are those relationships that actively
shift and change with the movement of the viewer. Morris is invested in an increased awareness
of the viewer’s capacity to establish dynamic apprehension of the object “from various positions
and under varying conditions of light and spatial context” (829). This is an awareness of sense
perception, and as such involves the body.
Another formal characteristic shared by these works is an inherent correspondence to the
body. The works confront the participant with their otherness. Fried stresses the importance of
participation when he states that “the entire situation means exactly that: all of it - including, it
seems, the beholder’s body” (Fried 839). Morris explains that literalist art is unique, in that the
“beholder is confronted by a literalist work within a situation that he experiences as his”, a
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relation between subject and object that becomes another type of composition that requires
physical participation (831).
The words ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are philosophically loaded and have many implications,
however the concepts are not rigid, nor are they here intended to reference the metaphysical. In
these works, as in the immersive aesthetic experience in general, the relation between subject and
object becomes another kind of composition, one that changes as the participant, or ‘subject’
moves their body through space, around the object. Morris points out that, “a larger object
includes more of the space around itself then does a smaller one. It is necessary literally to keep
one’s distance from large objects in order to take the whole of any one view into one’s field of
vision” (Morris 831). There is a deep concern about the participant’s experience of the visual
field, in which, “kinesthetic demands placed upon the body” affect perception of the object
(Morris 831). Fried claims, “the experience alone is what matters” (841). However, he also
acknowledges that, “something is said to have presence when it demands that the beholder take it
into account, that he take it seriously” (Fried 839). Taking anything seriously requires more than
experience, it demands thought, the active engagement of both perception and reason. Morris
explains that “the object itself has not become less important. It has merely become less self
important” (832). It is this collaboration of perception and reason, taken seriously, that is
essential to what I refer to as the immersive aesthetic experience.
One source of distinction between Kapoor and Morris or Judd, is Kapoor’s more
discernible expression of philosophical concepts. For Kapoor “the whole reason to be an artist in
fact, is to uncover, in the process of working, some deeper truth” (Dantas). He does not claim to
have answers, questions arise through an orchestrated “interplay between the sensuous and
enigmatic materiality of the mythic and the conceptual and abstractive tenor of the
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philosophical” (Adajania). Kapoor says that he returns, again and again to the same questions,
these are concepts that run like threads through the entirety of Kapoor’s body of work, concepts
that include, the void, absence and presence, abjection, and transformation. The following pages
illustrate a hermeneutic correlation between concepts and experience of a selection of
representative works, by Kapoor. These are works I consider immersive aesthetic experiences
because of their intense sensory character and ontological signification.
A major concept that occupies Kapoor, is a specific notion of the void. The word void
contains many meanings, in western thought it is used as an adjective, a noun, and a verb, to
indicate emptiness, the experience of loss, or the act of clearing or invalidating. To void, is to
excrete bodily waste. Its archaic use, as simply to depart from, to vacate, like the other
definitions is rooted in absence. The void, absence, and nothingness are philosophically
connected concepts, ontological in their association with presence. The relationship between
nothingness and being, between absence and presence is a familiar subject of inquiry. An inquiry
whose results often conclude that absence and presence as concepts, are bound, emphasizing and
dependent upon one another.
Notable conceptions of absence as it relates to presence include Hegel’s nothingness, in
relation to being. In his analysis of being, within The Science of Logic, he states that because of
their indeterminateness, “pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same” (Hegel 59).
Hegel’s nothingness, or pure nothingness, like pure being, is the absence of determination. He
explains that while nothingness and being are the same, they are also absolutely distinct, “equally
unseparated and inseparable”, one vanishing into the other, a movement that he names becoming
(Hegel 60). Hegel employs this concept of becoming as evidence of essence. Between being and
nothingness there is underlying unity, that he calls absolute essence. Absolute essence, “proceeds
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from that which has no ground”, and is the infinite movement of being (Hegel 421). According
to Hegel, essence precedes being. Another notable inquiry into absence, is Sartre’s Being and
Nothingness, a reaction to Hegel’s absolute essence, in which Sartre states that existence itself,
precedes any notion of essence, indicating that because there is no underlying absolute essence,
nothingness is empty, mere negation.
Unlike Hegel and Sartre’s concepts of nothingness, as negation of being, Kapoor’s void
is more akin to Eastern philosophical conceptions of the void as full. His void, like the void of
Indian mysticism, is the space in which the infinite exists. Kapoor confronts the void from a
perspective developed through diverse influences. According to Kapoor, void “is a potential
space, not a non-space” (Morely 91). He refers to psychology when he further explains that
“void is really a state within” related to fear, death and love, “there is nothing so black as the
black within” (Morely 91). The void is that aspect of self that remains unknowable, untapped
potential and the reserves of possibility left unchecked.
Kapoor’s Void Field from 1989 is an example of an immersive aesthetic experience in
which the participant, through perception and reason, is invited into an ontological reflection
ignited by signification of the void (see fig. 10). The exhibit consists of large Cumbrian
sandstones strewn across an otherwise empty room. The appearance of a field of voids is created
through the application of small circles of black pigment on the top center of each sandstone.
The circle of deep black pigment reads visually as an opening, a hole, indicating a hollow space
within the stone. These are objects that initiate a psychological alternation, an interior bouncing
back and forth between an understanding of the nature of rock as heavy and solid, or unnaturally
hollow, as if a kick might send the huge stone flying. This confusion between reason and
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perception solicits reflection. What is really inside the object? For that matter any objects,
including self?

Fig. 10. Void Field, 1989
The nature of absence is a question that eternally occupies thinkers. Eastern philosophies
have produced concepts that have greatly influenced western thought. It was India that gave to
the world the value of Zero. Śūnyatā (Shunya) is an ancient Sanskrit word meaning zero, and is a
symbol that represents absence, indicating the presence of nothing. In mathematical language,
shunya’s value is nil, however spiritually three major eastern religions interpret shunya’s
emptiness as ‘void’ in distinctive ways. Buddhism associates void with ‘self-emptying’, in
Taoism it is ‘[doing] nothing’, and in Confucianism as ‘nothingness’. What these interpretations
have in common is their attempt to address “the paradox that the world of seeming binaries being and non-being, presence and absence, life and death, emptiness and fullness - are in fact
not separated from each other but rather arise from one and the same source” (Joon 103). In
Hindu philosophy, the void of shunya is associated with the ultimate being, the Para Brahman
and indicates that which is blissful, auspicious, delightful, and good. Even in ancient Western
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philosophy, Pythagoras refers to, and considers Zero (shunya) to be the perfect form, which
contains all and from which all is created. The void is the space that mediates between being and
nothingness, accentuating being, through its absence. The universe is considered to be regulated
by an all pervading ‘nothingness’, in which being coexists with void, and void becomes a
dynamic, functional aspect of being (Joon 103).
Formally, traditional eastern art has engaged the concept of the void through “a lack of
forms or a space of incompletion” (Joon 102). And while the terms traditional eastern art cover
broad and diverse styles and ideas, the term void, here, refers to unpainted, or empty spaces. The
concept of negative space used aesthetically, is not intended as a denial, rather an
encouragement, of space. This void is an absence with presence (Joon 102). Often, empty space
signifies profound spaces of nature, such as clouds, atmosphere, or the ocean. Empty spaces
stand in for all that is abridged, suggested or invisible (Joon 102). Formally, these empty spaces
suggest the void. Kapoor states that it is in the suggestion, in contemplation of the sign of
emptiness, that “the truly made void is fabricated” (Bhabha). The real void exists conceptually.
To see the void, for example in Void Field, as contained empty space, inside the sandstone, is
only to apprehend its physicality. Kapoor believes there is a difference between the physicality
of void space, and truly made emptiness. Kapoor explains, “the void is not silent. I have always
thought of it more and more as a transitional space, an in-between space. It's a space of
becoming” (Bhabha). This conceiving of the void as an emptiness, or nothingness, imbued with
potential recalls Hegel’s concept of nothingness in relation to being.
Although Hegel concludes the ultimate end of becoming is to resolve transformative
states into a proposed absolute state, it is clear in The Science of Logic, that his definition of
nothingness draws inspiration from diverse thinkers, including Eastern philosophical conceptions
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of void, as space of potential becoming, of ceaseless transformation. Hegel states that becoming
is the unity of being and nothing (Hegel 62). His argument refers to Parmenides as first
articulating “the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth: only being is, and
nothing absolutely is not” (Hegel 60). Hegel is explicit regarding the influence of Eastern
Philosophy, describing the nothingness of void as the absolute principle of Buddhism. Hegel
credits Heraclitus with refining these concepts of pure being and nothingness into the totalizing
concept of becoming, “all is becoming”, while further referencing ‘oriental’ proverbs that teach,
“all that exists has the germ of death in its very birth” and that “death is an entrance into new
life”, he explains that these proverbs express the union of being and nothing (Hegel 60). Hegel
contends that pure being and pure nothing are the same in that they both lack determination
(Hegel 59). According to Hegel, as we saw before, there is unity of being and nothing, they are
absolutely distinct yet equally unseparated and inseparable, each immediately vanishes in its
opposite. This movement of immediate vanishing into the other is becoming (Hegel 59).
What these concepts share in common is an acknowledgement that there are no simple
binaries. Inquiries into these bracketed concepts show they are not distinct polarities, rather they
derive from the same source, their difference infinitesimal. Derrida investigates the ways in
which a structure of language, grounded in logocentrism, creates the illusion of distinct binaries
in opposition. His method of deconstruction aims to show how the structure of terms in

apparent opposition, terms typically understood as separate substances or forms, is
hierarchical and constructed or made, rather than inherent. One of the opposing terms is
generally considered more valuable than the other, however, between the invisible and the
intelligible, mind and body, presence and absence, inside and outside, is only what Derrida calls
differance.
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In Derrida’s investigations into the way in which meaning is determined, he employs the
term differance, intentionally replacing the letter e, with an a. He does this in order to reference
the French word, which means both ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’. The reference is intended to
emphasize how meaning is always deferred, because words and signs can only be defined
through an appeal to additional words and signs, from which they differ. Derrida explains that
difference, the force that differentiates elements from one another, under the influence of
logocentrism, results in the privileging of speech over writing, and the manufacture of distinction
between the sensible and the intelligible. This usage of difference, focused on identity and
category engenders binary oppositions and the hierarchies that meaning is built upon.
Logocentrism prioritizes reason and the notion that it is beneficial to discount and discredit
perception, when in fact the threshold between encounter and understanding encompasses both.
Derrida articulates how, in any signifying system, difference is actually an unfixed
relation between signs, rather than being understood as either or, meanings are caught up and
entangled with each other. According to Derrida, linguistic meaning is determined by the ‘play’
of differences, which occur at a threshold between the conceptual and the material, between
reason and perception. The diaphanous threshold between the two is pure trace, and Derrida
explains that pure trace is differance. Differance is never more or less sensible than intelligible,
and “although it does not exist, although it is never a being-present” the possibility of differance
precedes signification (Derrida 124). Derrida’s deconstruction aims to displace the
characterization of opposition, to demonstrate that neither term is primary. He shows how the
“metaphysics of presence” have the tendency to conceive of fundamental philosophical concepts
such as truth, reality, and being, in terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin,
while ignoring the crucial role of absence and difference.
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Understanding absence and presence relies on sense. Meaning exists in continuously
shifting context and sense allows learning to occur. In French, the word for sense is translated as
meaning, or direction. However, the enlightenment of the 18th century associates sense with
desire, and in doing so bifurcates sense’s relationship to reason. Sense will henceforth be used to
support reason, while at the same time viewed as untrustworthy. In effect, constructing an
opposition between sense and reason, assigning emphasis and value to reason. Jean Luc Nancy
explains why it is essential to examine sense and practice a better balancing of reason and
perception. He states that, “without giving up on either reason or skepticism, we must arrange
them in such a way that their clarities, instead of annulling each other, diffract and multiply each
other into other constellations, other gatherings of sense” (Nancy 45). It is only through sensing
that real understanding can occur.
Nancy describes the body as a receptor, a collector of data and asserts that reason has a
drive toward the unconditioned. Drive is a kind of energy, indistinct from the body, for there is
no materiality without energy, no force without something material. Furthermore, the body
operates in a state of plurality, always bodies rather than body. These conditions contribute to the
reading of sense as given, mediated, a set of signs, of signification, and sense as origin of
significance (Nancy 147). An aesthetic understanding of the significance of absence through
presence, occurs through the interplay of sense and reason. Immersive aesthetic experiences are
successful in engaging this type of reflection and their intensified sensory information combined
with ontological signification is capable of provoking the sublime.
Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences invite the participant to “become sensitive to
the continuous processes of cognition and imagination, instinct and dream, sensation and
inference, by which the mind constructs the world” (Adajania). Adajania’s essay The Mind
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Viewing Itself describes how Kapoor’s work addresses a philosophical conception of unity in
being and nothingness. She describes his work as an “enactment of the symmetry between the
cosmos and the body, each with its enfolded, pleated, whorled complexity of darkness and light,
emptiness and plenitude” (Adajania). Enactment indicates doing and precludes the passive
viewer. The engaged participant experiences the finite “punctured with apertures indicating the
infinite” (Adajania). An infinite that can only be approached through “indexical directions and
approximations”, and this is because, according to Kapoor, the true emptiness of the void is
conceptual (Adajania). The black holes of Void Field are not meant to be measured or occupied,
their emptiness exists only in the mind. Kapoor’s sculptures are not objects so much as signifiers
of emptiness in space and perception (Adajania). Kapoor observes, “you cannot enter the void,
but viewing gives prospect to the wholeness it contains” (Adajania). This is the void of
becoming, a site of transformation.
A beautiful example of Kapoor using sense to physically engage the participant, in an
experience of absence and presence, on the event horizon of void, is found in In Descent into
Limbo, 1992. The work is a large concrete cube, a structure with a sharply rectangular entry. It
appears as empty inside as out, not sterile, but blank. Inside, underneath a concrete ceiling
framed with light, on the center of the floor, is a large dark hole. The pigment used to color the
interior of the hole is completely non-reflective, creating a darkness that cannot be penetrated
visually. The hole could be four feet deep or four hundred feet. The body is compulsively drawn
toward the edge of the hole, there is almost a need to pierce the blackness, by sticking an arm
down into the hole, or simply staring into its depths. In Descent into Limbo, the participant is
aware of their body in relation to the void (see fig. 11). This is not the void of negation or
absence, it symbolizes the void as a threshold of becoming (Adajania). Kapoor literally leads the
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participant to the precipice of the void, and offers the experience of being drawn “toward the
impenetrable blackness of the void, into a primal fear and a quiet solitude, sleep’s embrace. This
is a darkness of the self” (Adajania).

Fig. 11. Two views of Descent Into Limbo, 1992
Whatever this thing that draws matter toward void is, it echoes throughout the universe. It
is a force that compels. This is the force that exists in the emptiness of the void. On a cosmic
level, it is the force of magnetic poles and black holes. Participants of Descent Into Limbo,
experience the force that pulls toward the void, along its border, at its threshold, the event
horizon. The lifecycle of celestial bodies includes these corpses of giant stars, referred to as
black holes. One such theoretical object has been named Cygnus XI by astronomers. This dark
object is one of a binary system, two stars orbiting each other, but only one emits light. Cygnus
XI does not emit not light, but it emits x-rays, with enough mass to move the living star around
it. Cygnus XI is a star in its final stage, a black hole. A black hole is a void with an event
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horizon, and everything in its vicinity is pulled toward it. Theorists speculate that within the
black hole everything is compressed, all particles crushed to an infinitely small point. They do
not consider a black hole to be an object, rather a hole in the universe, where there is only intense
gravity. Gravity at its most extreme displays characteristics of a physical entity with infinite
density, no beginning and no end, capable of pulling material towards it and warping light.
Gravity so intense, it slows time and particles disappear. This is thought to be an experience that
begins at the event horizon, the region of no return. The event horizon is the boundary where
gravitational force is so strong, nothing can escape.
On a terrestrial level, evidence of this force that pulls everything into the void, is found in
naturally occurring whirlpools, as alluded to in Kapoor’s 2014 work, Descension (see fig. 12).
This work evokes mysteries of the human experience of the unconscious, its constant movement
and unknown depths, signified by the repetitive spiraling, and the eternally disappearing action
of the water, within the void of a black hole. The work is a symbol of the emptiness of the void,
while at the same time signifying nothing in itself. Descension marks a threshold that is
analogous to the unconscious, as threshold (Bhabha). This is an embodiment of that velvet
darkness at the deepest levels of the human consciousness (Adajania). The participant, standing
at the edge, is witness to the sudden disappearance of surface; the deep, dark hole cuts the
ground, creating “an emptiness more extreme and exploratory than mere vacant or ‘negative’
space can ever accommodate” (Bhabha). Freud’s explorations into these depths, fueled by his
understanding of what he calls drives, lead him to his influential conception of the unconscious.
For Freud, the unconscious is akin to the void, his drives, equal to that force that draws
everything toward the void. Freud’s drive or Trieb, is the force that uncontrollably propels
existence, and his conception of it owes much to Schopenhauer’s Will.
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Fig. 12. Descension, 2014
Schopenhauer’s conception of the force that propels existence, what he calls will, is
influenced by his studies of eastern philosophies. Schopenhauer’s investigation into the nature of
being as absolutely, ephemeral or eternal, references the Upanishad of the Veda, a text at the
core of Hinduism. He quotes the Upanishad, “I am all these creatures, and besides me there is no
other being” (Schopenhauer 104). Schopenhauer’s concern over this force of connection and
distinction leads him to the will. Schopenhauer cautions, “there are two dangers or errors to be
avoided. We must not understand will as so dilute that it loses its connection with our starting
point: our bodily experience in motivated action...neither should we fix our concept too narrowly
on our own root experience of human willing” (xxvii). Will is both the force that connects
everything, and what forges identity. Schopenhauer explains that “the individual finds his body
as an object among objects...all investigations of these relations and connections lead back,
whether by a shorter or a longer route, to his body, and consequently to his will” (100).
Understanding will, is the key to understanding phenomenal existence, and may reveal the inner
workings of being, of behavior, and movement (Schopenhauer 32). According to Schopenhauer,
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the body understands its being through will, in two entirely different ways, as an individual, that
identifies with a specific body, immediately known, and also through the movement of the body
(32). He describes how all willing appears to arise from need, from deficiency, from suffering
and that its motivated desire lasts long, has infinite demands and is scantily measured out.
However, he is consistent with his eastern philosophical studies in explaining that both are
delusions (Schopenhauer 119). Will is an uncontrollable force of nature that shapes and
connects.
Delusions of need and desire, as primary forces propelling existence, obscure the capacity
of connection in determinations of existence. According to Schopenhauer, abandoning these
delusions is the only route to becoming a subject of knowledge, one who experiences a ‘state of
pure knowing’. It is difficult to escape the endless stream of willing, to observe without personal
interest and to comprehend things free from their relation to need and desire (Schopenhauer
120). For Schopenhauer, one way of reaching this state is through the aesthetic experience.
When the individual experiences aesthetic engagement:
He loses himself in this object… He forgets his very individuality, his will, and
continues to exist only as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it
is as if the object alone were there without anyone to perceive it, and he can no
longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one
because the whole consciousness is filled and taken up with one single sensuous
picture. (Schopenhauer 102)
The person enthralled in this type of perception, is no longer individual, but experiencing a state
of pure, will-less, painless, timelessness (Schopenhauer 102). And in doing so, gains knowledge
of the idea. Through contemplation that has absorbed all perception, identity is discharged, and
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comprehension of connectivity is achieved, this is the ‘state of pure knowing’ (Schopenhauer
121). When Schopenhauer refers to will-lessness, what he is talking about is clearly seeing the
connective force, without concern for the ways in which it shapes one’s individual experience.
The will, like drive, and the force that draws everything toward the void, is unavoidable, but this
aesthetic experience of being rapt, disassociated from identity, a subject of pure knowledge, one
who sees only connections, is an experience essential to what Schopenhauer describes as the
sublime.
Schopenhauer’s sublime is influenced by what the Buddhists call Nirvana, the state, he
explains, that is closest to pure nothingness. He credits “the ancient wisdom of the Indian
philosophers” and refers to “Mâyâ, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals”
(Schopenhauer 8). For Schopenhauer, this veil consists of the delusions created by will and
desire. Only by suspending the condition of individuality can these delusions be shed, the veil
torn asunder (Schopenhauer 98). Schopenhauer’s sublime is an aesthetic condition that may be
evoked through the sheer vastness of space and time, whose immeasurability reduces the
individual to a non-entity (Schopenhauer 129). The sublime is an experience of being
overwhelmed by the certainty of extinction, when faced with the power of the universe
(Schopenhauer xxxiii). Aesthetically, it is an engagement with a work, wherein the participant is
so consumed by the experience, that identity dissolves into nothingness.
Kapoor discusses the role of immensity in evoking the sublime in the work of Romantic
Painter, Caspar David Friedrich, and he utilizes it in his immersive aesthetic experience
Leviathan, 2011. Kapoor explains how the condition of immensity works, using the classic
example of Friedrich’s painting of a solitary figure, standing on the edge of a cliff, facing a vast
landscape, appearing to be lost in both physical and mental space, or as Kapoor describes him,
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lost in wonder, lost in time. According to Kapoor, the effects of the immensity of space and time
are a relation of scale, and he goes on to quote Barnet Newman as stating "scale is not a matter of
size, it is a matter of content", not about how big a thing is, rather, how meaningful a thing is
(Dantas). In order to be immensely meaningful the content must be, in some way, ontological, at
its core it is about being. Immensity causes one who encounters it to feel small, the infinite
produces an experience of being infinitesimal.
Kapoor's huge, biomorphic sculpture event, Leviathan, is a contemporary example of an
immersive aesthetic experience, in which immensity plays a role in allowing the participant to be
lost in wonder (see fig. 13). Leviathan is a name with strong associations, described in Jewish
spiritual texts, and part of a long tradition of mythical sea creatures. Ancient Near Eastern
religions describe a cosmic battle, in which a sea monster represents the forces of chaos, while
Babylonians refer to a serpent goddess, whose body is used to create the heavens and the earth.
Thomas Hobbes’ 17th century political critique on the absolute nature of power is titled
Leviathan, and Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, recounts a tale of obsessive desire in a quest to
understand yet another, mythical sea creature. Early in the tale, Melville’s Ishmael remembers
encountering a painting. He recalls his intense study of the painting, speculating that the artist
had “endeavored to delineate chaos bewitched” (Melville 11). The passage describing Ishmael’s
aesthetic experience includes one of the book’s first references to leviathan:
But what most puzzled and confounded you was a long, limber, portentous, black
mass of something hovering in the center of the picture over three blue, dim,
perpendicular lines floating in a nameless yeast. A boggy, soggy, squitchy picture
truly, enough to drive a nervous man distracted. Yet was there a sort of indefinite,
half-attained, unimaginable sublimity about it that fairly froze you to it, till you
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involuntarily took an oath with yourself to find out what that marvelous painting
meant. Ever and anon a bright, but, alas, deceptive idea would dart you through. It’s the Black Sea in a midnight gale. - It’s the unnatural combat of the four
primal elements. - It’s a blasted heath. - It’s a Hyperborean winter scene. - It’s
the breaking up of the ice-bound stream of Time. But at last all these fancies
yielded to that one portentous something in the picture’s midst. That once found
out, and all the rest were plain. But stop; does it not bear a faint resemblance to a
gigantic fish? even the great leviathan himself? (Melville 12)
It seems fitting that Melville describes this possible manifestation of leviathan as bewitched
chaos, disrupting the ice-bound stream of time, in an aesthetic work in which meaning is not
explicit. Kapoor shares Melville’s vision of a work of art, capable of compelling an encounter
with an aesthetic understanding, of sense and reason equally engaged. Kapoor’s Leviathan is an
enormous, bulbous structure, filling the interior of Paris’s Grand Palais. And while the history of
the name adds layers of meaning, it is unnecessary to be familiar with the multiple references in
order to experience the sheer wonder involved in an encounter with this work. From outside the
structure, the glass ceiling of the Grand Palais acts as a ribcage of sorts, enclosing an organ the
shade of venous blood, while inside the structure, everything is a shade of arterial blood.
Gigantic circular openings suggest enormous pulmonary valves, leaving the visitor to feel like a
microscopic blood cell, lingering in the very heart of the beast. The form of Leviathan shifts, is
open, is it an eggplant? A Liver? A Plesiosaurs? Its contextual information adds substantially to
the experience. The glass ceiling, intricate wrought iron trellis, arches, and walkways encase the
structure, creating the impression of a creature caught, trapped, a subject to inspection. Inspect
all one wants, certainty can never be attained, one is tiny in comparison to its mystery.
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Fig. 13. Leviathan 2011
Schopenhauer maintains the existence of forms that serve as a threshold to a state of pure
perception. These are forms that lend themselves to this higher state of perception, “when by
their manifold and yet definite and distinct form they easily become representatives of their
Ideas” (Schopenhauer 124). Meaningful forms invite us to pure contemplation because they can
be reinterpreted in multiple ways. Kapoor’s Leviathan takes form as organ, eggplant, balloon, or
sea creature, and at a scale in which its form is experienced as immense, the participant
miniscule in relation. According to Schopenhauer, the combination of manifold determinations
and immensity is conducive to an experience of the sublime. When standing in front or inside of
Leviathan, tiny in comparison, it is difficult to resist the pull of simultaneous sensing and
reflecting, feeling and thinking. In an experience of the sublime, what results from pure
reflection is an understanding related to the force, will, drive, the energy that propels the
universe.
The sublime results in an understanding that this force that drives existence, is often
hostile towards the human will, its overwhelming power threatening to reduce all being to
nothingness (Schopenhauer 101). The participant of the aesthetic experience is confronted with
this revelation, and yet in spite of the tenor, the participant surrenders to perception calmly, as
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pure, will-less subject of knowledge. In this process the participant contemplates the terrifying,
while lingering pleasurably over it, and “is thereby raised above himself, his person, his willing,
and all willing” it is then that the participant experiences the sense of the sublime (Schopenhauer
125). Here the sublime is the awareness of the temporality inherent in individuality, the will’s
frail phenomenon, decimated by the slightest impact of these energies. A being as an
infinitesimal dot in relation to stupendous powers of the universe, and at the same time, being as
the eternal, tranquil, knowing subject who glimpses a power incomparably superior to the
individual, a power which threatens annihilation. Schopenhauer describes the effects of
contemplating the void:
If we lose ourselves in contemplation of the infinite greatness of the universe in
space and time, meditate on the millennia of years that have passed and are yet to
come, or if the night-sky actually brings before our eyes countless worlds, and so
forces upon our consciousness the immensity of the universe, we feel ourselves
reduced to nothing; as individuals, as bodies vitalized as transient phenomena of
the will, we feel ourselves like drops in the ocean, dwindle and disperse into the
void. (Schopenhauer 129)
In Schopenhauer’s oceanic sublime, the experience of the universality of life force is connected
to the letting go of will and shedding of identity. This connection mirrors that of presence and
absence, in which one always emphasizes the other. The awareness of impending absence, is also
an experience of abjection. An awareness of the body, as a body among bodies, like all other
biological materials, existing within a cycle of life. Investigating the threshold between presence
and absence is an examination of process, breakdown, dissolution, of joining, coalescing and
emergence. This is the process of shifting between being and not.
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The sublime here, can be connected to abjection, by way of sublimation. Freud
introduces “the term ‘sublimation’ to mean both Schopenhauer’s sublime as exaltation and a
process of change borrowed from the scientific definition of the term” (Mishra 151). According
to Freud sublimation acts as an outlet for conflicting drives of life and death (Mishra 151).
Sublimation is a process of change, in which incompatible urges toward presence and absence
are converted into activities that involve some level of control. Sublimation is a way of dealing
with that which cannot be controlled.
According to Kristeva, sublimation is at the root of language, of signification itself.
Sublimation is the condition that produces signification. Sublimation is a process in which the
unsayable, the unspeakable, the uncontrollable, is dealt with by transferring uncontrollable drives
related to absence and presence, into the more controllable creation of signs, symbols and
language. Kristeva references Freud’s foundational ideas revealed by his studies in depression,
psychosis and autism. Freud’s interpretations privilege human beings’ relationship to the phallus
and the father, and establish castration conflict as the primary trauma. This insight informs
Kristeva’s knowledge of archaic states of the psyche, yet she looks beyond, to a moment that
occurs prior to castration conflict, an even more primary trauma. This is the experience of
abjection and it is the sublimation of this experience which results in language.
Before. Before anything, before everything, one exists in a state of absolute presence, in
which there is no distinction between that which nurtures and self. Kristeva posits abjection as an
initial confrontation with absence. Abjection is the separation of self from the maternal. A
violent, traumatic separation, like birth, there is a sense of ripping out, being torn asunder,
wrenched from the birthing canal, a collision with blood and tissue and shit. Abjection marks the
beginning of the slow march toward the eventual state of absolute absence. Abjection is a

154
confrontation with the horror experienced in the initial absence of the maternal, that coincides
with the development of one’s ability to signify. Before very young children begin to talk,
Kristeva says they become irremediably sad, an experience of early grief that has a
developmental effect. This grief stems from a belief that the being has been abandoned by its
maternal source and it transforms the autoerotic baby in a state of absolute presence, into a
speaking being, able to signify absence.
In the absolute state of presence, vocalizations correspond to need and demonstrate
dependence on the maternal body. Kristeva demonstrates how, in this moment of separation,
language develops, out of the loss of the sensory satisfaction obtained through maternal contact.
She explains that “grieving for tactile, olfactory, auditory, and visual symbiosis is replaced first
by hallucinations of the maternal face, then by its verbal designation” (The Severed Head 16).
The experience of separation and the absence of the maternal, induce suffering. Kristeva states
that the prevalent response is to “replace the absent face, as loved as it is feared, source of joy
and terror with…a representation. I have lost Mama? No, I hallucinate her: I see her image, then
I name her. From my babbling, which was its semiotic equivalent, I now fabricate word-signs”
(The Severed Head 5). It is the grief over absence of the maternal source that encourages
hallucinations of the mother, imagery of the face and finally a name by which she is referred.
A sign is precisely that which symbolizes an object, in the object’s absence. The ability to
create signs, to signify, is essential to the human condition, and it is no doubt beneficial that each
being experiences grief for the other (The Severed Head 5). This depressive phase marks the shift
into thought and the ability to signify, which in turn is dependent upon the sublimation of the
abject. The experience of absence is compensated for by the opportunity to take control, “by
concentrating on one’s own ability to represent, by investing in the representations one can

155
make, one’s own representations of that other, the abandoner” (The Severed Head 6). Ultimately,
abjection is a good thing, because of instinctual sublimation of the traumatic experience, energies
are converted into signification, representation and communication.
One of the most distinctive elements of the immersive aesthetic experience is this type of
work’s ability to address a need for a more balanced approach to critical thought, an engagement
with a participant wherein aesthetic understanding involves ontological signification. Abjection
can be ontologically signified, and is an essential element in the rebalancing of reason and
perception, because it is an experience that profoundly consists of both reason and perception, at
play. Kristeva describes how through this deeply traumatic experience of loss, one encounters
the opportunity to gain the ability to represent and to think:
That palpitation of the invisible surely had confronted them with the fundamental
invisible that is death: the disappearance of our carnal form and its most salient
parts, which are the head the limbs and the sex organs, prototypes of vitality. To
represent the invisible (the anguish of death as well as the jouissance of thought’s
triumph over it) wasn’t it necessary to begin by representing the loss of the
visible? (The Severed Head 4)
Between the absolute states of presence and absence, being occupies a confluence. Both the
sublime, and abjection refer to an overwhelming experience, involving reason and perception,
engaged in the attempt to understand the body’s relationship to presence and absence. In both the
sublime and abjection, the body is drawn, irresistibly, toward a void, powerless to resist, in tacit
acceptance. The experience involves an investigation of the threshold between presence and
absence, and the simultaneous acknowledgement of the power and regenerative nature of the
body, as well as an intense awareness of that same body’s frailty and temporality.
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According to Kristeva grief and melancholy related to loss and the body, line “the
underside of our languages” (The Severed Head 6). These aspects of abjection are often signified
throughout the arts in general. Kristeva points out that art is a space of freedom able to animate
the flight of thought, and our only remaining link to the sacred. The signifiers most explicit in
demonstrating their connection to the moment of abjection, that moment that incites
representation, historically often appear in religious imagery of sacrifice. Sacrifice recalls the
terror of death, while simultaneously evoking a serenity that follows from the identification of a
pact between sacrificed and sacrificing. An instilled belief of purpose and recompense associated
with that which has been lost.
The joy of representation cannot be disassociated from sacrifice (The Severed Head 10).
Sacrifice as a signifier, is used in the evoking of abjection. Kristeva asks, “what is the power of
representation? Does the image succumb to the violence of death, or does it possess the gift of
modulating it? By what alchemy of sacrifice is this sacred space constituted, which may be
nothing more than our intimate grappling with our passions and our mortality?” (The Severed
Head 10) Abjection, its cause, and all that follows, when comprehended in an aesthetic
experience, involves ontological understanding, and arises from reflecting on presence and
absence, drives and death. According to Kristeva the abjection apparent in the signification of
sacrifice is an aesthetic experience directly connected to the acknowledgement of the temporality
inherent in the physical condition. And yet, during this aesthetic experience, when faced with the
certainty of cessation, the feeling of powerlessness is obscured by immersing the unconscious in
signification.
More recently, Nancy states that any remaining link to the sacred has been lost, due to an
ever increasing inability to sense. The experience of abjection and its resulting signification, is an
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essential aspect of existence, however an imbalance in perceived value of the resulting signifiers,
over the conditions resulting in signification, have helped establish reason, logic and the quest
for an ultimate ‘truth’ as paramount. Nancy further contends that the unconscious that Freud
brought to light does not unveil another sense, does not conceal a fundamental truth, rather the
unconscious designates:
the inexhaustible, interminable swarming of significations that are not organized
around a sense but, rather, proceed from a significance or signifyingness
[signifiance] that whirls… around a void point of dispersion, circulating in the
condition of simultaneous, concurrent, and contradictory affirmation, and having
no point of perspective other than the void of truth at their core, a void itself quite
superficially and provisionally masked by the thin skin of an ‘ego’. (Nancy 46)
The contextual nature of sensing requires attention and dynamic perspective. Because of the
imbalance away from active sensing, and toward reason and logic, signification of sacrifice is no
longer sufficient to evoke the aesthetic experience of abjection. When the world itself appears as
an exposition of suffering, art depicting religious sacrifice is simply too easy to decipher, it is
known, but not felt.
References to the aggravated pain and redeemed suffering of sacrifice, are typical of
aesthetic works of art that refer to the memory of the suffering body, to the initial moment of
abjection. Nancy describes grief as a refusal of the body, and refers to Schopenhauer in stating
that man would be seized with horror if the suffering and misery of life were thoroughly exposed
(Nancy 144). He describes sublime abjection as a dark sense, and through “this sublime wisdom
or courage in anguish, there is the lightning bolt of meaning... fragmentation and jouissance”
(Nancy 146). To experience this lightning bolt of meaning is to understand, with both sense and
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reason, one’s temporal movement through presence and absence. The sublime, Nancy explains,
is not unsayable because there is nothing else to say, but unsayable because it lies beyond
signification. The sublime and the abject both occur at the very point where pain and joy mix
together (Nancy 146). What Nancy describes as, “an archi-transcendental condition of suffering
that touches on the nude exposition to sense, on unbearable decay” of wounded, undone, broken
or convulsed bodies, rings equally true of abjection. He explains that “the suffering body was up
until our own day a ‘quivering’ body: a pathos-laden body, rich with signs, clearly mixed up with
an obscure jouissance, a tortured, sacrificed body”, but suffering is no longer sacrificial. The
suffering body is broken, dislocated, or eaten away, without any meaning and for no reason
(Nancy 149). Suffering is no longer tied to the sacrificial, it is simply a matter of existence. To
this end, signification of sacrifice has become insufficient in calling forth abjection, however, the
signification of abjection continues to find form, especially in work like Kapoor’s sculptural
installations, for example First Milk 2015, I looking in at me 2016, and Mother 2016 (see fig.
14).

Fig. 14. First Milk, 2015, I looking in at me 2016, and Mother 2016
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These works are immersive aesthetic experiences in that in their physical presence the
body reacts, an immediate revulsion accompanied by a desire to investigate, are they wet? Do
they smell? One’s senses inquire. Ontologically they signify the inevitable decay of all flesh and
bone. Color is an important element throughout Kapoor’s body of work, his use of pigments is
always significant, and appears imbued with meaning. His red works, which include both
pigment and wax sculptural installations, embody the concept of abjection. Abjection, as an
experience of the threshold between presence and absence, the dissolution, the breakdown of the
materiality of being. For Kapoor, “red is a colour of the earth, it’s not a colour of deep space; it’s
obviously the color of blood and body. I have a feeling that the darkness that it reveals is a much
deeper and darker darkness than that of blue or black” (Dantas). If the void can be made concrete
in a conception of the universe, the abject is made concrete in the disintegration of the body.
Deep blacks and blues are the empty potential of void, red evokes Kristeva’s abjection. Kristeva
describes this threshold:
A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does
not signify death. In the presence of signified death - a flat encephalograph, for
instance - I would understand, react, or accept. No, as in true theater, without
make up or masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in
order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands,
hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my
condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that
border (Powers of Horror 3)
I looking in at me, Kapoor’s 2016 structural wall hanging is made of silicone, fiberglass and
gauze. The work is unmistakably linked to an understanding of unavoidable breakdown of the
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body. This huge bloody mess looks like freshly butchered muscle and bone. The title tells me, I
am looking in at me. Like any other being, composed of meat and bone. Capable of being
butchered. And yet, here I am. In such tenuous circumstances I persist.
Kristeva explains that “the abject is edged with the sublime. It is not the same moment on
the journey, but the same subject and speech bring them into being” (Powers of Horror 11). In
both sublime and abjection, aesthetic understanding, through sense and reason, involves the
ontological imperative. The sublime is experienced when faced with the power and potential of
the void, an experience so overwhelming that identity is momentarily suspended. The abject is
experienced when faced with the ramifications of being a material object. Kristeva says, “there
looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that
seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible,
the tolerable, the thinkable”, an unknowable other. Abjection is experienced through
signification of the repressed loss, of being at one with the maternal, the power and potential to
bring forth, the inevitable cleavage and eventual absence of being. Kristeva explains that the
abject is a fragile, archaic, sublimation, inseparable from drives, the abject is the object of a
primal repression (Powers of Horror 12).
According to Kristeva, abjection preserves the experience of the pre-objectal relationship,
along with the memory of the violence necessary to separate one body from another, in order to
be (Powers of Horror 10). She further states that jouissance insists upon an abjection from which
identity becomes absent during a return to the pre-objectal (Powers of Horror 54). Both Fist Milk
2015 and Mother 2016 fairly explicitly reference Kristeva’s conception of this moment.
Abjection inhabits the limits of the human universe (Powers of Horror 11). What is more
limiting than the flesh that holds a being together. Kapoor’s sculptures confront the participant
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with the most intimate of borders. As with abjection itself, these works draw attention to a
collapsing of that border, between the inside and the out, the body and its maternal source.
Kristeva’s description of experiencing abjection, “as if the skin, a fragile container, no longer
guaranteed the integrity of one’s own and clean self…gave way before the dejection of its
contents. Urine, blood, sperm, excrement then show up in order to reassure a subject that is
lacking” is aptly applied to each of the works (Powers of Horror 53). Kapoor’s red works
demand to be poked and prodded, they articulate a fleshy resistance. Kristeva points out that
Freud connected melancholy to the descriptives ‘wound,’ ‘internal hemorrhage,’ and ‘a hole in
the psyche’ and she explains that any erotization of abjection, “is an attempt at stopping the
hemorrhage: a threshold before death, a halt or a respite?” (Powers of Horror 55). For Freud, the
primal crisis finds its source in the paternal, and expresses a deep fear of powerlessness, however
according to Kristeva, the even more primal crisis finds as its source, one’s severing from
maternal generative power. No longer at one with the source, the being conceptualizes the
mother as ‘other’, other than self.
Kristeva describes how this primal crisis is a confrontation with the feminine. However,
what she designates as ‘feminine,’ is not only conceived of in terms of this primeval essence, it is
also understood more broadly as ‘other’ (Powers of Horror 58). The abject is excrement and
menstrual blood, it always relates to corporal orifices. It is often the subject of taboo. According
to Kristeva, “fear of the archaic mother turns out to be essentially fear of her generative power”
(Powers of Horror 77). Decay, infection, disease, and corpses signify danger to identity, the ego
threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by outsiders, life threatened by death (Powers of
Horror 71). Contrary to what enters the mouth and nourishes the body, that which leaves the
body, that which gives rise to abjection, is evidence of a body in a permanent state of loss
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(Powers of Horror 108). Kristeva points to Freud’s description of the properties of taboo, “as
sacred, consecrated; but also uncanny, dangerous, forbidden and unclean” (Powers of Horror
59). Properties commonly associated with the ‘other’. Abjection, the horror of being cut from the
maternal source, of being abandoned and discharged, in the development of being, results in the
ability to signify, yet, it can also result in neurotic associative fears related to the feminine, to the
other. The experience of abjection includes the experience of being at one with the (m)other.
Abjection is the moment of being torn from the source, thus it includes both, as one and apart, it
is a process, a transformation.
Being is simply a moment in becoming, the process that also includes the moment of
void, their relationship not one of opposition, but of otherness. Kapoor understands that
otherness, he was born in India, to a Jewish mother and a Punjabi Hindu father and calls London
home, “I'm used to being a foreigner”, he explains (Dantas). Kapoor finds inspiration in
Heidegger's parable of the jug, referring directly to it in his description of how the process of
becoming is dynamic and transformative. The parable uses a potter’s creation of a vessel, as a
metaphor for the relationship between absence and presence, being and the void. The potter takes
hold of the void and manifests it through the form of a containing vessel. The vessel's thingness
is not found in the clay of which it is made, but in the void that it holds. The vessel is a thing in
which the outside and inside come together, by virtue of the difference that holds them apart. As
with the parable's focus, Kapoor’s focus is not on objects, but the relation through material to
void that points to “an otherness, an alterity, an unabsolvable difference” (Dantas).
Kapoor’s work evokes the ambivalent movement of the transformative process, its
doubleness or ‘otherness’, both literal and metaphoric. He often achieves this through a
confusion between “what it is and what it appears to be” (Dantas). For example his work
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Ascension, emerges out of his interest in the idea of the immaterial becoming material (see fig.
15). In Ascension, smoke becomes a column (Dantas). It is both immaterial and object. Kapoor
employs the confusion that occurs when a thing within the field of vision is uncertain. Light
strikes the steady flow of smoke illuminating the column’s form. It appears to have parts, rings,
tendrils encircling the column. It is tenuous and moves slowly. Air, breath, light, and spirit spill
forth and the body demands a kind of readjustment, it demands certainty. The column is both,
certainly present and quite simply blown into nothingness. This encounter confounds one’s sense
of order. What was considered certain is thrown into doubt. This is a liminal experience of
transformation. (Morgan 82).

Fig. 15. Ascension, 2003
Ascension is an immersive aesthetic experience that evokes the transformative nature of
otherness, signifying the unfixed nature of identity. Kapoor considers his immersive aesthetic
experiences to be manifestations of a state of being, a state of flux (Morely 92). This is a state
evoked through immersive qualities of the work, the sound of rushing air, its continuous upward
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spiraling movement, which lends to the feeling of an overwhelming upward thrust. These
metaphors allude to transformation as rupture. A perpetual rupture that “portends the possibility
of an alternative self or social order”, and even though the transformative process always
includes death, it resists any notion of ontological completion or metaphysical resolution. The
dialectic of conflict between death and rebirth are distinguishing features of self-identity and
serve as primary concerns of spirituality and its artistic evocation (Morely 83). In the experience
of an encounter with these types of work, aesthetic understanding out of the free play of reason
and perception animates imagination and “the realization of the unknowable” is possible (Fisher
90). Kapoor’s work, as immersive aesthetic experience, has the power to activate and organize
the movement of desire. A desire to understand what it means that engenders imaginative
thought. The knowledge attained never inhabits the object, but is found in the process of
searching (Fisher 89). It is essential that this type of critical thinking is engaged and it is
characteristic of Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences. Kapoor creates spaces that are
sensuous, indeterminate and invoke several possible meanings (Fisher 89). He explains that
while engaged in aesthetic reflection, time changes, “time, I think, becomes slower. The mystical
truth of art is time” (Dantas). This is lingering.
In order to regain balance between the constructs of sense and reason, Nancy proposes
the necessity of preserving a radical open-endedness, explaining that “to transform’ should mean
‘to change the sense of sense,’ that is, once again, to pass from having to being” (Nancy 9). In
completely engaged contemplation of the immediacy of both presence and absence, one's
constant state of becoming is emphasized. This inquiry into how the immersive aesthetic
experience addresses the emergency related to a current deficiency of critical thinking begins
with a look at Kusama’s evocation of the sublime as projection outward into the immensity of
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the universe. The beautiful, sparkling lights of infinite joy, reflecting one’s infinitesimal place
and part in that universe. This chapter explored Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences as
projection inward, that gaze that was out toward the universe in the experience of Kusama’s
work, finds its equal measure inward toward the void. Here, the void as an interior space, one
that suggests the impending absence of the body. Kapoor’s focus is on creating ontological
signifiers with the potential to evoke a sublime that is grounded in abjection and transformation.
The next chapter finds its focus of inquiry in the experience of being present on earth, as an
object among the objects, aware of the inherent connectivity of all objects.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Olafur Eliasson
Previous chapters of this dissertation demonstrate the relationship of an art form, that I
call the immersive aesthetic experience, to perception, and understanding. This immersive
aesthetic experience is capable of evoking manifestations of the sublime. These are works that
offer the visitor an engagement in aesthetic understanding, or the interplay of perception and
reason. With intense interplay, comes the possibility of intense understanding. That flash of
intense understanding, rooted in the existential, is called the sublime. What the immersive
aesthetic experiences have in common is profuse sensory data and ambiguous ontological
signification. This allows for the possibility that in the midst of sensing and interpreting, a
participant may experience a brief flash of perceived understanding related to ‘being’. Yayoi
Kusama does this by creating experiences of the infinite, Anish Kapoor through experiences of
the void. In this chapter, I will examine how Olafur Eliasson evokes a specific manifestation of
the sublime through experiences with the ‘world’. Eliasson creates immersive aesthetic
experiences because his intention is to make those who experience his work more aware of
sensing, of other beings, and of the environment. He introduces sensory data through natural
phenomena, emphasizing how perception affects the way one interacts with the world.
Much of Eliasson’s work is a result of research into complex geometry, impossible
objects, explorations of infinity, reflection, symmetry, and perspective. Eliasson is drawn to the
most abstract concepts of scientific understanding or logos, he finds himself in a liminal spot
between the extremes of reason and perception. Albert Einstein is quoted in H. Eves
Mathematical Circles Adieu, as saying:
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A human being is a part of the whole, called by us the ‘Universe,’ a part limited in
time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something
separated from the rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness...Our task
must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to
embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. (Eves 154)
This idea of embracing a unity that contains oppositions, involves an acceptance that the
perception of separateness is at once, and not at all. With that understanding, an endless network
of connectivity is revealed. Eliasson aims to communicate his understanding of this connectivity
through immersive aesthetic experiences. Experience itself is central to the work of Eliasson.
One of his major goals is to emphasize the experiencing of one’s perception in the process of
perceiving and understanding, especially when in the company of the ‘other’. Eliasson’s ideas
related to perception, the other and the world correlate to philosophical concepts. This chapter
aims to connect encounters with his immersive aesthetic experience to Heidegger, MerleauPonty’s, Arendt, and Nancy. Eliasson’s work specifically calls to mind ideas about presence,
being, world, the other and connectivity. Major sections of this chapter include: an introduction
to Eliasson, encompassing contradiction and The curious garden, sensing and Your blind
passenger, experiencing perception together and The weather project, and finally, response and a
sublime understanding of the ultimate consequence of connectivity.
Olafur Eliasson spent his youth in Iceland, wandering a landscape teeming with incredible
meteorological phenomena, such as hot springs, rainbows, steam, caves, glaciers and volcanoes.
He refers to his homeland as “a place to feel a sharp sense of embodiment” recalling the smell of
Sulphur, while hiking from moss banks onto lava fields (Godfrey 14). He became increasingly
aware of the act of perception. Eliasson reflected on his ability to judge how far a landmark
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might be, based on sound and appearance. It was during these hikes that he learned how to use
the landscape to measure space and time. His youthful wandering a testing ground for perception
and measurement (Godfrey 14). Eliasson continues to draw inspiration from nature, engaging in
studies of insects, landscapes, and plants such as lichens. Often his work consists of formal
elements that include circles, paths, orbs, steam, mist, or fog (see fig. 16).

Fig. 16. Your Natural Denudation, Inverted, 1999
According to Mark Godfrey in his book Olafur Eliasson: A New Model of Artist, Eliasson
was part of a group of artists in the 1990’s that were creating ‘situations and new realities’ in
contrast to what much of the art world was preoccupied with, representation and deconstruction
(Godfrey 12). In the mid 90’s Eliasson created a series of captivating installations as the Royal
Danish Academy of Fine Art in Copenhagen (Godfrey 11). These works were temporary
illusions and compelling spatial situations. Some critics accuse him of repetition and complicity
in consumer culture and the entertainment industry, in the ‘spectacularization of contemporary
art’. Not unlike certain reactions to Kusama’s Mirror Infinity Rooms, the immense popularity of
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these works raises suspicion. iii Some critics describe how the work apparently overawes the
visitor with sensory overload, which they believe fosters an emotional rather than critical
response. The work is described as being too easily apprehended as otherworldly, even spiritual
and has been referenced in connection with a technological sublime (Godfrey 20). But this is a
misreading of his work, Eliasson acknowledges influence and how artists of one generation
rework inherited vocabularies under new conditions. He sees himself as reworking this inherited
vocabulary, with the new goal of getting visitors to look at each other in a different and
heightened way (Godfrey 15).
Often his installations are simple set-ups, and utilize little to no technology. Eliasson
transforms the experience of space, with light, sound, heat, mirrors and yellow monofrequency
lamps. He likes to bring part of the landscape into the sterile environments of gallery spaces,
evoking the force of nature within urban space by recreating meteorological and natural
phenomena indoors, by replicating wind, waves or rain (Godfrey 13). Eliasson is committed to
the notion of the sensing of sense. An early work, Sensing yourself sensing replaced windows
with a set of mirrored slates. Looking through the mirrored slates that alternated with open slots
created an experience in which attempts to look out through the window are confounded,
interrupted by the reflection, which stops the gaze like a wall. Concentrating on either the view
or reflection alone is nearly impossible (Godfrey 13).
An early influence on Eliasson’s work, Lucy Lippard’s Six Years: The Dematerialization
of the Art Object 1966-72 was particularly important in developing his conviction to make a
career not based in the selling of objects (Godfrey 14). Eliasson is particularly drawn to the
complex and irregular forms of expressionist architecture and the work of Buckminster Fuller
(Godfrey 18). Not unlike Anish Kapoor, Eliasson is deeply influenced by James Turrell, the
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Light and Space movement, American post minimalism and land art. Eliasson also cites Gordon
Matta-Clark, early fog sculptures of Fujiko Nakaya, and the work of Carlos Cruz-Diez as
instrumental in the development of his own work (Godfrey 14).
Eliasson explains that there are four key theoretical principles that recur throughout his
body of work, and underlie almost everything he does. These four key principles are; 1) the
viewer is to be co-producer of the work, 2) the works involve awareness of the process of
perception, 3) an engagement with the process of perception results in an alertness to those also
in the process of perception, and 4) this experience can result in responsiveness. Instead of
visitor or audience, Eliasson prepares for the participant. His immersive aesthetic experiences are
not about an object. They are about the experience and experience depends on the body, its
eyesight and sense of smell, as well as that body’s cultural associations and personal memories.
Meaning, in the work of Eliasson, is made “in the merging of the forms he built and the
associations viewers brought to them” (Godfrey 19). These works emphasize the process of
perception, resulting in an awareness of the body as it makes sense of the environment,
conscious of occupying and navigating space. Eliasson hopes this increased self-reflection may
in turn lead to a more reflective attitude towards the world. The process makes the participant
more alert to those around, undergoing a similar experience, in which a sense of ‘we-ness’
emerges. We-ness is a powerful sense of togetherness, “not tied to any credo or specific agenda,
but which has progressive potential precisely because its function is not prescribed” (Godfrey
19). What critics deride as an emotional rather than critical response, is in reality a return to a
more balanced understanding evolving out of the interplay between sense and reason. Eliasson
believes that understanding, experienced in less analytical ways can trigger powerful feelings.
Feelings he hopes might be harnessed in the cause of social, economic and environmental
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attentiveness. “Feelings”, he states, “could lead to actions” which he sees as the very reason to
make art (Godfrey 20).
The idea of being committed to social, economic and environmental cause, invites an
interrogation related to Theodore Adorno’s views on ‘commitment’. Adorno’s position regarding
art committed to cause develops in dialogue with Walter Benjamin. This is a dialogue involving
a distinction between autonomous art and committed art, in which Adorno asserts that
autonomous art is better suited to instigating real change than committed art. In his essay The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, first published in 1935, Benjamin argues
that reproducibility has smothered the ‘aura’ associated with original, unique works of art, but
stresses that far from being negative, the technology of mechanical reproduction opens up
progressive possibilities (520). Adorno’s initial response, doubts that technical change alone is
likely to result in a progressive popular art (524). He worries that if art has no aura, is no longer
autonomous or inherently about an object, then it becomes dependent on message. And when the
message is explicitly committed to social, economic and environmental cause, it runs the risk of
desensitizing its audience to the profound urgency of the horror inherent in the subject matter.
Adorno accuses committed art of eliciting enjoyment out of what is unspeakably horrible,
through artistic representation, stylization and transfiguration, thus providing a safe conceptual
distance (780).
According to Adorno, it is the autonomous work of art that can best act as a site capable
of igniting cause, or resistance. Autonomous art, as exemplified in modernism, is concerned with
its own inherent structure and Adorno asserts that this self-referential investigation results in
“knowledge as nonconceptual objects” (781). The power of these nonconceptual objects is in the
a priori nature of the knowledge they impart, as given. Unlike committed art which works
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through persuasion (Adorno 781). This is not an issue of explicit communication versus empty or
non-communication, autonomous artwork is simply imbibed with depth, its communication
ambiguous. Autonomous art known as ‘modernism’ evokes this ambiguity through investigation
of its own inherent structure, a self-referential investigation that is a circuit, a loop. Eliasson, like
other sculpture based artistsiv following modernism, evokes this ambiguity through a shared
concern for another, more inclusive loop, the self-referential investigation of being. Adorno
points out that autonomous artwork is a site of mediation, in which form becomes an analogy, he
insists that even in the most ambiguous work of art, there is a hidden ‘it should be otherwise’
(782). The immersive aesthetic experience expands the site of mediation to include and
emphasize experience, and Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic experiences aim to instigate or
awaken response, through an engagement with perception.
Sculpture based work after modernism in general, is informed by both sides of this
argument. In an age of mass mechanical reproduction, the aura of art is less often associated with
an object. The significance of the art object has changed. As exemplified by the work of
Eliasson, immersive aesthetic experiences are about the participants’ experience of interpreting
ambiguous ontological signifiers. Eliasson’s goal is to awaken responsibility through awareness
of the process of perception. He addresses this concern for being, by creating opportunities to
exercise attentiveness, while utilizing natural phenomena to provide sensory data. In Being and
Time, Heidegger explains that attentiveness is related to care, and points out that before care,
there must be awareness. Heidegger explains that when practicing attentiveness, or “in refraining
from all production, manipulation, and so on, taking care of things places itself in the only mode
of being-in which is left over, in the mode of simply lingering with” (Heidegger 61). This mode
of being is not doing nothing, vacancy or void, it is another aspect of being and involves
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engagement. The Being-in of lingering, demands a relinquishing of identity, and while there is
an emphasis on perception and understanding, it is not as authority, rather as relation. Where a
classical or modernist space tends to center on the viewer, endowing a sense of authority through
occupation, Eliasson creates spaces of uncertain coordinates. His investigations arouse curiosity
regarding the process of perception, through disruption, or dislocation, especially as it relates to
environment and immediate surroundings. Uncertainty invites the possibility of a more playful
response, and the opportunity to perceive otherness in a less familiar way (Godfrey 18).
One such space is Eliasson’s 1997 exhibit, The curious garden (see fig.17). This early
effort brings together objects and installations, creating a mysterious and playful environment,
the total experience of which is conceived of as a journey (Godfrey 17). Experience is central to
Eliasson’s work, he is deeply committed to investigating empathy and embodiment. His
approach includes bringing the outdoors in. Here he installs or recreates elements of natural
phenomena within the stark white space of the gallery. The installation contains the echo of
nature, and yet its mechanical sources are evident, signifying a relationship. The curious garden
encompasses three adjacent rooms, a series of interrelated installations, each spotlighting
sensation in a different way. Eliasson’s sketch is a map of the route he envisions visitors will
travel.
The first stop is a large open room with empty walls and herringbone flooring that
disrupts the visual experience. Natural light is replaced with a subdued tone of yellow. The
strange yellow light is created by mono-frequency bulbs installed within a skylight. Flooding a
space with mono-frequency bulbs reduces the spectral range of vision to duotone. Normally
colorful objects appear flat, gray. Like looking at the world through an old black and white
movie filter. A curious sensation that begs to be explored. With nothing else in the room to look
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at, visitors investigate this shift in perception by looking at the only objects in the space, bodies,
those of other visitors and one's own.
Part of the allure of these works is the simplicity of their mechanics. This is not some
trick of advanced technology. These are objects and arrangements that bring into focus the
process of perception. Eliasson’s curious garden includes an uncomplicated construction,
supporting blue tarp, that acts as a tunnel-like passage into the second room. Within the second
room natural light is imbued with blueness reflecting off the tarp. A fan, suspended by its own
power cord, propels itself around the space. Unexpected encounters with elements that recall
nature include a large boulder which sits on the gallery floor, an even larger boulder appearing to
peek in a window and a wall of blackthorn branches, a hedge to be navigated. Eliasson’s curious
garden encapsulates his interest in connecting notions of curiosity, journey or pilgrimage, with
perception and reflection. These aesthetic investigations involving traveling across spaces of
earth, and scientific paradox are in the same vein as Dante's Divine Comedy, the art of M.C.
Escher, and the short stories of Jorge Luis Borges.
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Fig. 17. The curious garden, 1997
What these seemingly disparate works of art have in common is a shared notion of path,
the path of a journey or pilgrimage. A journey shaped by perception and paradox. In reference to
the art of lingering, philosopher Byun-Chul Han, explains that the path of the pilgrimage,
“separates the place of departure from the place of arrival”, the path itself is an interval, not an
empty space to be passed through as quickly as possible, instead the journey is the goal. The
pilgrim’s path is transitional, a state of Being-on-one’s-way as opposed to the surface movement
of the tourist or the internet (Han 37). Han explains that the movement of the internet is passive,
“described as surfing or browsing (originally meaning ‘to gaze’ or, metaphorically, ‘to dip into a
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book’). These forms of movement are not linked to a direction; they also do not know of any
fixed paths” (Han 39). In space without direction it is possible to end a course of action or begin
a new one, at any time, this indefinite condition of continuous movement, from one link to the
next, from one ‘Now’ to another, means that “the Now does not possess duration” and nothing
encourages lingering. The paths of Dante, Escher, Borges and Eliasson celebrate the journey.
The path of the pilgrim has long been the subject of art and to this aesthetic genre, belongs the
strange loop, circular paths that embrace a unity that contains oppositions and involve a strange
blend of mystical idealism with a mathematical conception of the world.
A major influence on aesthetics in general, Dante’s The Divine Comedy is an iconic
depiction of a pilgrim’s strange journey. In volume 1, Inferno ‘The Shade of Virgil’ tells ‘Dante
The Pilgrim’, “I shall be your guide and lead you out through an eternal place” (71 ~114). The
epic poem recounts a journey full of strange encounters, across mysterious landscapes. The circle
and the path are major recurring elements. At the threshold, in the vestibule leading to Hell, an
inscription announces both a blessing and a warning,
DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE CREATED ME,
AND HIGHEST WISDOM JOINED WITH PRIMAL LOVE,
BEFORE ME NOTHING BUT ETERNAL THINGS
WERE MADE, AND I SHALL LAST ETERNALLY.
ABANDON EVERY HOPE, ALL YOU WHO ENTER
(Dante 89 ~ 5-9)
The pilgrim passes through and the journey has begun, the audience is informed that, “across the
landscape rushes a howling wind, which blasts the Pilgrim out of his senses”, an early encounter
between nature and perception that helps to set the tone. Dante’s journey is across a seemingly
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infinite land, where he must navigate boundaries, castles encircled with high walls, flowing
water, and steep inclines. These boundaries to be navigated work in a way that is similar to
Eliasson’s hedge, in his curious garden, they do not stop the journey, they slow the pace, and
force travelers to consider them. At the Climax of Dante’s journey the orientation of the horizon
inexplicably flips, and night turns to day. What is of importance in relation to the work of
Eliasson is not the pilgrim, nor the objective of his journey, but the aesthetic description of a
path. This is a path of strange occurrences and unlikely encounters, says Dante, “the company of
six becomes just two; my wise guide leads me by another way out of the quiet into tempestuous
air. I come into a place where no light is” (102 ~146-151). Dante describes a place that embraces
paradox, a description that remains decidedly influential.
Visually, the path of paradox is exemplified in the drawings of Maurits Cornelis Escher,
better known as M.C. Escher (see fig. 18). Escher traveled extensively, living variously in the
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Spain. During his youth, he was drawn to the overwhelming
sensuousness of the organ music at St. Bartholomew’s church in the Netherlands, which, along
with the Alhambra castle in Spain, serve as major influences on his work. Escher credits the
layers of otherworldly sounds created by the organs and the intricately patterned tiles and
carvings at Alhambra, for introducing him to “a motif that repeats itself according to a certain
system” and for informing his later aesthetic pursuits (Selvin). Escher shares with Eliasson a
concern for mathematics and natural science. Escher’s illimitable tessellations, paradoxical
architectures, and other scenes that produce vertiginous effects are the result of his committed
investigations into the “idea of expressing endlessness within a limited plane” (Selvin). Escher
creates scenes in which opposites appear to flow seamlessly from one to the other, while
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simultaneously remaining distinct. Positive and negative spaces seem to fluctuate between a state
of cohesiveness and entropy, points of connection always slipping just out

Fig. 18. works of M.C. Escher
of sight. These scenes parallel the situations Eliasson creates, for example, his use of
monofrequency bulbs and their effect on the way color is observed, situations that almost appear
normal, but something is simply, not quite right. The lithographs, woodcuts and wood
engravings created by Escher are visual metaphors, maps to navigate impossible places. The path
of paradox, in the works of both Escher and Eliasson, demands engagement, the pilgrim is
compelled to pause, linger and examine the curious, while questioning perception itself.
Jorge Luis Borges’ collection of short stories, Ficciones, reveals what is at stake in the
lingering contemplation of paradox. Borges is included here because his aesthetic explorations
further develop an understanding of what is occurring along the path of paradox. He shares much
in common with the ends and means of both Escher and Eliasson. Borges, like Escher and
Eliasson, exudes the cosmopolitan, these are artists easily imagined as being at home all over the
world. They can be described as ‘cosmopolite’, from the Greek kosmopolī́tēs, citizens of the
world. Borges is known for the ease with which he shifts between multiple languages, including
Spanish, English, German and French. He deftly employs the transfer of inherited meanings
through analogies, cultural reference, and direct implementation (Borges 9). Recurring themes in
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the mythologies of Borges include iconography of the fearful abyss, the infinite, and the eternal
return (10). Of major concern is the connection he perceives between books, labyrinths, and man.
Each of these ideas embody an expression of the singular, as opposed to the particular or the
universal. For Borges, every man is one man, every book one book, and simultaneously, each is
also a specific and particular dialogue (10). Borges writes, “If equality entails identity, it would
have to be admitted at the same time that the nine coins are only one coin...there is only one
Individual, and that this indivisible Individual is every one of the separate beings in the universe”
(27). The confusion between the one and the multiple recalls the infinite loops of Escher and
hints at Eliasson’s ultimate goal, which I argue is to reveal connectivity.
Borges beautifully communicates a mysticism that recalls the ‘tempestuous air’ of Dante.
In a note, included at the end of The Approach To Al-Mu’tasim, Borges summarizes a poem he
describes as written by a ‘Persian mystic’, to explicate his use of the term ‘metempsychosis’. The
poem is about a quest to locate an exquisite feather, dropped by a king called “Thirty Birds”,
whose royal castle sits atop “the circular mountain which surrounds the earth”. The quest
amounts to an “almost infinite adventure”, in which the ‘pilgrims’ fly over seven valleys and
seven seas, and experience vertigo and annihilation What the surviving pilgrims learn upon the
completion of the path is that, “Anything is all things. The sun is all the stars, and each star is all
stars and the sun” (Borges 43). Borges employs aesthetics of the path of paradox to lead his
reader to an opening in which an understanding of the consequences of the nature of singularity
becomes apparent. Borges writes, “there is one night, called the Night of Nights, on which the
secret gates of the sky open wide and the water in the water jugs tastes sweeter” (21).
Metempsychosis can refer to transmigration of the soul, but it is further linked to changing,
becoming, and metamorphosis. The ability to change from one thing to another, and the nature of
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the singular as bridging the particular to the universal, both indicate connectivity. Connectivity
entails responsibility.
Borges again and again returns to the connection between man, book and labyrinth as a
paradoxical metaphor of the singular. His description of books, and especially his description of
a receptacle of books, evokes the mathematical constructions of Escher. Borges postulates a
connection between a book and the infinite, proposing a cyclic volume, a book “whose last page
would be the same as the first, and so have the possibility of continuing indefinitely” (97). In
Borges short story, The Library of Babel, the reader learns, “the universe (which others call the
Library) is composed of an indefinite, perhaps an infinite, number of hexagonal galleries” (79).
The visuals of infinite hexagonal galleries, which include miniature rooms bisected by a spiral
staircase, and are surrounded by mirror and polished surfaces, read as allegory of Escher’s visual
landscapes (Borges 79). Both places, in the words of Borges, are “a false country, a substantial
fragment, an unknown planet” (21). What all of this has to do with the immersive aesthetic
experiences of Ellison, is that all of these aesthetic constructions provide a clearing in which
perception momentarily expands, using similar signification and metaphor.
Because these works utilize similar signification and metaphor, it is possible to draw
conclusions about how they also may be constructed upon a shared foundation or intent. They
communicate similar messages. Eliasson’s The curious garden, like many of Borges’s stories,
involves a journey, along a path that abounds with moments of being perplexed. Borges guides
the reader through journeys, in the company of pilgrims, who are in the process of investigating,
and likely to experience a state of perceived understanding. What is to be understood, is that the
path is like a curious labyrinth, and labyrinths are plotted, destined to be deciphered (Borges 34).
These particular labyrinths are maps of an enchanted cosmos. Borges describes, “a mythical
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labyrinth, untouched and perfect, infinite, made not only of eight-sided pavilions and of twisting
paths, but also of rivers, provinces and kingdoms...a maze of mazes, of a sinuous, ever growing
maze which would take in both past and future and would somehow involve the stars” (94). The
circular ruins and forking paths of Borges illustrate the richness of ambiguity (52). This is the
same ambiguity involved in the encounter of a giant boulder peering in the window of Eliasson’s
curious garden. The boulder peeking in the window, appears both ancient and alive.
Borges ultimately concludes that the garden “is an enormous guessing game, or parable,
in which the subject is time” (99). And time is only important in the context of human life.
According to Borges, for most, the purpose of the journey will remain unknown, and the strange
encounters will not be understood until the last paragraph (15). Once dead, Borges writes, “my
sepulchre shall be the unfathomable air: my body will sink lengthily and will corrupt and
dissolve in the wind engendered by the fall, which is infinite” (80). Borges sees man as a
banished spirit in the monstrous chaos of infinity, preoccupied by a cosmic exile in time, but he
finds grace in the possibilities of extension and thinking (24). Borges is interested in a
conception of the “universe as a series of mental processes, whose unfolding is to be understood
only as a time sequence” (Borges 24). Time, in the mind of Borges, is yet another medium in
which the curious labyrinth can be found. Time is related to the curious labyrinth and in turn, the
paradoxical path. Borges describes a bifurcation that occurs, not in space, but in time, one that
creates various futures, various times, that lead to others, and will in turn branch out, an infinite
number of times (Borges 98). Borges reasons that the present is undefined, the future has no
other reality than as present hope, and the past is no more than present memory (Borges 25).
Simultaneously, Borges conceives of time as endless, or existing in some cyclical form (Borges
41). He describes time as “an infinite series of times, in a dizzily growing, ever spreading
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network of diverging, converging and parallel times. This web of time – the strands which
approach one another, bifurcate, intersect or ignore each other through the centuries”, embraces
every possibility. There are an infinite number of parallel multiverses, that include every
variation of ‘me’, ‘I’, but Borges points out that “we do not exist in most of them”, ‘my’
particular perception is an anomaly (Borges 100). In Borges’ mystical philosophical musings, the
brief flicker of individual existence is, however, ultimately redeemed by art.
Eliasson’s Your sense of Unity, installed in the Palace of Versailles, in 2016, is a work
that invites its pilgrim to linger, visually tracing a path that runs through circles, through
reflections and mirror (see fig. 19). Psychic lines of sight connect past, present, and future. The
very futuristic looking circles of neon lights against mirror, contrast with the elegant splendor of
Versailles. Between these points of future and past, the pilgrim stands in the now. Does one
sense infinity? History? Unity is apparent when connection is perceived. In order to truly
perceive, it is necessary to be purposefully engaged with the ‘now’. The incredible journey of the
pilgrim,

Fig. 19 Your sense of unity, 2016 Palace of Versailles
along the path of paradox, involves curious and perplexing encounters with the world. These
encounters provide moments to linger, in thought. Eliasson’s works are immersive aesthetic
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experiences because they use sense and signification to engage reason and perception, equally.
And in doing so, create an opportunity to experience a particular articulation of the sublime.
The goal of this paper is to explain why the immersive aesthetic experience serves as a
beneficial practice, one which addresses the contemporary imbalance that increasingly favors
abstract reasoning. The immersive aesthetic experience is a response to what has become, a
conventional discounting of sense. In Being and Time, Heidegger anticipates consequences of an
over reliance on logic and reason in the age of information,
Plethora of information seduces us into failing to see the real problem. The
syncretistic comparison and classification of everything does not of itself give us
genuine essential knowledge. Subjecting the manifold to tabulation does not
guarantee a real understanding of what has been ordered. (Heidegger 51)
Reason and logic alone are unable to provide essential understanding about immediate
circumstances. In addition to having the tools of reason and logic, using them requires a body, a
body that senses and perceives. Sensory data must be conceived of as a whole that cannot be
broken up, yet encompasses a multiplicity of constitutive structural factors. The compound
expression ‘being-in-the-world’ indicates a unified phenomenon (Heidegger 53). Being is
conditioned by its circumstances. Merleau-Ponty characterizes embodiment as perception’s
connection to the body, to this Heidegger adds the importance of ‘presence’, of being present, an
awareness of sense. Nancy further develops this understanding of sense as singularly “toward
(and in) the world” (Nancy 74). I intend to demonstrate how Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic
experiences respond to these issues raised by Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Nancy.
Eliasson creates opportunities to examine being, sensing and ‘the other’ explicitly in his
immersive aesthetic experience, Your blind passenger, installed at ARKEN Museum of Modern
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Art, Copenhagen, 2010 (see fig. 20). Din blinde passager, is the Danish expression for a
stowaway. A dark and foggy seaside harbor is evoked. Upon entering, the passenger is
temporarily blinded in brightly illuminated fog. By hampering visual perception, other senses are
activated in order to navigate the space. The long, narrow corridor is dense with fog and zones of
light of different hues. Passengers are engulfed in a thick haze that makes it difficult to see, the
situation creates an awareness of the power of the other senses. Eliasson asks the passenger to
slow down, and in so doing, see them self sensing. The yellow and blue light, combined with the
heavy fog, allow for moments of disappearance and appearance, in the encounter of others, and
in turn reveals an understanding of body consciousness, as a body always among bodies.
Eliasson's ideas about perception, seeing, and sensing are deeply influenced by his interest in all
things science and nature. He credits Francisco Varela, a Chilean biologist, philosopher,
cybernetician, and neuroscientist along with other scientists and philosophers as deeply
influential to his work (“Your monochromatic listening”).
Eliasson is interested in how an altered perceptive apparatus changes the appearance of
the world; he imagines an ability to see infrared or ultraviolet light in addition to the spectrum
that we can perceive. His interest in color perception led him to a recurring use of yellow
monofrequency bulbs, whose light makes everything a shade of gray. Eliasson uses the
monochromatic light to create an experience that requires a recalibrated perceptual apparatus and
encourages imagining other perspectives. While at the same time making evident the limits of
our senses and the relativity of our color perception. Eliasson hopes this experience will cause
the passenger to reconsider how the world is constituted. He describes perception as a type of
world-making, “For a moment, we can imagine what it might be like to become colour-blind or
another species of animal or even more radically other. What strange, new worlds might emerge
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then?” (“Your monochromatic listening”). Eliasson begins by examining physical processes and
arrives at a philosophical conception of being and the responsibility associated with connection.

Fig. 20. Your Blind Passenger, 2010
The perception evoked in the experience of Your blind passenger is a sensing that
involves far more than simple ‘seeing’, the entire body perceives. Upon entering the long
corridor, briefly befuddled by light and fog, the passenger becomes aware of their eyes adjusting,
the feel of air moving with the weight of other passengers hidden in the fog, hands instinctively
reach out, feet gingerly advance. Merleau-Ponty explains that sensing is more than just seeing,
describing smiling babies, and how “the child’s visual experience of his own body is altogether
insignificant in relation to the kinesthetic, cenesthesic, or tactile feeling he can have of it”
(Merleau-Ponty 145). He explains that the sensory domains involved in perception are no mere
agglomeration of sensations, they comprise a system revolving around “consciousness as the
perception of my body’s position in relation to the vertical, the horizontal, and certain other axes
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of important coordinates” (Merleau-Ponty 147). Your blind passenger emphasizes the body’s
role, in the way passengers who remain still see little more than fog, while passengers who move
through the space encounter each other, appearing and disappearing. Sensing is a system that
works to orient the body in space, perception, however introduces paradox.
The paradox of perception is rooted in the experience of ‘my’ body as ‘mine’, MerleauPonty contrasts his metaphor of a ‘mixture’ of ‘mind with body’ to the Aristotelian metaphor of
the soul as a pilot of his ship (Merleau-Ponty 15). In the act of representing, he states, “I imply
that they are not grasped as actually existing; because what is represented is not here before us, I
do not actually perceive it” (Merleau-Ponty 90). Representations are created in the mind, the
echo of sensations, hammered together. The perceived thing itself is paradoxical. Merleau-Ponty
says the perceived thing exists, only insofar as someone can perceive it. Otherwise it is not a
perceived thing. The perception of ‘things’ is possible only under the condition that they always
recede beyond their immediately given aspects. Merleau-Ponty points to this as “a paradox of
immanence and transcendence”, one that always involves “a beyond of what is actually given”,
perceptual experience of the appearance of ‘something,’ requires both this presence and this
absence (Merleau-Ponty 93). This is an understanding that involves a kind of practical synthesis.
Your blind passenger is an immersive aesthetic experience in as much as it is a physical
representation of this metaphor. Moving along the corridor, navigating through space, senses on
alert, ‘others’ appear and disappear into the fog. Merleau-Ponty points to the problem of
“knowing how my experience is related to the experience which others have of the same objects”
(Merleau-Ponty 93). Because the ‘thing’ is never fully accessible, a shared perception can never
be confirmed as identical. Merleau-Ponty explains that the paradoxical phenomenon which
renders being accessible to us involves the perception of sensations (Merleau-Ponty 93).
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Understood as simple sensations, “they are private: they are mine alone” however, if sensations
are treated “as acts of the intellect, if perception is an inspection of the mind, and the perceived
object an idea, then you and I are talking about the same world” (Merleau-Ponty 93).
Communication involves coming into agreement about an idea, but neither private sensation, nor
ability to agree, fully accounts for experience.
The study of perception reveals that the perceived world is not a collection of objects, and
that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought. The final analysis,
according to Merleau-Ponty, shows that every perception takes place within a certain horizon
and ultimately in the ‘world’ (Merleau-Ponty 89). Perception cannot be extricated from the
context of its occurrence. Additionally, Merleau-Ponty explains that the psyche does not consist
of a series of states of consciousness, with distinct borders and inaccessible to others, but that in
fact “consciousness is turned first toward the world, turned toward things; it is above all a
relation to the world” (Merleau-Ponty 146). Merleau-Ponty describes consciousness as a certain
way of behaving toward the world. Consciousness, he argues, is discovered in conduct, and it is
only by considering the manner in which the other deals with the world that some insight on the
consciousness of the other may be gained (Merleau-Ponty 146). Instinctively the act of
perception in the company of the other, demands a kind of agreement, that what is seen is a
shared object of perception (Merleau-Ponty 94). Separation of consciousness is first recognized
only after a failure of communication. How can ‘you’ not sense what ‘I’ am sensing.
The stage prior to this recognition, is the primordial illusion, in which Merleau-Ponty
explains, consciousness first assumes itself to be undivided (Merleau-Ponty 94). In this initial
state of pre-communication, “the other’s intentions somehow play across my body while my
intentions play across his” (Merleau-Ponty 148). Merleau-Ponty describes a form of
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communication not bound by language and signification, that is connected to a stage of
development in which identity is “virtual, latent, unaware of itself in its absolute difference”
(Merleau-Ponty 149). The primordial illusion, a stage of pre-communication, does not involve
the individual, rather “an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group of life”, however
this initial continuity is soon disrupted by the objectification of one’s own body and an
awareness of the other in his difference (Merleau-Ponty 149). Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic
experiences involve the primordial illusion, in that the participant engages in pre-communication
with other participants. Participants, moving through space, sense paradoxical phenomena and
instinctively respond by questioning their senses and the perception of those around them. As
previously described in this dissertation, the sublime is an aesthetic response to copious sensory
data and ontological signification that involves the shedding of identity. In the overwhelming
moment, the particular dissolves to reveal the singular.
What is essential to both Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic experiences, and an
understanding of the singular, is the relationship between sensing and ‘being-with’. Being is
associated with place, happening with where, and always affected in the presence of another.
Location itself is changed by the being that senses. Merleau-Ponty explains that perception opens
out on an ‘other,’ allowing for a knowledge of truth and an experience of reality, that is
developed through a synthesis of intellection and sensation (Merleau-Ponty 15). Consciousness
of the subjectivity of perception is derived through being-with. In the perception of another, “the
body of the other tears itself away from being one of my phenomena”, the discovery of a relation
to another individual, of the same being, reveals the depths of subjectivity. Another subjectivity
whose body is a system for understanding the world, becomes the bearer of symbolic behaviors,
and offers the task of a true communication (Merleau-Ponty 94). ‘I’ understand the other through
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a comparison of ‘our’ response to the environment that we share. Being present not only reveals
the other, it discloses the connectivity of singularity, and affirms the necessity of responsibility.
Because of connectivity, the action of being, ultimately returns to alter the doer of said action.
Eliasson addresses this concern for the relationship between singularity, connectivity and
response by creating shared spaces that activate sensing and encourage a mode of perceiving
perception in action.
Nancy explains “all of sense is along the edge of being ‘with”, and being-with implies a
relation that engenders an inquiry into the being of beings (Nancy 71). The being of beings,
according to Heidegger, is what remains concealed, is always covered up again, or only shows
itself in a disguised way (Heidegger 33). However, he also explains that beings show themselves
in the present, are understood and interpreted with regard to the present, and are to be conceived
of as presence (Heidegger 25). Being, as presence, is action oriented, it is a doing, being is what
it does now, in this moment. The understanding of a being develops or decays according to the
manner of being, in time, in its average everydayness (Heidegger 16). Nancy also points out that
presence always resolves itself into an absence (Nancy 69). An awareness of this relation
between presence and absence, is emphasized in being with another. It is in being-with that
conjecture concerning essence and being itself develops. Nancy says that it is in the other, whose
absence stands out as vestige, remainder, and imprint, that the singular is first intuited. It is the
other whose, “fugitive existence of singularity configures essence”, that the singular is not a
creation, a product or production, “it is being-as-act or being-in-action, the entelechy that no
power precedes” (Nancy 72).
For Nancy the question remains, “What then is someone? This is precisely what one
cannot ask – even though this is the whole question” (Nancy 70). He describes the singular as
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both a certain one and anyone, each and every one, inimitable and unique, and yet identical to
all. The singular is an outline, a configuration, a point without dimensions, or a limit. The
singular is what ‘makes’ up the world and ‘makes sense’, it is the body among bodies, the
answer then, according to Nancy is, the plural singular (Nancy 70). Any consideration of any
type of ‘individuality’ or ‘autonomy’ must then be grounded in the essential determination of
multiplicity (Nancy 71). Nancy explains that the ‘someone’ does not enter into relation with
other ‘someones,’ nor is there a ‘community’ that precedes interrelated individuals. The singular
is not the particular, not a part of a group, ‘one’ means some ones and some other ones, or some
ones with other ones. According to Nancy it is precisely this ‘and’ and this ‘with’ that determine
the very texture of the world. Being-with is an engagement with presence, an engagement that
may also be described as a response (Nancy 71). However, the ‘response,’ here, does not contain
the presupposition of a question. This is not a response to a question, nor the solution to a
problem, the appeasement of an interrogation, or the conclusion of a search. Instead, Nancy
looks to etymology, and finds response as a given guarantee, a promise, and an engagement.
Someone, the singular, is less a being-present than an engaged presence, engaged perhaps first in
nothing other than being-here, exposed there (Nancy 71).
Through sense and ontological signification, Eliasson creates immersive aesthetic
experiences that draw attention to perception, to being-with, and through reflection on beingwith, provide opportunity to better understand singularity and its connection to responsiveness.
Eliasson’s The Weather Project, especially epitomizes the way his immersive aesthetic
experiences allow for the practice of mode of being present, that has the potential to
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Fig. 21. The Weather Project, 2003
result in presence as engaged responsibility (see fig. 21). The weather project is a site-specific
installation in Turbine Hall, which exhibited at the Tate Modern London in 2003. In it, Eliasson
uses many of the same formal elements that he has incorporated in many projects: circles, light,
mist, mirrors, and yellow monofrequency bulbs, which make everything appear monochrome.
The weather project is yet another puzzling environment, in which the outdoors have been
brought inside formal gallery space. An environment that intimates science, technology, and
architecture as much as it references elements of nature. The weather project is grounded in
perception and structured around Eliasson’s interest in how nature organizes space, in the
experience of the world, and understanding.
The work is an awesome illusion of a sun inside Turbine hall. It is not a complex
technical projection, or a virtual reality, instead the illusion is simple, its inner workings exposed.
The ceiling is rigged with aluminum frames, lined with mirror foil that create a giant mirror,
which visually doubles the volume of the hall. A huge half circle screen is mounted on one end
of the hall, its flat edge abutting the ceiling at the mirror, whose reflection makes the half circle
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whole. The screen is backlit with mono-frequency light bulbs and artificial mist is emitted into
the room. The effect is of a massive indoor sunset. Eliasson invokes the manufactured element of
perception through the obvious manufactured nature of his ‘environment’. This is a space where
participants are active, rather than passive, they explore the space, and find their reflection in the
mirror, along with all the other participants sharing the space. Eliasson aims for a meditative,
dreamy space and is not interested in over-explaining, instead he wants the viewer to co-produce
the narrative. A narrative that involves the seeing of seeing, and the sharing of space. This space
is an immersive aesthetic experience because it involves sense and reason and encourages
lingering, and presence (being present). What is notable about the immersive aesthetic
experience is that participants who fully engage with sensing, while simultaneously interpreting
ontological signifiers may encounter an opportunity to experience the sublime. Eliasson’s work
does this in specific ways, it engages sense through the use of elements of earth, and reason
through reference to science and technology. By creating the need for a recalibration of sense,
yet simultaneously making the inner workings of the illusion clear, the participant is confounded
by paradox. Ontological signification that relates to singularity, and its corresponding response
(ability) are evoked in these shared spaces. His works, especially Curious garden, Your blind
passenger and The weather project involve both sense and reason, engaged in the interplay of
aesthetic understanding.
Whereas in previous chapters ontological signification has been related to the infinite and
the void, in the work of Eliasson ontological signification involves singularity, being-with and
responsiveness. By doing, the active participant, moving through space, senses and becomes
more aware of their body in space. Heidegger’s being-in is an existential (54). Being-in
understands ‘itself’ in terms of what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, and in the things
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which it initially takes care of (Heidegger 116). Eliasson creates spaces in which participants
encounter confounding natural elements and are confronted with ambiguous ‘outward
appearance’ that is unable to confer comprehensive understanding (Heidegger 69). Being always
happens in space, in a certain place, an environment, and always in that place being happens with
other beings. Being-with involves connection, and the effect – affect that living organisms in
close physical proximity have upon each other introduces responsibility.
Being is singular, and singularity entails connection. Individual being is distinguished by
the course of its movement, in which encounters with others instigate distinction and isolation of
the ‘I’. However, Heidegger points out that, ‘others’ are “those from whom one mostly does not
distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is”, the ‘with’ and ‘also’ of being-with, are to
be understood existentially, not categorically (115). On the basis of this being-with, the world is
always already a world shared with others (Heidegger 115). Eliasson’s shared spaces accentuate
being-with through the sensing of perception in action, and result in an increased awareness of
the subjectivity involved in singularity, and the impossibility of ever completely knowing the
‘other’ or being completely understood. Communication is most commonly associated with
reason, as necessary to the possibility of meaningful language, ignoring the state of precommunication where language is based on a relationship that is prior to understanding, a
relation that cannot be reduced to understanding (Levinas 4). This relationship is being-with.
Levinas explains that our relation with the other consists in wanting to understand the other, but
he says it is a relation that exceeds the confines of understanding. It is also about sensing, about
listening, and about feeling. Besides curiosity, Levinas says knowledge of the other, also
demands sympathy or love. The other as being, is also singular so the relation is one of
connectivity, which responds in kind (Levinas 5). Being-with happens in a circuit of intelligence
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with the real. It requires both reason and perception. Additionally, all understanding and meaning
are only grasped within a particular horizon. Levinas states that “all misunderstanding is simply
a deficient mode of understanding” (10). Immersive aesthetic experiences address a
contemporary deficiency in perception as a mode of understanding.
The contemporary deficiency of perception as mode of understanding is due to a
continued focus on logos, and the exalted power of reason, which affects our relationship with
the environment, the world, and being itself. Arendt’s explanation of The Human Condition
shows that this over-reliance on reason and logic has grown out of a distortion of the ancient
Greek reverence of contemplation. In Plato’s Republic contemplation is the ideal, superior to
activity of any kind (Arendt 14). Contemplation is further buoyed by Aristotle, whose three ways
of life include having concern for beautiful things, having concern for beautiful deeds, or
contemplation of eternal everlasting beauty (Arendt 13). Arendt points out that Aristotle
designates all activity as ‘askholk’ a Greek word meaning “un-quiet”, an important distinction in
that according to Aristotle, every kind of activity, even the processes of mere thought, must
culminate in the absolute quiet of contemplation. Only in complete human stillness can truth
reveal itself (Arendt 15). This reverence for contemplation becomes distorted when Plato
simultaneously “subordinated the sensation of the particular to the knowledge of the universal”
(Levinas 5). Arendt describes how Augustine distinguishes between the ‘burden’ (sarcina) of
active life, and the unbearable ‘sweetness’ (suavitas) and ‘delight of truth’ found in
contemplation (Arendt 16). This separation of sense and reason is at the root of ‘endless
distinctions’ to follow (Arendt 19). Distinctions, categories and abstract thinking, without feeling
or confluence are untenable.

195
In 10,000 BC The Geology of Morals, Deleuze and Guattari describe the ‘Earth’ as a
body without organs, “permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by
free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles” (40). They state that
simultaneously there occurs a very important, inevitable phenomenon that is both beneficial and
unfortunate, what they describe as, stratification (Deleuze and Guattari 40). Strata, “consist of
giving form to matters of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of
resonance and redundancy” (Deleuze and Guattari 40). The current overemphasis on reason, and
over-reliance on abstract categorical thinking is a stratum, a blockage. This blockage has several
results.
One result of the blockage is coalescing of the parentheticals, reason and perception with
immortality and eternity. Reason and logic yearn for immortality, while sense and perception
extend toward eternity. A striking difference between immortality and eternity is their
relationship with responsibility. Immortality allows for the postponement or avoidance of
response, while eternity, the now, creates response, responsibility is immediate. Arendt describes
how within the inordinate focus on contemplation over activity, mind over body, a desire for
immortality further affects how the activities of the body, labor, work and action, are
distinguished. The body, as second to mind, is regarded as a tool. Arendt explains that labor
correlates to the body, it is the work of maintenance, an unending process. Work is artifice, it is
the thing a body makes, and action is the activity between bodies. It is through action and work
that monuments of remembrance are possible (Arendt 19). Arendt points out that immortality
means endurance in time, so the task of potential genius is to produce works, deeds, and words,
“durable enough to last and great enough to be remembered” (Arendt 18). The Greek language
does not distinguish between ‘works’ and ‘deeds’ but calls both erga, and Arendt says it is not
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until the sophists that their meanings are severed (Arendt 19). In its theoretical glorification,
labor loses its nuance, as care and maintenance of the body, and is lumped into a category that
includes both work and action. This new conception of activity as means of creating great and
durable works, in which immortality may be achieved, has had the effect of a factual
transformation of the entire society into a laboring society (Arendt 4). In which all labor
maintains, not the body, but the artifice of an ideal.
The ideal in question is of unending progress in service of the possibility of immortality.
The perception of the ‘thinking being’ is of exteriority, and involves an invitation to labor and
assume ownership, while the experience of the ‘living being’ is of substance, co-substantial with
its horizon, essentially immediate (Levinas 13). Categories of subject and object, being and
thing, under the influence of logos, result in a conflation of activities of the body: labor, work
and action. Labor is considered equally necessary to the achievements of immortality, along with
work and action. What follows is the concept of a ‘progress’ whose goal is always deferred.
Through this constant progress man has created science and technology, as well as developed a
heavy reliance on gadgets and tools. Arendt points out that when sense and reason have “parted
company for good, then we would indeed become the helpless slaves, not so much of our
machines as of our know-how, thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every gadget which is
technically possible, no matter how murderous it is” (Arendt 3). The abstraction of reason and
logic obscures the reality of experience. Reason is always directed toward a future, always
looking ahead, thwarting peripheral vision. Reason is aggressive and dominates.
Decades later, in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, Haraway describes how the structure of
patriarchal dominance is deeply embedded in the natural sciences as well as showing how the
‘body politic’ of the early industrial revolution, theoretically linked the natural and political
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economy on multiple levels (8). Haraway explains that, “nature, including human nature, has
been theorized and constructed on the basis of scarcity and competition. Moreover, our nature
has been theorized and developed through the construction of life science in and for capitalism
and patriarchy” (8). Watching for dominance rather than cooperation, reveals dominance. You
are what you do, and you find what you look for. A self perpetuating system whose
responsibility is always toward the future, involving a present that is to be endured. Eliasson is
invested in confronting and resisting the effects of this tendency toward over emphasis on reason
and discounting of perception. Of particular interest to Eliasson is the incongruence between
perception and understanding, and what it might demonstrate about being-with.
Eternity demands responsibility, the space in which being-is requires maintenance.
Immortality is outside of time, not affected by time, and thus able to avoid the consequences of
not maintaining one’s space. Immortality is in effect, fantasy of infinitely deferred responsibility.
A fantasy also found in man’s desire to explore, extend, colonize and escape ‘earthly bounds’.
An inspection of the universe by the light of reason, amounts to avoidance of perception of the
singular in the now (Nancy 39). Heidegger explains that being-in is response to environment,
being is, having to do with, producing, ordering and taking care of, it is using or relinquishing, it
is also losing, and undertaking. Being is to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, observe, or
speak about, and includes determining, but it also includes resting, renouncing, omitting and
neglecting as deficient modes, all of whom, Heidegger links with ‘taking care of’ (Heidegger
57). The effects of all beings in shared space affect one another. Perhaps Arendt’s observation of
the human notion of ‘escaping’ earth, and of being earthbound as a form of imprisonment, stems
from a desire to avoid responsibility.
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Arendt describes human beings as earth-bound creatures, who act as though they are
dwellers of the universe, yet forever unable to understand, to think and speak, about the things
which they nevertheless are able to do. And that in the plural, insofar as they live and move and
act in this world, only experience meaningfulness when they talk and make sense to themselves
and each other (Arendt 4). The quest for meaning begins with self, augustinian quaestio mihi
factus sum (a question have I become for myself), and yet Arendt points out that “it is highly
unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things
surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves” (Arendt 10).
The conditions of human existence, life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and
the earth – can never ‘explain’ what we are – they never condition us absolutely (Arendt 11).
The search for meaning can only lead to deep understanding through an engagement of
both perception and contemplation. In order to confront and resist the contemporary conviction
that sense and reason are distinct, and that reason alone leads to understanding, the notion of
categories and universals must be re-evaluated. Levinas explains that “to free man from
categories adopted solely to things,” the distinction between the static, inert, and determined
nature of things and the dynamism, durée, and transcendence or freedom, as the essence of
being, must be re-examined (8). The enormous weight of contemplation in the traditional
hierarchy has blurred distinctions and obscured nuance (Arendt 17). This deeply embedded
structure cannot be fixed by simply reinterpreting or changing terminology. One condition
necessary to a deconstruction, explains Haraway, is the requirement of “rejection of all forms of
the ideological claims for pure objectivity rooted in the subject-object split that has legitimated
our logics of domination of nature and ourselves” (19). To understand is not to merely see, or
recognize, not to simply define, but to be in an affective state. Thinking in more than quiet
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contemplation, it also requires engagement, “the dramatic event of being-in-the-world” (Levinas
3). This mode of being-in-the-world is described by Heidegger as dwelling, and he explains that
the ‘in’ stems from innan, in which ‘in’ means to live, habitare, to dwell, and ‘an’ means,
familiar with and to take care of (Heidegger 55). He recommends “looking explicitly as a mode
of independent dwelling, together with beings in the world. In this ‘dwelling’ – as refraining
from every manipulation and use – the perception of what is objectively present takes place
(Heidegger 61). Any kind of deeper understanding requires lingering, which does not indicate
doing nothing, lingering is an activity, an engagement.
Arendt says that “art has the power to reimagine our shared possible futures as well as
shape the social configurations and potentials of our present”, it has this power because it
encourages and provides practice lingering, along with a potential experience that can be
described as a flash of the eternal, in the form of the sublime. Arendt says that Plato calls the
experience of the eternal, arrheton (unspeakable) and Aristotle refers to it as, aneu logon
(without word), she explains that it was later conceptualized in the paradoxical nunc stans (the
standing now), this flash of the eternal, grasped through the aesthetic interplay of sense and
reason, is the sublime (Arendt 20). Eliasson confronts and resists the effects of unduly abstract
reasoning in many ways, but he is especially effective when his works are immersive aesthetic
experiences, that involve paradoxical phenomenon, emphasize being-with, and instigate an
interrogation of the inevitably of response. As an essential part of his practice, Eliasson is
committed to community action, and has created Studio Eliasson. A team of investigators
looking into ways of directly addressing specific issues, like melting icebergs and living
conditions throughout the world. His approach is one of unity and connection. Eliasson hopes to
reveal the world as phenomena that confounds, and in doing so bring sense to the forefront of
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experience. Heidegger says that to describe ‘the world’ as a phenomenon, means letting what
shows itself in the ‘beings’ within the world be seen (Heidegger 63). Explicitly looking and
seeing confounding phenomena is an act of presence that prompts an awareness that which
confounds cannot be dominated and if you really look at anything long enough it is bound to
confound.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Damien Hirst
In a 2012 video interview for the Tate, about his diamond encrusted skull, For the Love
of God, Damien Hirst says that every artwork that has ever interested him, has always been about
death. In some ways this entire dissertation is about death. Death is the ontological signification,
and a thread that runs through all the various manifestations of the sublime. Nancy explains that
from Plato to Heidegger, philosophy reaches the conclusion that death is the phenomenon of
truth, that death is truth itself, and this is because death “is the only presentation of essence as
essence” (Nancy 32). Absence as evidence of the absolute. Nancy, goes on to say that it would
be worthwhile to trace, “from the God of Thomas Aquinas to the God of classical rationalism,
the slow, deadly accentuation that displaces the index of God from esse to essentia, from act to
truth”, from sense to reason (Nancy 32). This slippage towards reason and logic, that discounts
sense, attempts to sever essence from being, postulating an essence that will go on existing, even
when the body no longer does, and resulting in a conception of death as a birth, to a beyond. This
view of death as birth to a beyond-the-world, not only engenders ‘being-for-death’ or ‘beingtoward-death’, it impacts structures, both conscious and unconscious, interior and exterior
(Nancy 32).
In order to recover sense, Nancy posits a reconception of death, not as a simple contrary
to life, but as a relation. Death as that which has always already taken place, as existence itself.
This death is not a birth to a beyond the world, but within it, a relation between finitude and
infinity, a conception that engenders a ‘being-toward-infinity’ (Nancy 32). Being includes death,
as a component part of a process connected to birth, it is the absence within the presence of
being. Damien Hirst’s immersive aesthetic experience, Treasure from the Wreck of the
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Unbelievable, at the 2017 Venice Biennale, provides an opportunity to examine some of the
ways it successfully evokes ontological reflection. In this chapter I will demonstrate how this
immersive aesthetic experience employs abundant sensory data and ontological signification,
intended to activate one’s sense of humor, engaging participants in the interplay of sense and
reason that may result in aesthetic understanding.
Humor arises from an awareness, through reflection, of the absurdity and contradictions
inherent in being. A sense of humor is developed through the same unconscious processes that
create dreams, ignited by the will, desire, libido, and the struggle to conceive of death. Both
develop through perceptions, memories, and associations, through condensation and
displacement. One’s sense of humor is singular, in that everyone’s sense of humor develops
along a unique path, and yet there is an expectation of universal agreement. Humor is the
singular event of this chapter, the moment of connection, neither particular nor universal, the
moment when identity is briefly shed and the participant is engaged in reflection on ontological
ideologies including, authority, belief, and mythology.

Fig. 22. Fate of a Banished Man, 2017
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable employs humor to reveal deeply embedded
constructs and is ultimately the experience of an intertextual reading, a topography of ontological
signifiers.

203

Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable filled two entire locations, the Punta della
Dogana as well as Palazzo Grassi, buildings that astound visitors with the sheer beauty of their
architecture and location (see fig. 22). This is a work that should not be described outside of its
context, Venice, during the Biennale no less. Venice, with its labyrinthine passages, canals, and
history, is a work of art in and of itself, the Biennale serves to emphasize this. Both museums
exhibiting Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, lie outside the official Biennale
grounds, effectively helping to extend the reach of the Biennale citywide. The exhibit is
presented as if the works were ‘actual’ artifacts, located and retrieved from the sea by a team of
marine archaeologists. Works are displayed as they would be presented in a natural history
museum. Materials refer to Cif Amotan II, the protagonist in Hirst’s mythic tale, revealed by the
discovery of this shipwrecked treasure. Hirst even produced a documentary style video of the
underwater retrieval that plays in a theater at the Palazzo Grassi, further adding to the semblance
of authenticity. Any visitor, happening upon the exhibit would naturally accept its presentation at
face value, many visitors in town specifically for the Biennale were deep within the exhibit
before understanding they had been duped. That ‘Cif Amotan II’ is an anagram for ‘I am Fiction’
seems so obvious after that moment of understanding occurs. Now the references to popular
culture scream out and even the veracity of the materials is uncertain. Yet there is still an
audacity to the attention to detail, with an impression that no expense was spared.
This exhibit was largely panned by critics, while visitors were anything but indifferent,
the general reaction was to either love it, or hate it. Hirst himself has a persona that generates a
similar reaction. He began his career as an English art school punk. He caused scandal,
disrupting the gallery commission system. With fame and success came more elaborately
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produced works. Like Jeff Koons, Hirst often employs others to craft his vision. The works cost
massive amounts of money to make, and sell for even more. Hirst is a major player in the
contemporary ‘art market’, what has become a money game, for the very rich. To their credit, art
collectors have played a role in preserving what may have otherwise become treasures lost to the
sea of time. However, the ‘art market’ like everything else is impacted by the overemphasis on
reason and logic.
And while Hirst most definitely understands the power of objects to elicit a strong
reaction, Baudrillard believes that art has been corrupted by science and its quest for objectivity
(Baudrillard 52). The objectivity of reason and logic produces and relies on category and
determination. The art market produces and relies on its own categories and determinations of
value. In order to assign abstract value, the art market has subsumed the cult of ‘artistic genius’
within a larger ‘cult of personality’. Value is often affirmed in terms of brand name, who has it,
who wants it. Art in this sense is simply an object, to be valued, collected, traded, bought and
resold. Baudrillard claims that Warhol “went furthest in abolishing the subject of art,”
supplanting it with “an escalation in the power of the object, the sign, the image, the simulacrum
and value”, the cult of personality drives a “fetishism of value that explodes the very notion of a
market and, at the same time, abolishes the artworks as works of art” (Baudrillard 45). Hirst is
one of these personalities and some critics simply associate Hirst’s massive success in this
market with avarice, the idea of ‘selling-out’. Most recently Hirst has dabbled in the diabolical
NFT market. NFTs or non-fungible tokens are the newest version of bitcoin, yet another money
game for the very wealthy, one that completely divorces the notion of art from experience.
Absolutely no sense is involved, NFTs are monetary abstractions. These digital images simply
act as markers, pointing to code, code that indicates provenance, and it is the code that is bought
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and sold. No print, no painting, no object whatsoever. Furthermore, there is no event, no
experience of singularity. The irony of this cannot be escaped. This is not to say that there are no
great digital works of art, only that this value system places its worth, its collectability, in the
wrong factors. Typically things that are popular become popular for a reason, it takes something
exceptional to capture the attention of enough people for the wave of popularity to wash over the
culture.
Baudrillard describes how the aims of modernity and abstraction, the analytical
exploration of objects, was in fact, a quest for an “analytical truth for the object and for the
world” (Baudrillard 51). An objective, analytical truth is as much a fiction as Cif Amotan II.
Without a more balanced interplay between sense and reason, abstraction becomes “merely a
pseudo-analytical procedure for decomposing reality, not deconstructing it” (Baudrillard 63).
Deconstruction is a process of peeling away layers, breaking down structures, while considering
how they were put together. It is a doing, while decomposing evokes a passive process. One that
happens and cannot be reconstructed. Baudrillard is shocked by what he calls the ‘pretension of
art’, it has “turned into something pretentious with the will to transcend the world, to give an
exceptional, sublime form to things. Art has become an argument for mental prowess”
(Baudrillard 64). Is the mental prowess Baudrillard describes the practice of thinking
conceptually, abstractly, in search of objective, analytical truth, the type of thinking lauded, and
put upon a pedestal? Or is true mental prowess the ability to combine the powers of reason with
those of sense, to think both conceptually and contextually.
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, is not merely a collection of nearly 200
objects, it is an immersive aesthetic experience, one that might evoke Baudrillard’s shock at the
pretension of art’s flirtation with ‘mental prowess’. However, this chapter will show that
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Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is an exceptional example of immersive aesthetic
experience, through the writings of Freud, Barthes, Kristeva and Nancy, among others. I intend
to demonstrate how Hirst’s use of humor activates unconscious processes related to will, desire
or libido, that along with the experience of discovering trickery, engages the participant in
reflection on ontological ideologies; authority, belief, mythology. The work provides the
opportunity to engage in a ‘reading’ of an intertextual topography. An experience that involves
exorbitant sensory data and ontological signification, which activates sense and reason toward
aesthetic understanding.

Fig. 23. The Severed Head of Medusa, 2013
In a video for the exhibit, Hirst describes Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable as
a history of the world through 100 objects. He is explicit in his references, particularly those of
the sea, history, and mythology (see fig. 23). The objects range from gold coins and beads to a
three story sculpture of a mythical creature. The materials include what appear to be jade, lapis
lazuli, marble, bronze and gold. Most works are made to appear as though covered in coral
growth. The sea is an important element of the work, especially as an immersive aesthetic
experience. The sea is the origin of the shipwreck, and the sunken treasure it contains. The sea is
an equally important element of Venice. Hirst describes this sea as connective, a web, a grid; an
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idea that echoes through the canals and walkways of Venice. Yet Hirst also describes the depths
of the sea as a place that feels alien, where one is out of their depth, outside of a comfort zone.
The objects are even more directly identified with the sea by the coral. Hirst believes the coral
makes the sculptures more beautiful, and that because the coral spoils function, he imagines the
sculptures have become a kind of natural object. He also explains that it was Medusa’s spilt
blood upon the ocean that created coral. One wing of the exhibit, one of the most convincing, is
filled with golden artifacts. A documentary about the discovery and retrieval of the treasure plays
in a gallery theater. Among the golden artifacts it is darkly lit, golden figures, golden jewelry,
and other golden objects are all perfectly spot lighted. In describing the gold, Hirst refers to the
concept of the ‘MacGuffin’, a plot motivator, and describes how gold has obsessed collectors,
and is thought to be incorruptible. There are no coral growths on any of the gold works. He
points out that the word ‘unbelievable’ has two meanings, not believable, but also amazing, and
that all treasures are rooted in belief. The sea, what it hides and reveals, treasure, and the lengths
man will go to retrieve it, are ideas Hirst takes very seriously. And yet, one of the greatest
strengths of this work is its humor. And humor, a sense, in play with ontological signifiers is
capable of provoking aesthetic understanding.
Fig. 24. The Collector, 2017 and Andromeda and the Sea Monster, 2017
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Hirst’s presentation of the work is funny. He never breaks character, never offers an
explanation. As close as he comes is the devilish smile that briefly lights up his face while
describing a particular sculpture that depicts Cif Amotan II, the protagonist, captain of the ship
doomed to wreck, who Hirst describes as vain and undoubtedly ugly, and which is clearly a self
portrait (see fig. 24). Hirst is an ironic humorist. He engages irony, in service of a reflection on
history, museums, collections, and myth. While certain areas of the exhibit would be difficult to
distinguish from a natural history museum display, others are so blatantly ‘plastic’ they scream
to be recognized for what they are, and allow for the inevitable ‘discovery’ of the fiction.
Sculptures throughout depict unnamed popular culture icons, whose familiar faces activate a
sense of déjà vu, the uncanny. The humorist, ironist, absurdist is a special kind of artist, one who
is reflective. A reflection that is ultimately about the absurdity of existence. Humor deconstructs
fictions unconsciously accepted as truth and reveals the pretense of logic. Humor is a sense and it
relates to the will, drive or libido, as do dreams and the uncanny, which are produced through
unconscious mental processes. Humor develops through the condensation and displacement of
particular moments and can shed light on unconscious thought connections. There are an
immense variety of different shades of humor and it is conceivable that Hegel might consider
Hirst an ironist.
Irony, for Hegel, is an impartial mode of self-reflection. In his Introductory Lectures on
Aesthetics, Hegel describes self-consciousness as requiring both reason and sense. According to
Hegel self-consciousness cannot be attained by solely focusing on self, in addition to
contemplation, the practical activity of ‘doing’ is necessary, an engagement of both reason and
sense (Hegel xix). And for Hegel, serious art is that which combines both reason and sense,
expressing a definite vision in a sensory medium. Hegel describes the modern artist for works
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whose aims are exclusively reflective or conceptual, and he describes how an overemphasis on
reflection, by the artist, leads to detachment and irony (Hegel xxvii). Hegel worries that this
reflection never ceases, he “reflects on societies, philosophies, religions, and types of art; he
reflects on the criteria for assessing them, and on the criteria for assessing the criteria. Thus the
reflective artist becomes an ironist, without attachment to any definite cause or way of life”
(Hegel xxix). Reflection reveals the merits of the other side and the limits of one's own, but
according to Hegel the ironist becomes aloof and detached, breaks loose from attachments and
succumbs to irony (Hegel xxix). The ironist perceives them self as wholly unattached, in no way
bound, an annihilator as well as a creator (Hegel 72). Hegel’s concept of irony is an awareness of
absolute subjectivity, of “the futility of all that is matter of fact” and “the nothingness of all that
is objective” (Hegel 72).
This endless reflection without practical action is problematic for Hegel in part because it
is antithetical to ‘progress’ and Hegel needs progress in order for his dialectic to resolve.
Progress is an insidious offspring of reason and logic. Progress insists there must be a point, a
reason, a destination, one that is never attained. The notion of progress is a carrot on a stick,
intended to keep everything in a constant state of motion. Hegel’s master and slave dialectic, is a
stage to be surpassed, eventually reaching, achieving, becoming, absolute. Luigi Pirandello,
points out that while the ardent thirst for knowledge will always last, and the faculty of wishing
will never be extinguished, “it cannot be said that man's happiness consists in his progress”
(Pirandello 47). And yet, while the concept of progress may have become overly emphasized
along with reason and logic, rectification does not involve abandonment, rather a more complete
blending, progress that facilitates lingering. Hegel’s serious art achieves this balance and Hirst’s
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is an excellent example of what Hegel calls serious
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art. This immersive aesthetic experience communicates a definite vision in a sensory medium.
Hirst intentionally sets out as annihilator, of trust in authority, and creator of myth, one told in
absolute subjectivity, revealing the futility of fact and objectivity.
Pirandello, the Italian dramatist, poet, and playwright describes how humor is a kind of
faculty that attempts to reveal and deconstruct unconscious correlations, connotations and
associations, and in so doing discovers the pretense of logic. A sense of humor, Pirandello
explains, develops out of a disconcerting vision of life that occurs during certain moments of
reflective interior silence. In this vision, the facts of daily existence appear meaningless and
without scope, the normal sense of things, relationships, ideas, and consciousness itself, are
regarded as deceptions, “which man needs to save himself from death or insanity” (Pirandello
53). There is a never ending struggle between “illusion, which insinuates itself everywhere and
builds things up in its own way, and humorous reflection, which analyzes these constructions one
by one by one” (Pirandello 48). Comedy and tragedy are intimately connected, they both “lie in
the same disposition of feeling”, and reveal what Priandello refers to as the ‘soul’s fictions’
(Pirandello 46). Humor acts like “a little devil which disassembles the machine of each image, of
each fantasy created by feeling; it will take it apart to see how it is made; it will unwind its
spring, and the whole machine will break convulsively” (Pirandello 47). This process of
alternating between compulsive illusion and intentional deconstruction makes obvious the
pretense of logic.
According to Pirandello, the artist who utilizes humor, the humorist, understands that
“reality is a continuously illusory construction” and that due to habit, unconscious imitation, and
mental laziness, the pretense of logic “is much greater in us than real logical coherence”
(Pirandello 48). Pirandello says that logic tries to extract ideas from feelings, that it attempts to
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fix what is mobile and flowing, seeking to give an absolute value to that which is relative
(Pirandello 54). Humor is transformative, neither particular nor universal, always singular. Every
‘single’ sense of humor is unique, and yet, conceptions of humor, like those of beauty, involve an
expectation of agreement, and typically find some amount of agreement, though never universal.
The discrepancy between expectation and experience engenders a feeling of connection with
those sharing the experience and coming into agreement. Humor is about connection, between
the sender and the receiver of the humorous communication, as well as between those who share
the immediate experience of something humorous. The fact that there is not always agreement,
and that humor ultimately involves a reflection on the absurdity of existence, often leads to the
conception of the humorist as transgressive. Pirandello says, “in its abnormality this disposition
is bitterly comical, the condition of a man who is always out of tune” (Pirandello 46). Perhaps
not ‘out of tune’, but simply a different tune that does not appeal universally. Those in agreement
with the humorist’s assessment of a perception, can then be thought of as sharing the same tune.
An ‘inside joke’ is one shared in a typically small group, a connection between thought and
laughter, reason and sense and binds and creates a group.

212

Fig. 25. The Collector with friend, 2016
Hirst accomplishes the creation of an opening that allows for the experience of an ‘inside
joke’, a shared vibration, on a particular chord. There is a felt connection between those who
hear the same tune, laugh at the same things, put the same references together in the same way,
and there are a number of ways the work might be considered funny. Some may find humor in
the surprised recognition of pop stars, from the seemingly obvious depiction of Mickey Mouse
and Walt Disney, to the likely less recognizable depiction of Yolandi, South African rap star (see
fig. 25). There is the tragic-comic myth of the captain at sea, shipwrecked along with his
treasures, melodramatic and over the top. There is humor in the sheer audacity of the show itself,
huge, in size, number and detail. Not only is the work humorous, reactions to it are equally
humorous. Sharing the stage, the humor of surprise is joined by snide judgmental humor, and the
humor of belonging or acceptance, laughing falsely to appear in agreement. The ‘laughing at’, of
watching others being fooled. Some visitors indignant at being tricked. And then, the laughing at
those whose reaction was indignant. The inside joke of those who ‘get it’, and the utter falsity of
the exhibit in contrast to the felt authenticity of Venice. Not everyone finds humor in these
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things, some find humor in none of them. Humor, as with irony, involves absolute subjectivity.
Humor is a sense that develops and operates through the same unconscious structures,
connections, sediments and movements that produce dreams and the uncanny.
Freud describes humor, dreams and the uncanny as productions of the unconscious mind.
These productions are singular, in that they are neither particular nor universal, yet include
aspects of both. Freud theorizes about how the processes that lead to dreams, the uncanny, and
humor operate. He sees the human mind as a generator of riddles and dreams designed to elude
conscious interpretation, and the psychology he develops reflects this, characterizing poetry as an
indigenous condition of the mind (Freud x). Humor involves ‘sense’, and sense also detects what
Freud calls the uncanny. Freud describes the uncanny as being connected to obscure
compulsions, the sublime, and negative experiences of awe, terror or dread (Freud xii). The
uncanny explores wishful fears, operating in a stratum of the psyche that has to do with
unrestrained, aggressive or spontaneous emotional impulses. The uncanny exists within the field
of the frightening, repulsion and distress (Freud 123). The uncanny is a “species of the
frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar” (Freud
124). Belonging to two sets of ideas, which are not mutually contradictory, but very different, the
uncanny is at once familiar, and concealed or kept hidden (Freud 132). According to Freud,
“uncanny is what one calls everything that was meant to remain secret and hidden and has come
into the open'', and the uncanny always involves intellectual uncertainty (Freud 132). The
processes controlling the unconscious concealment and disclosure of things operate in the same
manner as what Freud calls the dream-work.
Freud sets out on an investigation into the interpretation of dreams in order to establish
them as products of normal mental function and to throw light on their puzzling aspects. He
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discovers that the manifest content of dreams, often perplexing or strange, is derived from latent,
logical, dream-thoughts. Freud describes a dream as a fragmentary memory that remains after
waking, a mesh-work of sense-impressions, mostly visual, whose “strange manifest content” can
regularly be made intelligible as “a mutilated and altered transcript of certain rational psychical
structures” (Freud 115). His focus then turns to these transforming processes and psychical
forces that make the dream out of the latent dream-thoughts (Freud 17). The dream-work submits
thoughts to strange revisions, giving them a hallucinatory representation (Freud 117). The
internal relations between the thoughts, which link them together, is lost in the manifest dream.
The raw material of ideas are represented, not the logical relations. Ideas are compressed,
condensed and displaced, reused and assigned multiple meanings (Freud 28). According to
Freud, “the dream-work is the name for the whole sum of transforming processes which have
converted the dream-thoughts into the manifest dream” this process of condensation,
abbreviation, and creation of substitute formations is similar to the process occurring in the
development of humor (Freud 116). He says the processes share so much in common it “can
scarcely be a matter of chance”, both share indirect representation, allusion, a “symbolism akin
to analogy”, they both involve the transformation of ideas (Freud 66).
Freud determines that the operation of the sense of humor involves functioning that
benefits being. The product of humor, a joke, can be interpreted in much the same way as a
dream. The interpretation process offers a more thorough understanding of being. Through
interpretation, thought processes, mental connections, and memories, are perceived as a
meshwork of thoughts, whose structure serves as a foundation for being. Humor, and dreams
both result from subconscious processing of desire, will, existence and the struggle with
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conceiving of death. The joke can activate unconscious thought processes. In Jokes and Their
Relation to the Unconscious Freud explains:
The comic is concerned with the ugly in one of its manifestations: if it is
concealed, it must be uncovered in the light of the comic way of looking at things;
if it is noticed only a little or scarcely at all, it must be brought forward and made
obvious, so that it lies clear and open to the light of day. (Freud 3)
The joke serves to point out, to draw attention to, it is a judgement that produces comic contrasts,
whose aim is the concealed ugliness of the world of thoughts (Freud 3). Freud’s definition of
joking includes the ability to find similarity between dissimilar things, hidden similarities. An
activation of the sense of humor involves rapidly binding into a unity, several ideas alien to one
another. A joke arbitrarily connects or links two contrasting ideas, it is the ability to find sense in
nonsense, an experience of bewilderment and illumination through the contrast of ideas (Freud
4). Brevity is an important element of the joke, which says what it has to say, in too few words,
“words that are insufficient by strict logic or by common modes of thought and speech” and may
even communicate by not communicating at all (Freud 6). According to Freud, in the comic
process the contrast between sense and nonsense becomes significant, and “what at one moment
seemed to us to have meaning, we now see as completely meaningless” (Freud 5). This reflection
is manifested in different types of humor, madness, the ridiculous, the absurd, even scornful
humor. The sense of humor is connected to unrestrained emotion, at its best involuntary, a sense
that involves crying, ‘hysterics’, fake laughter in search of acceptance, suppressed laughter,
giggles, even the spontaneous laughter of babies. As we will see, Hirst’s Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable adeptly engages what Freud calls tendentious humor.
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Freud explains that either, a joke “is an end in itself and serves no particular aim” or it is
tendentious. It is only tendentious jokes, says Freud, which serve a particular purpose, that run
the risk of meeting those who do not want to listen to them (Freud 66). However, tendentious
jokes, he points out, have sources of pleasure at their disposal besides those open to jokes
without aim, and that with tendentious jokes it is difficult to distinguish “what part of the
pleasure arises from the sources of their technique and what part from those of their purpose.
Thus, strictly speaking, we do not know what we are laughing at” (Freud 75). Pirandello claims
that the humorist recognizes heroes, knows what legend and history are, and how they are
formed, and understands that “they are all compositions more or less ideal; perhaps they are the
more ideal if they show a greater pretense of reality”, the humorist amuses himself by
deconstructing these formations (Pirandello 57). Hirst fits this definition of the humorist and
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is tendentious, in that it has a purpose, an
underlying demand to interrogate the idea of authority.

Fig. 26. Demon with Bowl, 2014
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Through Hirst’s use of hero, history, and legend, combined with the manner of
presentation, a humorous interrogation of authority is encouraged. There is an instinctual
reaction to believe, to accept the works as historical artifacts, but soon, subtle and not-so-subtle
clues invite an investigation into the veracity of these artifacts (see fig.26). Ultimately there is a
dawning realization that all is not as it seems, prompting an internal review of past experiences
where clues were perhaps not apparent, or simply unrecognized, and questions of authority
surface. Authorities are those whose word is typically taken for granted, Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable questions the authority granted to museums and keepers of history.
Questions also arise regarding figures put upon literal, as well as metaphorical, pedestals. Hirst’s
statues reference classical Greek sculptures of politicians, philosophers and mythical characters,
but his versions are of contemporary icons of popular culture, entertainers. This work, as a
cohesive whole, dependent on context, is an immersive aesthetic experience that engages both
sense and reason, providing an opening for a mental dismantling of the notion of authority. The
sense of humor entices visitors to reflect on authority, who is instilled with the power of
authority, and how often the powers of authority are questioned or reevaluated. One’s sense of
humor is a faculty that develops through unconscious processes, whose function appears to be
related to the management of stress or anxiety, and contributes to the singular nature of
perception. Ultimately humor is a mechanism that works to alleviate a recognition of the
absurdity of existence, and impending death. Humor involves reflection, an intuitive awareness
of connections, and the deconstruction of illusions or self deceptions concerning the nature of
‘reality’.
Jokes, like dreams, are conveyors of hidden meaning that remain enigmatic phenomenon
even when their latent thoughts have been unmasked (Žižek 8). It was just a dream, just a joke,
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just a feeling, are all too common refrains, especially in consideration of the Lacanian thesis that
it is only in the dream that we approach “the Real of our desire”, a hard kernel, leftover, which
persists and cannot be reduced, always present in the dream (Žižek 48). Jokes as well as dreams
can reveal the fantasy framework which determines our activity, our mode of acting in reality
itself (Žižek 47). What is treasured, longed after, or worked for, belief and trust are all rooted in
semi-conscious desire. Confronting these fantasy frameworks offers the only hope of recognizing
weaknesses and the opportunity to restructure. The examination of how and why unconscious
interior constructs are successful also provides an opening to compare similar structures
operating in society, exterior constructs, or what Schürmann calls ‘hegemonic fantasms’.
Schürmann describes ‘hegemonic fantasms’ as large overarching concepts that structure
lives, are accepted and perpetuated thoughtlessly, and which typically reinforce the status quo,
while empowering the ruling class. Hegemonies are supported by constructs, wherein the hard
kernel of desire, managed through a series of unconscious thought processes, results in
determining actions. Schürmann says that, “in brief, natality makes us posit hegemonic
fantasms”, which are, in effect, coping mechanisms associated with being alive (Schürmann
346). The affirmation of constructs purported as ‘real’ occurs “in response to the tragic condition
of being, exaltation in tragic denial under authority of the law of the gods” (Schürmann 195).
The infinite number of constructs and the interconnectivity of their effects are further affected by
the imbalance favoring reason and logic. The pursuit of pure reason involves abstraction in
search of universals, definition, categorization and limit, and the belief in hierarchical
organization of structuring principles. Hegemonic fantasms impact notions of authority in areas
as diverse as conceptions of gender and scientific theory. They are disseminated through
language and dismantled through art.
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Echoing Heidegger, Schürmann says, “unveiling, which is the one and only journey,
consists of two stages, concealment and unconcealment” (64). Schürmann explains that it is
necessary to dismantle hegemonies “in order to grasp what usage makes obvious” and that this
can be done by analyzing the everyday use of words (Schürmann 34). Schürmann recommends a
hermeneutic approach, in part, because, when we name a being, we at the same time affirm its
being (Schürmann 56). However, Schürmann stipulates that “written words never give us
anything more than a dead discourse. Only the spoken word is living” (Schürmann 385). The
sign, the symbol, or thought, alone, do not provide the whole story; sensing, feeling, being, are
equally essential to understanding. Accordingly, the deconstruction of hegemonic fantasms
operating as ultimate authority requires a contextual investigation. Schürmann says the decisive
question involves location, where does the hegemonic fantasm happen, “what is its original
topos?” (Schürmann 41). Schürmann posits the dismantling as a topological question, in which
location and sensation are intimately involved. The conventional understanding of a ‘text’ puts
‘signs’ in the position of predicates, the subject merely an abstract indicator, whereas a
topography resists abstraction, and may provide “an itinerary that is neither abstractive nor
dialectical”, and allows for the “holding together of contraries without subsuming them and
thereby universalizing them” (Schürmann 124). In place of an abstract dialectic, a topology relies
on the concrete and the polyphonic, and can be understood as a reaction to imbalanced emphasis
on, and the continuous search for, ‘pure’ reason.
Schürmann is able to advocate the dismantling of arbitrary, yet determining structures, in
part because structuralists sought them out. Structural linguistics involves the simple, yet
revolutionary idea that language consists of a formal system of interrelated elements, and that
meaning resides not in the elements themselves, but in their relationships to one another. This
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viewpoint involves a shift in focus, from objects to the relationships between objects (Wilcken
146). Levi-Strauss appropriates this linguistic framework for his anthropological studies,
determined to prove that culture, like nature, has its own structuring principles, structures that are
hidden, yet ultimately determining (Wilcken 119). Levi-Strauss, driven by reason, determined to
define and categorize, set out to study the mind rather than the individual, abstract thought in
place of subjective experience, ultimately producing many details, but little substance (Wilcken
11). The framework of a structuralist inquiry is also utilized by Lacan, who argues the
unconscious is structured like a language (Wilcken 228). Merleau-Ponty attempts to “reconcile
the formal schemes of structuralism and phenomenology’s excavations of the self” (Wilcken
239). Bringing focus to the experience of hidden, and determining structures.
Post structuralism, Foucault builds upon these investigations into words, meaning and
context, and examines the hidden, determining structures of discourse, and their relationship to
power and knowledge. Foucault describes how discourse acts as a form of social control. He asks
historical, theoretical, political questions, with an emphasis on the asking. Foucault investigates
‘why’ an issue is discussed, he wants to know what has been said about it? He is interested in the
links between discourses, the effects of their power and the pleasure they evoke, and asks “what
knowledge (savoir) was formed as a result of this linkage?” Foucault’s objective is to “define the
regime of power-knowledge-pleasure” (Foucault 11). Discourse, then, acts as a hidden,
determining structure, an enclosing web, that is interlocked, hierarchized, and “highly articulated
around a cluster of power relations” (Foucault 30). It is easy to understand Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable as an examination of, and inciter of, discourse. All of these questions
posited by Foucault, can comfortably be considered in relation to the work. Questions such as,
who sees the work in its necessary context, how accessible is it, who participates in the
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communication? All questions of power and pleasure, they are unavoidable elements of the
work, of the Biennale and of Venice itself.
Other post-structuralist theories have focused on gender, political predicaments of
feminism, and science (Butler ix). The works of both Butler and Haraway expose “regimes of
truth” that stipulate certain kinds of expressions “false or derivative, and others, true and
original” (Butler viii). Butler demonstrates how gender constructs cannot be universalized, that
experiences of gender and race must be read through multiple lenses at once. Butler points out
that “no single account of construction will do”, illuminating the limits of categorical analysis
(Butler xvii). While Haraway focuses on destabilizing “the great Western evolutionary,
technological, and biological narratives” (Haraway 2). Haraway shows how the “principle of
domination is deeply embedded in our natural sciences” (Haraway 8). She evokes Marx’s
science of wealth, in her description of the necessity of a “reappropriation of knowledge” which
is also a “revolutionary appropriation” of the means by which “we produce and reproduce our
lives'' (Haraway 47). Science, knowledge, and ‘truth’, like capitalism, consist of determining
structures, often oblivious. Haraway is interested in unwinding and examining interconnections
of social and theoretical structures, specific to life science (Haraway 12). She examines the role
of dominance and hierarchy in what is perceived as objective, scientific ‘truth’. Haraway
explains that no simple reinterpretation or changing of terminology will have any lasting effect in
dismantling these structures. She calls for the “rejection of all forms of ideological claims for
pure objectivity rooted in the subject-object split” as these have legitimated our logics of
domination (Haraway 19). She says the task is figuring out how to simultaneously, have “an
account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a
critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-
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nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (Haraway 187). This is an
acknowledgement of the necessity of context, of the need for a more balanced approach to
understanding, one that equally relies on sense and reason. Haraway says that “only partial
perspective promises objective vision”, she understands there are no absolutes, that between the
particular and the universal lies the singular (Haraway 190).
Structures, categories, and definitions, help us understand the complexities of a big
picture, yet they are unable to account for the totality of experience. A partial perspective, a
singular understanding, requires what I call the practice of nuance. Categorical thinking must be
regulated by nuanced thought. Nuance is understanding that nothing fits completely into any
categorical, universal system. There is always something that does not fit, a remainder, a
fragment. Nancy describes how art, sense, and being are connected through the fragment. A
fragment is what is left over, outside of category, without definition, uncategorizable. A
fragment is both universal and particular, connected to the whole and yet cut off, distinct. Art can
be described as fragment in a number of ways, conventionally it is considered unlike other
objects, in that art is not a natural object, not a commodity, nor a resource, it is a thing unto itself.
Additionally, art describes an incredible variety of works, including advertisements, cinema,
interior design, culinary arts and so on. What they all have in common is a relation to what
Nancy calls aesthetic entelechy, the potential to engage sense perception.
Art, sense, and being, are connected through the concept of the fragment, of
fragmentation. Nancy points out that the word aesthetic derives from the ancient Greek word,
aisthesis, meaning sense perception. Both the sensible and the aesthetic are extroverted, working
through, as, and toward. Both share a relation to the general sense of sense, but “there is no sense
‘in general’, nor is there a generic sense. There is sense only in local difference and differing
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division” (Nancy 129). Nancy explains that “a sensation without difference and without locality
– a sensation without world – would not be a sensation (and would not be ‘a,’ would not be this
singular being that a sensation as ‘a’ sensation always is)”, sense and the singular being
indistinguishable (Nancy 129). Nancy describes the exteriority of sense as intimacy, and explains
that aesthetic acts also involve intimate exteriority, and in their immediacy, “the plurality of the
senses” (Nancy 129). He describes the senses not as fragments of a transcendent or immanent
sense, instead, senses as fragmentation, no longer a noun, but a verb (Nancy 129). The
fragmentation of senses is the presentation of “being toward the world,” a tracing out [frayage]
of the singularity of existence (Nancy 132). A tracing out of a web of sensations that determine
perception and influence understanding.
According to Nancy, both sensing and the aesthetic experience are instances of
“fragmentation as the presentation of being (of existence), tracing [frayage] of/in its totality”
(Nancy 128). He explains that the event of fragmentation is not a ‘taking-place’, rather it is “the
praes-entia of being-present”, the event is presentation (Nancy 126). At its core fragmentation
has to do with the event of being, existence (Nancy 127). Being, enjoys and suffers pain and
pleasure under existence, “this enjoyment-and-suffering is the arrival into presence, presentation
without presentness: this presentation does not possess a truth as does (the subject of) being.
Rather, presentation itself is truth”, and according to Nancy it is in this sense that art is a
fragment (Nancy 138). Art “borders on pleasure: it gives pleasure [il fait plaisir]”, and pleasure,
like sense, takes place through place, touch, and zone. It is local, discreet and detached,
fragmentary (Nancy 133). Pleasure surprises and suspends the enchainment of signifying sense,
and when the signifying or symbolic order is suspended, fragmentation opens an access,
allowing for an occurrence of jouissance, a manifestation of the sublime (Nancy 134). Nancy
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explains that “what art does is to please: and so it is neither a poiesis nor a praxis, but another
kind of ‘doing” (Nancy 134). A nuanced definition of art, not as a creation or a practice, but as
an experience, applies directly to art I refer to as the aesthetic immersive experience.
The immersive aesthetic experience exemplifies Rancière’s description of the result of a
necessary ‘aesthetic revolution’. Rancière believes that the aesthetic experience, should be one in
which “the rules that subordinate human practices to a social function, bodies to places and
corresponding horizons of affect, are reframed and suspended”, an experience that initiates a
gradual reframing of the sensible field (Rancière 4). Where reason prevails, everything must fit
neatly into its category, definitions succinct and complete. Rancière’s ‘logic of dissensus’ by
contrast, enacts “a certain impropriety that disrupts the identity” (Rancière 11). His nuanced
description of what he calls ‘regimes of art’ includes an understanding of aesthetic, as a separate
sphere of experience associated with innovative activity (Rancière 20). Reframing the sensible
field in an innovative way is what the immersive aesthetic experience is capable of. Art can help
us practice understanding in a manner that relies equally on logic or reason and sense perception,
mind and body. Rancière explains that the aesthetic regime involves “this knot between poiesis
and aisthesis that is undone...art in the aesthetic regime finds its only content precisely in this
process of undoing, in opening up a gap between poiesis and aisthesis” (Rancière 22). Poiesis
and aisthesis, Greek words often encountered in philosophy that refer to creating and sensing,
respectively. Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable provides an example of how the
aesthetic regime engages in the undoing, fragmentation, dismantling, and deconstructing of
aesthetic constructs.
Both Hirst and Rancière reflect on the art museum as an aesthetic condition. Rancière
describes the divergent views related to institutions whose initial goal was “rendering visible and
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intelligible the ‘life of art”, but are often viewed as either “mausoleums dedicated to the
contemplation of dead icons” or, as blank surfaces that allow “spectators to be confronted with
the artwork itself, undistracted” (13). Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable raises
questions about the contemplation of icons in general, and confronts visitors with the work itself,
providing no essays or explanations. Rancière’s artistic dissensus consists “in operations of
reconfiguration of the common experience of the sensible” and may be produced during the
aesthetic experience (23). Rancière explains that artistic dissensus is possible and “the aesthetic
experience is effective inasmuch as it is the experience of that and” (24). It is the and that
differentiates this nuanced understanding of what art is capable of. The ‘and’ indicates a
referencing, a reading, an engagement of both sense and reason. According to Rancière, art
remains vital as long as it is able to express a thought, unclear to itself and in a matter that resists
it. The engagement brought about by ambiguous communication facilitates the reframing of
forms experience (Rancière 131). The participant, who engages in the free play of the aesthetic
enjoys a special kind of autonomy, he explains. Not an autonomy free of reason, subdued by the
anarchy of sensation, rather the suspension of that kind of autonomy. Whereas Kant’s autonomy
of free will results in the eventual dominance of reason over the chaos of sensing, Rancière
describes a resulting autonomy that is strictly related to a withdrawal of power (125). The
participant, engaged in the free play of aesthetic understanding, experiences this autonomy. An
autonomy involving a withdrawal of power, or the shedding of identity, that also occurs in an
experience of the sublime.
The immersive aesthetic experience is capable of provoking artistic dissensus and it does
this by raising questions without clear answers, questions communicated through both sense and
signification. However, nuance is required because art is not typically understood as immersive
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aesthetic experience. In fact, many critics might accuse Hirst of being complicit in what
Baudrillard calls The Conspiracy of Art. Baudrillard complains about the lack of nuance when
discussing contemporary art, “nothing differentiates it from technical, advertising, media, and
digital operations” (89). Baudrillard reiterates Hegel’s concern for irony, left unchecked by
practical action. But while Hegel’s concern is with the artist’s ceaseless self-reflection,
Baudrillard broadens this concern to include the ironic indifference with which art is now
received. He indicates Duchamp’s readymades as a tipping point, and describes “the orgy of
modernity”, in which art becomes deterritorialized to the extent that “it was all in the mind”
(Baudrillard 20). Baudrillard explains that art’s deconstruction of the object and of
representation, has led to the loss of a desire for illusion, while simultaneously raising everything
to aesthetic banality (25). He indicates that the event of the readymade transforms the artistic act,
from an ambiguous communication to a simple transposition of an object into an art object. What
the artist says is art, is then art, accordingly everything has the potential to be art. The only magic
operation remaining concerns why a certain object is selected over another, “all the banality of
the world passes into aesthetics and inversely, all aesthetics becomes banal” (Baudrillard 52).
Baudrillard complains that contemporary art is too obvious to be true, too transparent, and
provides no room for interpretation. That it is too superficial to be truly null and void
(Baudrillard 26).
Baudrillard argues that when “art substituted itself for life in the form of a generalized
aesthetics” it resulted in a ‘Disneyfication’ of the world, attracting tourists rather than pilgrims
(53). No object escapes the global circuit of either use or interpretation. Art has been transformed
into value, a commodity to be fetishized. After the readymades, Baudrillard says there are “no
more real objects at all: the object is no longer there, only the idea of the object. And we no
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longer take pleasure in art, only in the idea of art (92). In the spring of 2021, artist Salvatore
Garau sold an “immaterial sculpture” for nearly twenty thousand dollars. The buyer received a
certificate of authenticity and instructions that the work must be exhibited in a private house, in a
roughly five-by-five-foot space free of obstruction. This immaterial sculpture seems to epitomize
the tendency of art to immerse itself in reality instead of becoming “the agent symbolically
assassinating reality” (Baudrillard 96). Prolonging a drawn out reflection on what art is, rather
than questioning being itself. In order to break the spell of fetishizing abstraction, value and form
should be understood as opposing ideas according to Baudrillard. Art, he claims, is
fundamentally form, and should be understood as “a form of radical exception” capable of
creating “the illusion of the world and the possibility to invent this other scene” (Baudrillard 57).
The poetic operation is to make ‘nothingness’, or the void, rise from the power of signs,
however, because banality and indifference reign supreme a different approach is required
(Baudrillard 27) Rather than persisting, the quiet, disinterested contemplation of the art object
must shift and expand to an active engagement in aesthetic understanding, and what Hirst does is
provide this opening, an opening that requires a specific kind of participation, a participant who
is engaged in a contextual reading that involves sense and ontological signification.
Reading is always of a text, and text, like art, encompasses a multitude of meanings. A
nuanced understanding is simply a better balance between sense and reason, an awareness of
context. In the same way that art can be understood as both the aesthetic object and the aesthetic
experience, text can also be understood as both object and experience. The focus on experience,
a revival of the value of experience, might remedy the over emphasis on reason and logic. Not a
replacement of reason with sense, but a bringing together. Thinking contextually requires a
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concerted effort, a practice rather than a goal. Reason constantly strives toward universal rules
and structures that simplify understanding.
Žižek explains that cognition is a process of appropriation that “goes on only as long as
cognition remains incomplete. The sign of its completion is that it liberates its object, lets it be,
drops it” (Žižek xv). Reason searches for a structure that will contain everything neatly, and sets
out to reduce tension, to rationalize and explain, to resolve confusion. The logical conclusion of
reason’s endless and active quest is a state of weightless, fixed, motionless balance, absolute
balance. The eradication of all sensation, creates a climate of death, of nonbeing, while context
unbalances, shocks, stimulates, and arrests attention (Dondis 86). Instead of making it easier to
appropriate and then immediately release concepts, concepts should be grappled with, permitted
to linger in uncertainty.
Kristeva pulls threads from various fields of study, weaving together ideas about
literature, semiotics and the unconscious, referencing thinkers like Bahktin, Barthes, and Lacan
to show how these hidden structures are connected and inform understanding of the world. From
Bahktin, the polyphonic narrative structure of many voices coming together, from Barthes,
desire, and Lacan, the unconscious structures that mirror those found in the poetic operation.
Kristeva shows a possible method to regain what Nancy refers to as ‘sense of the world’,
providing a nuanced understanding of text, one that differentiates between text as object and as
experience. It is this concept of text as experience that Treasure from the Wreck of the
Unbelievable epitomizes. Approaching the work as a text allows for the practice of nuanced
interpretation. The text, as immersive aesthetic experience, relies on symbols rather than signs, it
is a complex ontological communication that results in singular interpretations. A sign works
through common usage or deliberate intent; signs do no more than denote the objects to which
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they are attached. A symbol, however, refers to “a term, a name, or even a picture that may be
familiar in daily life,” yet possesses additional connotations, implying “something vague,
unknown, or hidden” (Jung 3).
Jung says that man never perceives anything fully, or comprehends anything completely,
that understanding is dependent upon “the number and quality of his senses” which limit
perception of the surrounding world. To further complicate understanding, the ‘unconscious’
designates an “inexhaustible, interminable swarming of significations”. All of which affects
perception of reality (Jung 4). Unconscious “significance or signifyingness [significance] whirls
around a void point of dispersion, circulating in a condition of simultaneous, concurrent, and
contradictory affirmation” (Nancy 47). Symbols are also produced unconsciously and
spontaneously, in the form of dreams (Jung 4). Dreams reveal unconscious aspects of any event,
not as rational thought, but as symbolic images (Jung 5). Symbols imply something more than an
obvious and immediate meaning. A symbol’s wider unconscious aspects can never be precisely
defined or fully explained, and a mind exploring the symbol is led to ideas that lie beyond the
grasp of reason (Jung 4).
Understanding the text as an object, utilizes a logical approach, in which the text consists
of sentences containing precise subject-predicate relations, and which grows by identification,
determination and causality. This logical approach is ineffective in understanding text as
experience, text that is beyond the grasp of reason, as symbol, text within the realm of poetic
language (Desire in Language 70). This requires an understanding related to frayage and
fragment, involving textual theory in which a ‘trans-linguistic apparatus’ initiates a productive
redistribution to the order of language, resulting in a permutation of texts, an intertextuality
(Desire in Language 36). Redistribution is achieved by cutting, and Barthes describes two edges
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that are created through this cutting. One edge represents text as object, rooted in reason, the text
“obedient, conformist, and plagiarizing” (Barthes 6). Text understood as object is established by
schooling, good usage, literature, and culture. While the other edge, rooted in sense, represents
text as experience, an edge that is mobile, blank and ready to assume any contours (Barthes 6).
The text as experience consists of language, and yet is outside languages. Text
understood as experience, as poetic utterance, destroys its discursive category, its sociolinguistic
reference, its genre. Barthes describes it as “the comical that does not make us laugh”, it is
serious about its humor, and it finds humor in its seriousness (30). This is a text not defined by
the object of its message, but by the way in which it utters this message (Desire in Language
103). Text understood as experience encompasses phonetic speech, oral utterance, sound itself
(Desire in Language 53). However, Barthes specifies that a text, whether utterance, art, or
painting, needs a bit of ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject, and that without any
ideology, without any ontological communication, it is sterile, without fecundity, and without
productivity (Barthes 32).
The immersive aesthetic experience should be thought of as a text, and Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable can be even more precisely described as a text engaged in a dialogical
discourse related to the Menippean and the carnivalesque. Kristeva’s description of the event, the
experience of these discourses, aptly applies to the experience of Treasure from the Wreck of the
Unbelievable, as a text, and as an immersive aesthetic experience. She describes the
carnivalesque as a homology between body, dream, linguistic structure, and structures of desire
(Desire in Language 78). The carnivalesque and Menippean discourse adopts a dream logic, and
transgresses rules of linguistic code and social morality (Desire in Language 70). Its
interpretation relies on relations and analogy, rather than substance and inference. Kristeva
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explains that identity, substance, causality, and definition are transgressed, supplanted by
analogy, relation, opposition, and ambivalence (Desire in Language 86). She describes the
laughter of the carnival as “not simply parodic; it is no more comic than tragic; it is both at once,
one might say that it is serious” (Desire in Language 80). Kristeva considers the work of
Hereclitus, Ovid, and Kafka prime examples of the carnivalesque, engaged in Menippean
discourse, all three, seriously comic and tragic (Desire in Language 82). These examples, like
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable are composed of distances, relationships,
analogies, complete with nonexclusive oppositions. They are, she explains, essentially dialogical
(Desire in Language 78). Their meaning malleable, changing according to what the reader brings
to the reading. In dialogical structures, “writing reads another writing, reads itself and constructs
itself through a process of destructive genesis” (Desire in Language 77). A carnival participant,
like the participant of the immersive aesthetic experience, is both actor and spectator. The
experience involves the loss of individuality, “within the carnival the subject is reduced to
nothingness” (Desire in Language 78). The carnivalesque is spectacle without a stage, “the scene
of the carnival, where there is no stage, no ‘theater’, is thus both stage and life, game and dream,
discourse and spectacle” (Desire in Language 79).
The subject of the spectacle, its discourse, is the hidden meaning at the root of all
unconscious determining structures, sex, death, and desire. The spectacle is a concept that is in
dialogue with Bakhtin’s polyphonic and Nietzsche’s dionysiac. This is a text that first
exteriorizes structures, “then inevitably brings to light this structure’s underlying unconscious:
sexuality and death. Out of the dialogue that is established between them, the structural dyads of
carnival appear: high and low, birth and agony, food and excrement, praise and curses, laughter
and tears” (Desire in Language 78). These structural dyads underlie all hegemonic fantasms, all
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external and internal constructs that determine perception. In order to expose them the carnival
involves subversive discourse, it “challenges God, authority, and social law; insofar as it is
dialogical, it is rebellious” (Desire in Language 79). Kristeva says that it is a discourse that
exteriorizes political and ideological conflicts of the moment, often politically and socially
disturbing (Desire in Language 83). Menippean discourse tends towards the scandalous and
eccentric in language, it describes a text often “fascinated with the ‘double’ (with its own activity
as graphic trace, doubling an ‘outside’)” (Desire in Language 83). A great example of this, from
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is found in a room displaying a series sculpted Fig.
27. Five Grecian Nudes, 2017
of female torsos (see fig. 27). The sculptures, all missing heads and limbs, are pale pink stone,
aged by a blackened wash. These sculptures contain a multitude of references. Within the context
of Venice, and its history of art, a comparison to ancient Roman sculptures with missing limbs
seems obvious.
Within the context of the Biennale, reference can be made to Picasso’s Les Demoiselles
d'Avignon. Upon closer inspection, 1999 Mattel Inc and China, are carved on the lower back of

all the figures, clearly referencing the Barbie doll, at which point references become dark, bodies
mutilated, in more ways than one. Kristeva explains that the Menippean experience transmits no
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fixed message, except that it should be ‘the eternal joy of becoming,’ exhausting itself in the act,
in the present (Desire in Language 84). The immersive aesthetic experience, understood as text,
is dialogical in the manner of the carnivalesque and Menippean discourse.
Barthes applies Aristotle’s notion of pleasure in understanding to text as experience, and
differentiates between the text of pleasure and the text bliss, which in many ways align with the
beautiful and the sublime. According to Barthes’ description, Treasure from the Wreck of the
Unbelievable is arguably, a text of bliss. Pleasure found in the text is the experience of creative
imagination, a moment, according to Barthes, when the mind and body pursues its own ideas
(17). Barthes explains that the text of pleasure, “contents, fills, grants euphoria” it is a text that
comes from, and does not break with, culture. Texts of pleasure are linked to a comfortable
practice of reading (Barthes 14). Not unlike the beautiful, the text of pleasure can be associated
with quiet, distanced contemplation. Indirectly drawing from psychoanalysis, Barthes establishes
opposition between the text of pleasure and the text of bliss through their relation to language.
Pleasure, he explains, can be expressed in words, bliss cannot. Bliss, like the sublime, is
unspeakable (Barthes 21).
Barthes describes the text of bliss as “a site of the possibility of a dialectics of desire”,
whose meaning will always be precarious, revocable, reversible, an incomplete discourse (4).
The text of bliss is one in which the narrativity is dismantled and yet the story is still readable. It
is comprised of “controlled discontinuities, faked conformities, and indirect destructions”, its
goal, “to sustain the mimesis of language... in a fashion so radically ambiguous...that the text
never succumbs to the good conscience (and bad faith) of parody (of castrating laughter, of “the
comical the makes us laugh”)” (Barthes 9). The text of bliss partakes in serious humor, while at
the same time imposing a state of loss. The text of bliss, like carnivalesque and Menippean
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discourse, discomforts and unsettles assumptions; historical, cultural, and psychological (Barthes
14).
The question then becomes, how is a text of experience produced? Kristeva explains that
the historical and social text produces the abstraction of linear history, and that ‘the writer’ of
this new text participates by transgressing the abstraction through a process of reading-writing. A
writer of a text of experience, inserts himself into the text he reads, rewriting it in the process
(Desire in Language 65). According to Kristeva, the production of this new text relies on the
most fundamental laws of the signifying process: displacement, condensation, repetition, and
inversion (Desire in Language 102). She claims the writer of a text of experience is someone
who finds language profound and problematic. The urge to master and structure language
resisted through irony. Rather than in its instrumentality or its beauty, this writing is experienced
as contestation, as rupture, and flight (Desire in Language 107).
Kristeva explains that irony is the crystallization of an ephemeral meaning, and a product
of the writer’s death drive (Desire in Language 109). In addition to irony and death, rhythm and
future also figure in the form of the poetic utterance (Desire in Language 27). The poetic
utterance, she explains, is a discharge with two meanings between sense and nonsense, in which
a semblance appears at a fugitive moment (Desire in Language. 109). Interpretation of the poetic
utterance is not a thing, not a ‘being’, but a process, a becoming (Barthes 62). Interpretation, like
the moment of semblance, is dynamic and ephemeral. The writer then, is always in dialogue with
another text, “the one who writes is the same as the one who reads” and because the writer is in
dialogue with text, “he himself is no more than a text rereading itself as it writes itself” (Desire
in Language 87). Not only does Hirst act as reader-writer in the production of the experience of
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, but the participant acts as reader-writer as well.
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The production of text as experience should be understood as recording, through the symbolic
order, the dialectic of this displacement. And according to Kristeva, the experience of
displacement, of ‘re-writing’ is a poetic operation that facilitates the discharge of drives (Desire
in Language 102).
Kristeva’s assertion regarding the connection between the poetic operation of rewriting
and the discharge of drives, creates a circuit of thought, connecting back once again, to Freud.
According to Freud, desire is an impulse, a drive. Death and desire, competing drives that
seemingly underscore all human activity. Desire plays a role in the development of meaning as
an instigator of myth. Nancy connects the impulse of desire to myth, as myth or ‘fiction’ whose
explanation is useless, and as muthos, or speech, saying, doing. He quotes Freud saying “our
doctrine of impulses is our mythology” (Nancy 16). Explanations developed regarding the
drives, how they work, what they mean, constitute a mythology, in that they are made up, a
fiction, but also an utterance, a doing (Nancy 16). Myths unconsciously become determining.
Nancy says that desideration itself, engenders desire, the act, the doing, is the meaning (Nancy
44). Desire pleases itself, it understands meaning, not as an object to be appropriated, but as a
pleasurable experience of understanding, finding meaning, looking for. Treasure from the Wreck
of the Unbelievable, provides a framework that entices its visitors to engage sense and reason,
toward aesthetic understanding. The immersive aesthetic experience, especially an inter-text-ual
dialogue involving irony, mythology, art, history, and subjectivity is particularly suited to
engender pleasure as a production of this tension (Nancy 29).
A defining element of the immersive aesthetic experience is its capacity to evoke the
sublime. The sublime, activated by an experience of aesthetic understanding, through exorbitant
sensory data and ontological signification manifests in a number of ways. As this research
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shows, there is a sublime of the infinite as seen in the work of Kusama, Kapoor’s sublime of the
void, of abjection, and the sublime of presence found in the work of Eliasson. Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable, evokes a sublime related to the interpretation of text, to the pleasure
of the text, what Freud, Barthes, and Kristeva refer to as jouissance, a word with a complex
history. The connection between sex and desire, will, libido, or creative urge, is a strong one.
Barthes, references Freud’s conditions for orgasm, repetition and novelty, in his description of
two ways the pleasurable tension of desire, as it relates to meaning in aesthetic understanding,
can be provoked. The pleasurable tension of desire is provoked “on two opposing conditions,
both excessive: if it is extravagantly repeated, or on the contrary, if it is unexpected, succulent in
its newness” (Barthes 42). Both repetition and novelty are important formal elements of Treasure
from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, baroque in its extravagance. As an immersive aesthetic
experience, it involves excessive sensory data and signification, that may result in an encounter
with the sublime. This experience of the sublime is related to the pleasure of the text, the
pleasure of reading-writing, satisfaction in the interpretation of signs, and the pleasure of
understanding.
Nancy explains that it is the movement of the drives, of desire, will, libido, or creative
urge, that best describes jouissance (17) He recounts the word’s history and various meanings
associated with it. Jouissance is a French word whose meanings, according to Nancy, involve
duality, ambivalence, even duplicity. There is an opposition between two general ideas related to
the word, on one hand associated with accumulation or absorption, while on the other, associated
with the ecstatic, carried away, the dis-appropriating (Nancy viii). The second group of meanings
are typically limited to discourses of sex or the mystical. However, Nancy’s description of
certain meanings associated with jouissance help clarify why the word is useful in understanding
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a particular mode of the sublime, encountered during the immersive aesthetic experience,
Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable. For example, Nancy points out that the phrase
‘réjouissances populaires’ refers to popular festivals, to the idea of festivities, of festive excess,
to the suspension of everyday activities, but also to obligation and finality (Nancy 8). He
explains that the noun ‘jouissance’ is used to designate the action or movement of jouir, enjoying
(Nancy vii). Importantly, jouissance as action, as movement, as experience, also implies a
dissolution of the subject as well as the impossibility of appropriating its object (Nancy 12). The
lesson of jouissance is that meaning is not a thing to be had, concrete, an object, meaning exists
as a dynamic ephemeral experience.
Nancy explains that it is Freud who establishes the explicit transfer between sexual and
aesthetic jouissance, explaining one by means of the other (28). An aesthetic jouissance involves
a desire for art to “subvert the very theoretical, philosophical, or semiological apparatus” (Desire
in Language viii). Art, in a nuanced definition, is an aesthetic experience that provokes
ontological reflection. In this case, the ontological question is an ironic look at social and
historical constructs, a dismantling of the apparatus. An engaged interpreter of the text, is likely
to experience jouissance. Kristeva explains that the only method of avoiding a relationship of
dominance and submission, to meaning, lies in an “ability to insure our mastery of it (through
technique or knowledge) as well as our passage through it (through play or practice). In a word,
jouissance” (Desire in Language x). According to Kristeva jouissance is “sexual, spiritual,
physical, conceptual at one and the same time” and it implies the presence of meaning by
requiring it, so that it may go beyond it (Desire in Language 16). The experience of aesthetic
jouissance indicates an encounter with meaning. Jouissance demands attention to the present
moment, as it occurs, encouraging a practice of lingering (Nancy 83).
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The subject object split perspective of reason permeates all social and historical milieus.
In art, this perspective leads to the acceptance of an unconscious cleavage, the idea that an object
is either useful, or useless. This perspective views art as useless object, disinterested and
sublime, perhaps, but gratuitous. It is in this gratuitousness that its value is fixed (Barthes 24).
This mode of thought, the reliance on reason, category, definition, and rule of law, permits the
easy release of the object of knowledge, the ‘object’ quickly defined and set down. But there
follows a “passage from tendency to dependency” (Nancy 76). Over reliance on reason weakens
the ability to think contextually, which requires practice. According to Nancy, “if there is an
illusion from which one must protect oneself today more than ever, it is the illusion that consists
in getting hung up on words” (5). The illusion that a particular definition of a word is the correct
definition limits understanding. Contextual, or ‘intertextual’ thinking, involves reflection,
questioning, not a summoning of ‘authority’, but a circular act of memory (Barthes 36).
According to Kristeva, language must be understood as both, “a germination of empty and
infinite meaning making its way through linguistic and semiological relationships” and
simultaneously “a practice, a relationship to heterogeneity, to materiality” (Desire in Language
105). Thinking intertextually then requires these nuanced definitions of art, and text, and
language, as experience. Texts, being read, interpreted, or simply ignored, but as living dynamic
texts. ‘Irony’ as Kristeva describes it, “is nothing more than a question put to language by
language” (Desire in Language 109). The immersive aesthetic experience should be thought of
as an opportunity to experience intertextual interpretation, Treasure from the Wreck of the
Unbelievable, as ironic text.
In the 1960’s Ted Nelson introduced the term hypertext. Hypertext refers to a body of
words and, or images, so complexly interconnected that it could not easily be presented on paper

239
(Wolfreys 113). A hypertext is a hub of links, a web of information. And while Nelson’s work is
grounded in information technologies, and Kristeva’s in literature, both concepts, hypertext and
intertextuality, eliminate the ‘subject’ and the notion of an objective origin of meaning. Both
offer the possibility of representing and exploring meaning without destructively carving it up, in
order to succinctly define and categorize (Wolfreys 122). This period in the sixties marks a shift
in how information is accessed, and both of these concepts offer important new ways of
approaching information. They acknowledge cross connections and understand that the
innumerable subjects of the world cannot be divided up neatly. Thorough interpretations require
the reader to mix every language, accept illogicality, incongruity, and endure contradiction
without shame, and according to Barthes, this reader will find pleasure in abolishing barriers by
simile, and discarding ‘logical contradiction’ (3). This approach to a mode of being in the world,
is modeled in the experience of art, in art as immersive aesthetic experience. Treasure from the
Wreck of the Unbelievable is an immersive aesthetic experience, art as text, that demands
interpretation, transforming its audience into authors of experience, generators of new meaning.
This is especially important as sense and meaning are assiduously entwined. The over
emphasis on reason and logic, discards sense, instead associating meaning with the subject object
split. According to Nancy, “as long as the world was essentially in relation to some other (that is,
another world or an author of the world), it could have sense”, the relationship between object
and subject, provides meaning, allows for everything to make sense (8). Moving beyond the
subject object split, there is only subject and relation. The absent object, indicating the
impossibility of pure objectivity. Nancy explains that the world may no longer make sense, but
still, it is sense (8). His nuanced use of sense models a critical practice of thought that is
necessary to the rebalancing of sense and reason. Nancy claims that it is “a total waste of time to
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try to rediscover, behind the logos that has governed our twenty-five-centuries, something like a
‘mythical’ dimension or sense”, there is no going back (6). In order to address the imbalance, a
new, nuanced understanding of myth is necessary. Hirst’s commitment to myth and the personal
creation of it, relates to belief and in turn action. Myth is about creating meaning in being-toward
‘the world’, myth involves existence, signification and symbol. According to Nancy, the
common space between notions of myth is infinitely slight, “it is nothing but the limit that
separates and mixes at once the insignificance that arises out of the pulverization of
significations and the nonsignificance or archi-significance encountered by the need of beingtoward-the-world” (9). Myth is needed, existence is complicated, and the desire for meaning
strong. Nancy says that the goal of understanding should no longer be to “arrive at the
constitution of an originary signification,” that instead it should be “to hold the step of thought
suspended over this sense that has already touched us”, to linger, pausing to grapple with
connections, instead of severing edges and packing boxes in haste (11).
The dislocation of myth, out of balance with reason, in favor of logic, science and truth
must be remedied through sense, perception, and poetry (Nancy 20). The world, as described by
Nancy, is now senseless, “sense beyond all sense, sense in the absence of sense, the overflowing
of sense as element of the world or world as absolute excess of sense” is absolutely tragic,
comical, sublime, and grotesque, and according to Nancy, should be considered all of these
things at once (23). The immersive aesthetic experience condenses this experience of the world,
and presents it as an activity in which pausing, lingering, and engaging both sense and reason, is
rewarded with the pleasure of understanding. All immersive aesthetic experience should include
both the sensible, and an ontological question. Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable
poses ironic questions about the veritas of western hegemonic constructs and institutions, and in
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so doing belongs to the carnivalesque. This immersive aesthetic exhibit is a discourse, and a text,
one that is intertextual. Nancy says, “we have to know how to enjoy letting go of control:
Thinking about the present demands it. Attention to the present must be a tension without
anxiety, a desire without greed” (Nancy 84). One way of modeling this being-toward is through
an encounter with the sublime, in which identity is shed, the singular revealed. This encounter is
possible when sense and reason are equally engaged in the ontological puzzle.

242
CONCLUSION

The intention of this dissertation has been to develop a ‘post-object’ aesthetic, an
aesthetic whose concerns lie in the experience of art, rather than in the art object. Events
publicized as immersive experiences are becoming increasingly common, clearly responding to a
genuine need of viewers eager for multi-sensorial experiences. My assertion, that many of these
works remain confined to a superficial level (i.e. entertainment), reveals the necessity of
developing nuanced definitions. A distinction of the immersive ‘aesthetic’ experience is its
ability to engage its audience in thinking and perceiving in a heightened form. The artworks
discussed in this study share a mode of communication, or text, that involves the artist, the work,
and its interpreter. They all partake in an ontological discourse that occurs in the present, the
now. These works are topographical events, in that they speak directly to the body, through sense
and perception. Sense is always local, always mapping its location, its topography. The artworks
discussed all communicate through open, ambiguous signifiers and extravagant sensory data.
And they all include the elements necessary to provoke an experience of the sublime.
The sublime, understood as an intense experience of aesthetic understanding, is
particularly important to conclusions drawn from this line of inquiry. Aesthetic understanding
arises from the free play of sense and reason. When this understanding is of an ontological
nature, occurs unexpectedly, briefly, and intensely, it is what I call sublime. This intense
experience may act as an enticement to engage sense and reason, freely and with more
frequency.
Thinking in a mode that engages both sense and reason, requires context, as all sense is
local, it is a mode of engagement one might describe as topo-aesthetic. Like Bergson showed, an
overreliance on reason results in habit and repetition, and makes contextual thinking an exercise,
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a practice. The immersive aesthetic experience provides opportunities for this type of practice.
And after following Kristeva, Nancy and other thinkers, as well as artists like Kusama, Kapoor,
Eliasson, and Hirst it becomes clear that it is helpful to think of this type of experience as a
reading, an interpretation of ‘text’. These are works that communicate, they are texts that pose
ontological questions, whose meaning is always singularly interpreted. Heidegger says,
“discourse (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking or vocalization”, the
character of speaking, of vocalizing, is active, it is doing (Heidegger 31). The immersive
aesthetic experience, like Heidegger’s discourse, allows for something to be seen and requires a
doing, an understanding that develops out of mind and body.
Deleuze and Guattari shed light on why intertextual interpretation is key to understanding
this notion of ‘text’,
A book has neither object nor subject, it is made of variously formed matters, and
very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook
this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations...In a book, as in all
things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but
also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification.
(Deleuze & Guattari 3)
Texts speak to one another, and context is a web, whose points of connection branch out
endlessly. A web whose meaning is drastically different depending on perspective. Intertextual
interpretation requires reason and logic, but is equally dependent on the presence of sense. This
nuanced definition shows how the immersive aesthetic experience involves the interpretation of a
topographical text and may result in the pleasure of understanding, or even an encounter with the
sublime.
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The sublime is then a feeling that occurs when an interpretation of an aesthetic text,
where text is understood to mean, a reading, an event, a relation, rather than an object, reveals
the singular unity of being. Barthes explains that this text is language without its image-system.
Communication freed from analytical constraints. He sees “the word as singular unity, magic
monad: speech as instrument or expression of thought” and he says that it is ‘bliss’, a
manifestation of the sublime, that initiates the unfettering of “image-systems of language”
(Barthes 33). As we have seen, during an immersive aesthetic experience an intense ontological
communication is interpreted through signification and sensory reaction. A space is created that
suggests and affects. These are works created by artists who compose and propose symbolic
ontological questions. In order to allow for the possibility of evoking the sublime, the ontological
question must relate to the singularity of being. This is why all immersive aesthetic experiences,
in some way, communicate that between the infinite and the void, the body comes into presence,
a body driven by unconscious impulse, and enframed by hidden constructs.
The interpretation of immersive aesthetic experiences involves critical, contextual
thinking, a mode of thinking that never ceases to require effort, and takes practice. Logic and
reason continuously look for ways to initiate systems of thought that enable a sort of autopilot.
Aesthetic understanding, however, amounts to a dynamic progress of sense and reason at work.
Bergson describes how distinct perception, as ‘knowledge’ is often regarded as a static condition,
a thing, an object of knowledge. Instead, he suggests the emphasis should be on the dynamic
progress of perception, brought about by two opposite currents, the immediacy of now, what is
at hand, and the conceptual reference to an inner catalogue of associative memory, “together
these two currents make up, at their point of confluence, the perception that is distinct and
recognized” (Matter and Memory 163). The experience of interpreting excess sensory stimuli
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and ambiguous ontological signification, activates an ontological amplification, the sublime.
Over the course of this research I have examined how specific works, by certain artists, have
evoked particular manifestations of the sublime, as immersive aesthetic experiences.
Yayoi Kusama’s Infinity Mirror Rooms, as explored in chapter two, are shown to be
immersive aesthetic experiences whose ontological content is rooted in witnessing and
recognizing oneself, as an articulation of the infinite. These works generate experiences of an
interpretive “dialogue about the relation between body and soul”, whose signification recalls
perception as it relates to the now, to time, and to the infinite (Matter and Memory x). The brief
and stunning effect of the illusion of endless space containing incalculable points of light,
spreading out in all directions, momentarily disrupts the normal development of perception. The
shock interrupts the mind's process of recognition, recollection, and reference.
Bergson explains there is “no perception which is not full of memories”, the immediate
and present data of our senses mingles with a thousand details of past experience (24). He goes
on to say that impersonal perception, which is distinguished from that which memory adds to, or
subtracts from it, is at the root of all knowledge (Matter and Memory 25). Bergson imagines
impersonal perception, perception freed from its ties to identity, as “a perception that a
consciousness would have if it were supposed to be ripe and full-grown, yet confined to the
present and absorbed, to the exclusion of all else, in the task of moulding itself upon the external
object” (Matter and Memory 24). This impersonal perception is disclosed to the participant of
Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experience. It occurs in the involuntary gasp of wonder at the
perfection of the illusion. For a brief moment the participant experiences singularity.
However, in the everyday experience of individual consciousness, the core of immediate
perception is covered by memory’s cloak of recollections. Subjective knowledge develops out of
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the mingling, condensation and displacement of the entirety of information, both immediate and
recalled, a process in which several external moments contract into a single internal moment
(Matter and Memory 25). According to Bergson:
The immediate horizon given to our perception appears to us to be necessarily
surrounded by a wider circle, existing though unperceived, this circle itself
implying yet another outside it and so on, ad infinitum. It is, then, of the essence
of our actual perception, inasmuch as it is extended, to be always only a content in
relation to a vaster, even an unlimited, experience which contains it.
(Matter and Memory 186)
Kusama’s Infinity Mirror Rooms invite the participant to examine the position and perspective of
that content, and its relation to the infinite that contains it. Kusama’s points of light are the poetic
equivalent to Bergson’s atom. Bergson describes how the material and ideal, the particular and
the universal are terms that converge towards a common limit in the atom, the singular. Bergson
says, “we may still speak of atoms; the atom may even retain its individuality for our mind which
isolates it; but the solidity and the inertia of the atom dissolve either into movements or into lines
of force whose reciprocal solidarity brings back to us universal continuity (Matter and Memory
265). The being, of Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experiences is one of singularity, at once
distinct and continuous.
This experience of aesthetic understanding associated with the infinite involves a
manifestation of the sublime which cannot be coaxed into existence. The sublime, like Barthes
bliss, is a reaction to a text that is “not precarious, it is worse: precocious: it does not come in its
own good time, it does not depend on any ripening. Everything is wrought to a transport at one
and the same moment” (Barthes 52). In that brief, sublime, encounter with the infinite, finitude is
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disclosed. According to Nancy, “finitude is the truth of which the infinite is the sense” (Nancy
29). The finitude disclosed in Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experiences is not a finitude of
“being-finished-off of an existent deprived within itself of the property of completion, butting up
against and stumbling over its own limit (its contingency, error, imperfection, or fault) Finitude
is not privation (Nancy 29). Instead, the participant becomes a singular point of light, one of a
multitude, spread out across the infinite universe, a singular atom among all other atoms. Within
this moment the manifestation of the sublime is best described by Nancy, “the presence in
question here resolves itself into absence in the very instant of its – supposed – presentation...At
the point of the pure subject, all predicates are negated” (Nancy 69) Kusama’s Infinity Mirror
rooms are immersive aesthetic experiences because they stimulate the senses while speaking of
the infinite finitude of being.
Formally, Kusama’s immersive aesthetic experiences are constructed spaces that the
participant enters. Anish Kapoor also creates immersive aesthetic experiences in relation to
space, however, Kapoor creates spaces in which the participant encounters, both object and void.
These encounters with object and void suggest primordial memories of being ripped asunder,
separated from the maternal, being that is toward death. These are immersive aesthetic
experiences because they affect, their ambiguous ontological signification simultaneously
compels and repulses. Participants inch closer to the edge of a void, peering into the inky
blackness, or recognize organic forms, colors and textures, as the normally concealed internal
elements of the body. These works are capable of evoking a manifestation of the sublime that is
rooted in the void, the abject.
As we saw before, for Kristeva, abjection is not a final state of being, rather a stage of
being, “abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). It is an alchemy that
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transforms death drive into a start of life, of new significance” (Kristeva 15). Abjection is not
simply a recognition of mortality, it is an aesthetic understanding of the role mortality plays in
the event of being. Kristeva says, “the time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and
thunder, of veiled infinity and the movement when revelation bursts forth” (Kristeva 9). A
dialogue between the infinite and void. The abject cannot be expressed through explicit
signification, it shatters the wall of representation and with it, its judgements (Kristeva 15).
Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences are ambiguous texts that invite interpretation, and
create an opening that allows for an encounter with the sublime. Abjection, as manifestation of
the sublime, ferments out of anxiety. Kapoor creates immersive aesthetic experiences that are
insistently unsettling and disturbing, whether through the use of materials that recall the inner
workings of bodies, or constructions framing the void, these works both repel and compel the
body, through sense and signification. It is art that engenders rather than removes anxiety
(Zabala 29). And at the root of anxiety can be found the fear and anticipation of tragedy.
Barthes explains that tragedy is perverse. Tragedy involves taking “pleasure in hearing a
story whose end I know: I act toward myself as though I did not know” (49). Unlike the dramatic
story, whose outcome is unknown, the outcome of tragedy is inevitably tragic. According to
Barthes, understanding the outcome is always death, while at the same moment being caught up
in the details of the tale, leads to “an effacement of pleasure and a progression of bliss” (49).
That bliss, which is intimately connected to the abject, is summoned forth during an encounter
with Kapoor’s immersive aesthetic experiences.
It is evident that the aesthetic concept ‘the sublime’ is integral to the definition of
immersive aesthetic experience developed in this study. The sublime, a sudden, overwhelming,
aesthetic reaction to an ontological question, manifests in accordance with the tone of the work.
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An occurrence of the sublime is never on demand, yet requires a particular set of circumstances.
Neither space, nor the object, nor blurring the line between the two is sufficient to guarantee the
sublime. The engaged presence of a participant is also required. The work of Olafur Eliasson has
as its ontological content, this presence. The being encountered in Kusama’s work is infinite, in
Kapoor’s abject. Eliasson’s being is present. Eliasson creates liminal spaces. Spaces to be moved
through, not ‘entering’ or ‘encountering’ but passing through.
Eliasson’s investigations of scientific phenomena result in immersive aesthetic
experiences that invite the participant to reflect on the relationship between, and connection to,
the physical environment. Aesthetic understanding that may develop out of these experiences,
evokes a sublime that manifests as the overwhelming recognition of connectivity, and the weight
of responsibility this connectivity entails. Eliasson appeals to the participant’s senses through
natural phenomena. He uses colored light and fog to affect perception, and often presents natural
elements outside their normal context. While presence is self-aware, the sublime insists upon the
shedding of identity. According to Barthes, “the generative idea that the text is made, is worked
out in a perpetual interweaving: lost in this tissue – this texture – the subject unmakes himself”
(Barthes 64). The participant, whose sense and reason are completely absorbed in an intertextual
interpretation, has no room in their field of attention for self centered thought.
Presence, minus identity, exists in the now. The ‘now’ as described by Lyotard was
indicated as important throughout my initial development of a contemporary sublime and
specifically in reference to the work of Kusama (see chapter 2). An experience of the now is an
awareness of the perpetual flow of becoming. It is awareness of presence. Heidegger explains
that “beings, which show themselves in and for this making present and which are understood as
genuine beings, are accordingly interpreted with regard to the present, that is to say, they are
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conceived as presence (25). The present involves both sensation and movement, which forms an
undivided whole, movement prolonging sensation. The present is, in its essence, sensori-motor
(Matter and Memory 177). Presence happens in the present, within a space. The body is an
aggregate of the material world, it is a being that acts like other beings, a being that receives and
gives back movement (Matter and Memory 4). Presence emerges from the body’s systems.
Bergson says that “between what is called the perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflux
functions of the spinal cord” there is only a difference of degree, the systems are of the same
kind (10). They situate and keep the body moving. Presence, “in itself ecstatically open, it is
always already disclosed to itself and can be articulated in the interpretation that understands and
speaks” (Heidegger 388). Heidegger’s presence, like that evoked in Eliasson’s immersive
aesthetic experiences, is active, engaged in an ontological dialogue about ‘being-in-the-world’
that shows itself as a unified phenomenon (Heidegger 53). Being present, the experience of
presence, entails a recognition of connectivity and the responsibility that accompanies that
recognition.
The body displays an unconditioned reaction to stimuli. Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic
experiences demonstrate how immediate, physical environments influence understanding.
Whether it is his use of yellow monochromatic light, causing everything in its space to appear
desaturated, or fog limiting the typical scope of vision, Eliasson creates spaces that demonstrate
the relationship between the body and its environment. Its connection. For Eliasson, as for
Heidegger, “every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference”, everything is in
relation to every other thing (Heidegger 76). Eliasson is explicit in his intent to draw focus to the
connection between beings and their environment.
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There are implications to this universal connectivity. Relation is a ubiquitous aspect of
being, and yet understanding reference, knowing, requires the ability “to grasp a given in a
certain function, in a certain relation” (Merleau-Ponty 16). If everything is connected, affecting
and affected, in order to articulate an appropriate response the field of conscious attention must
be narrowed and focused on immediate relations. Perception requires agility of focus, the ability
to widen, narrow, shift and continuously become.
Merleau-Ponty explains that the study of perception reveals the perceived world is not
simply a collection of objects, “our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of
thought”, all being is in relation. Every perception occurs for beings within a certain horizon and
ultimately in the world (Merleau-Ponty 89) Perception is contextual. Instead of thinker to object
of thought, Merleau-Ponty finds a relation that reveals subjectivity,
In the perception of another I find myself in relation with another ‘myself’ who is,
in principle, open to the same truths as I am, in relation to the same being that I
am. And this perception is realized. From the depths of my subjectivity I see
another subjectivity appear invested with the same rights. (Merleau-Ponty 94)
Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic experiences amplify this understanding by creating shared spaces
in which the senses are beguiled. The participant, questioning their own perception, extends that
question to whomever shares the space. The subjectivity of perception becomes apparent, along
with the relation of cause and effect. But, as Deleuze & Guattari pointed out, relation is not
abundantly clear, relation is a multiplicity and multiplicities are rhizomatic: “a multiplicity has
neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase
in number without the multiplicity changing in nature” (8). All being, produces a ripple effect.
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The shared space of Eliasson’s immersive aesthetic experiences shed light on the body, as
systems of grasping the world, and the body’s relation to other bodies. The other, capable of
tearing “itself away from being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of true
communication” (Merleau-Ponty 95). These are experiences that entice dialogue. A dialogue
about the nature of perception and the environment. The aesthetic understanding that may arise
out of this experience involves the apprehension of the infinite nature of connectivity and an
overwhelming recognition of the responsibility that connection entails. At the most basic level,
any energy a being does or does not extend, affects that being’s immediate environment, and as
such that being is, first, and at least, responsible for its immediate environment, as the space that
supports its being.
Eliasson’s works dwell in this space of encounter, between the being and its environment.
One could say, his works provoke an encounter with the sublime that relates to Agamben’s
‘revelation’. Agamben explains, “revelation does not mean revelation of the sacredness of the
world, but only revelation of its irreparably profane character” (89). Eliasson’s work does not
attempt to reveal ‘nature’ as sacred, rather it communicates the material immediacy of the
environment. These works demonstrate the relation between environment and body, through
sense. This sublime reveals a body that affects and is affected. This awareness of the reciprocal
nature of being is connected to an ontological aesthetic understanding. An aesthetic
understanding of the presence of being present.
The definition put forth in this research of immersive aesthetic experience is dependent
on the engagement of both sense and reason, in pursuit of an interpretation, of an ontological
question put forth by the work. This engagement may result in aesthetic understanding, and has
the potential to evoke the sublime. The sublime as a brief, overwhelming, ontological revelation.
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My approach to understanding what these different works share in common has addressed four
important questions. What kind of being does the ontological content of each work address?
What is the formal approach to the work? How does the work physically engage sense? And
what is revealed? What I found in Kusama’s work is an appeal to being, as infinite. Kusama
creates space to be entered, and the visual illusion of the infinite. An encounter with the sublime
reveals singularity. Kapoor appeals to being as abject, he creates encounters with the void, works
that awaken sense in compulsion, and reveal infinite finitude. Eliasson’s work is in dialogue with
being as presence. He creates shared environments to be moved through and around. His spaces
emphasize sense by hampering it, and offer a sublime recognition of connectivity and
responsibility. And Hirst?
Hirst’s Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is a work that addresses the
unconsciousness of being, an event in which the line that delineates the work from its location is
erased. Sense is engaged through humor, and ironic reflection, and what is revealed is the role of
unconscious structuring in the development of meaning. The dialogue initiated by Hirst, through
his topographical text Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, is about unconscious
determining processes that structure being. A conversation that begins with questions about
authority, desire, and meaning. An experience of pleasure in understanding, resulting from a
reading of the text. Topographical to the extent that it is difficult to determine any kind of
circumference enclosing ‘the work’. Where are its limits? The walls? The walkways? The water?
Venice itself? Formally, the fully immersive nature of this aesthetic experience is essential to its
interpretation. And in addition to requiring the presence of the participant, physical sensory
engagement is also achieved through the sense of humor. The work elicits an ironic self
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reflection, a serious humor, ontological. In its sublime manifestation, pleasure becomes bliss in
revelation of the infinite complexity of unconscious structuring.
In chapter five I suggested that mythology, mythos, myth, can be understood as the
manifest content produced from latent understanding of big ontological questions. As we saw in
this previous chapter, the ontological content of Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable is
this relation between desire, myth, and meaning. The questions that arise during an experience of
the work direct the attention toward the idea of authority, who is believed, what is believed, and
why. Many of the pieces, of which the work is comprised, confound the visitor, who cannot help
but wonder, is the object real, and if not, what is it, is it a joke, and if so, on whom, if Hirst is
serious, what is he serious about? These questions are important because they participate in a
dialogue with Nancy’s concerns for sense.
Nancy exposes a root in the tangle of issues that is the cleavage of sense from reason. He
explains that “desire is our word for infinite loss of sense”, it is all want, and lack, it is forward
or backward, but cannot recognize the fullness of the moment (Nancy 43). Reason in collusion
with sidereal ontology engenders consideration, however, with the upending of sidereal order,
consideration ceases. In its place, desideration, which Nancy explains, engenders desire. Nancy
says ontology is no longer situated “with respect to the distant stars that act as hinge of the
cosmos, the unknown just beyond. The beyond is over, the beyond is home of the gods” (Nancy
43). With the loss of the ‘other’, the ‘beyond’, being no longer situates itself in relation to a
cosmos that merely borders the infinite. This being, not situated in relation to, without direction,
is more prone to the effects of desire. Desire is the infinite loss of sense. Consideration and
desideration, both derive from the sidereal order, consideration involves understanding according
to specific relations, and desideration, is to be metaphorically lost at sea.
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According to Nancy, “the end of the observation and observance of the sidereal order”
brings with it the end of consideration (43). To suspend the sideal order, means consideration is
also suspended, in the absence of consideration, desideration, and with it, desire flourishes. The
objectivity of consideration, and desideral subjectivity form a dichotomy in which desire
functions in an opposite and symmetrical extreme relation to sense (Nancy 44). Without the
structure and meaning implied by the beyond, we are metaphorically lost at sea, in search of
structure and meaning, desire grasps blindly. The illusion of an antithesis between desire and
common sense must be shattered in order to find balance between sense and reason. Nancy
explains that, “it should be a matter neither of consideration nor desideration, but the end of
sideration in general. Praxis” (Nancy 45). Desire, as manifestation of thought, and sense as
corporeal, are inseverable concepts. In the doing of being both are tools that permit
communication.
With Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable Hirst emphasizes the impossibility of
a return to some prior mode of engagement with mythology. His explorations and investigation
of belief, history, and presentation reveal the loss of Nancy’s sidereal order. Hirst perfectly
replicates forms associated with mythologies of western civilization. He presents a new myth,
dressed in the recognizable garments of our ancient mythologies, a story of adventure, conquest
and tragedy. And yet, regardless of its apparent authenticity, its presentation is suspect, and
ultimately unbelievable. Treasure from the Wreck of the Unbelievable can be understood as an
event, a topographical interpretation of a poetic text. As we discussed before, the immersive
aesthetic experience is a communication, involving the interpretation of ontological questions
related to sense, signification and singularity. An experience that emphasizes sense at play with
reason. Therefore, one could say that the immersive aesthetic experience corresponds to, what
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for Nancy is, the preeminent ambition of philosophy: “To sense oneself making sense, and even
more, to sense oneself as the engenderment of sense” (162). In both cases, the sensing of sense
involves an awareness of presence, thinking and being. Sensing is never static, never a being,
always a becoming. To be present, aware of one’s presence, is an engagement of mind and body,
reason and sense.
I have argued that an intense experience of this type of aesthetic understanding, involved
in the interpretation of an ontological communication, can result in a brief shedding of identity
and reveal singularity. According to Agamben, singularity has no identity, it is not determinate,
but neither is it simply indeterminate. The singularity revealed in aesthetic understanding is one
that is determined through relation and possibility (Agamben 67). The shedding of identity, the
particular, while in sight of the universal, reveals this singularity, that Agamben describes as “not
a final determination of being, but an unraveling or an indetermination of its limits: a paradoxical
individuation by indetermination” (56). The intense experience of aesthetic understanding is a
moment in which the complex connectivity of everything reveals identities based on connection
and influence rather than through distinction and category.
My intention with this research has been to show how the practice of a mode of
engagement associated with immersive aesthetic experience is especially important in light of
Nancy’s assertion that “all sense has been abandoned” (2). As we have seen in chapter one, the
abandonment of sense can be traced back as far as Plato and Aristotle’s discourse involving
beauty and the sublime. In the age after Socrates, Plato, and the Sophists, thought, according to
Kristeva, “ceases to be a practice”, a praxis, that which engages the body and thus entails sense,
instead it is considered a têkhne, a skill based on structure and rule. The category, definition, and
rule, of reason and logic have been overemphasized in the striving toward absolute truth through
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the impossibility of ‘pure’ reason (Kristeva 84). Reason is a builder, of logic, of stable structures
that permit continuous forward of movement. Structures, categories, and definitions, meant to
rescue being from the crisis of connectivity (Zabala 4). However, the illusion of stability, the
static nature of category and definition, result in habit, compliance, and complacency. The
immersive aesthetic experience counters this complacency through the shock of the sublime that
results from an understanding developed out of the interplay of sense and reason.
The works of artists examined throughout this dissertation exemplify the characteristic
that connects all immersive aesthetic experience. These are works that communicate with their
audience through a direct appeal to sense and ambiguous ontological signification. They engage
a mode of thought that is playful and active; thought, not as structure, reason and rule, rather,
thought as pure potentiality (Agamben 36). Their ontological content reveals the complex
connectivity of being, and demands reflection on the consequences of that connectivity. The
structures of reason are unable to provide the whole story, “syncretistic comparison and
classification of everything does not of itself give us genuine essential knowledge. Subjecting the
manifold to tabulation does not guarantee a real understanding of what has been ordered”
(Heidegger 51). As we have seen, specifically in chapter four, presence plays an integral role in
understanding, without consideration of it, knowledge amounts to data and information.
The absolutes associated with reason are illusion, there is no absolute truth, distinct from
perception, in fact, truth and sense belong to one another, according to Nancy:
Truth punctuates, sense enchains. Punctuation is a presentation, full or empty, full
of emptiness, a point or a hole, an awl, and perhaps always the hole that is pierced
by the sharp point of an accomplished present. It is always without spatial or
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temporal dimensions. Enchaining, on the contrary, opens up the dimensional,
spaces out the punctuations. (Nancy 14)
Truth cannot be severed from sense, from context, Zabala explains that today the “dominant
impression is that nothing new happens: reality is fixed, stable, and secured” (Zabala 4). This
misguided impression is perpetuated by the positioning of reason and eternal truth as apex values
in opposition to sensing. The immersive aesthetic experience provides opportunities in which a
truth is sensed ambiguously, an existential truth.
Zabala describes how an aesthetics under the influence of values associated with reason
and logic, forgets art’s ontological task. It is an aesthetics that is a consequence of “modern
subjectivism, where an ‘object’ is posited, identified, and applied to a ‘subject’ beforehand, that
is, independently of its meaning”, quick determinant judgements, based on category and
definition (Zabala 15). The designation ‘art object’ reduces art to representable objects to be felt,
contemplated, and reproduced at will. The art object, according to Zabala, constitutes “the
completion of the abandonment of Being”, by concealing art’s ontological meaning (13). The
systems and structures of reason engender an impression of already knowing, understanding
becomes a process of recognition, sorting, and ordering, rather than an active engagement in the
present moment (Zabala 15). Value of art, based in reason, is found in the object, its material
attributes, its provenance.
The impact of overemphasis on reason in aesthetics results in loss of sense, loss of being.
Even experience is conceptual, ‘virtual’. Most often the phrase ‘immersive experience’ refers to
a virtual experience in which ‘I’ am virtually here and then there, I am able to conceive of myself
in a conceptual environment. There is no shedding of identity in contemplation of the
ontological, the experience does not demand interpretation of ambiguous signifiers. It is an
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experience of sensory illusion, that implicates sense as untrustworthy. The virtual experience
constitutes an attempt at escaping the responsibility of sense, that of care, ‘housekeeping’, the
taking care of one’s home, the body, and its environment. In order to operate in a complex and
contextual world, one must learn to focus, must become conscious of the nature of singularity.
Aesthetic understanding belongs to singularity, it confronts logic, “contradicts it and
points it towards other forms of thought” (Kristeva 85). Heidegger says that human beings
behave distinctly different from other beings. Human being, it appears, is “ontically
distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being”
(Heidegger 11). It thinks about how it feels and why. The understanding that results from this
reflection is dynamic, constantly shifting. It is an understanding “that develops or decays
according to the actual manner of being at any given time”, it is contextual, nothing about it is
fixed or absolute (Heidegger 16). And as with aesthetic understanding, it requires both sense and
reason.
In moments of deep ontological reflection, through the interplay of sense and reason, a
brief and overwhelming experience of “the eternal joy of becoming”, the sublime, is possible
(Kristeva 84). What this insight reveals is singularity. As we have seen, singularity is neither the
particular, nor the universal, it is free from the false dilemma between “the ineffability of the
individual and the intelligibility of the universal” (Agamben 1). Singularity includes the
universal aspect that enchains particulars, and the particular cut off, a fragment of the universal.
According to Nancy, “neither is the singular created, nor does it create itself. It is neither product
nor production. It is being-as-act or being-in-action” (Nancy 72). Being is what it does, such as it
is. Being-as-act or being-in-action, depend on the body that senses, and “sense is every time –
singularly – toward (and in) the world” (Nancy 74). The singular is connected to all other
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singularities, a connection that affects. It is the task of art, through form and signification, sense
and reason, to reveal singularity.
Agamben says, “the only ethical experience (which, as such, cannot be a task or a
subjective decision) is the experience of being (one’s own) potentiality, of being (one’s own)
possibility”, of being singular (Agamben 44). The immersive aesthetic experience provides
practice in this manner of experience, by providing sensuous form and ambiguous ontological
signification, demanding participation that is open and engaged. Out of this experience may
develop an awareness of presence, and relation to the environment in which it is. Understanding
the connection that grounds singularity may help “overcome the conception of being, as object of
representation” (Zabala 13). In the immersive aesthetic experience, intertextuality replaces
intersubjectivity, these are experiences that involve speaking to each other, rather than about one
another (Kristeva 66).
The definition and category of reason, the veneration of logos in general, must be brought
in check. Zabala says we inhabit “a world that needs new interpretations instead of better
descriptions”, intertextual interpretations that involve sense (9). Immersive aesthetic experiences
have the potential to provide practice in this type of interpretation. According to Zabala “the
truth of art no longer rests in representations of reality but rather in an existential project of
transformation” (Zabala 7). A transformation of viewer into participant is possible through the
immersive aesthetic experience, where sense and signification combine to suggest openness,
undecidedness, and multiple potentialities (Zabala. 4).
Zabala explains that “an aesthetic force is needed to shake us out of our tendency to
ignore the ‘social paradoxes’ generated by the political, financial, and technological frames that
contain us” (Zabala 4). I have argued that the immersive aesthetic experience provides that force
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capable of disrupting the illusion that constructs which appear abstract and indirect, have no
immediate personal consequence, by exposing the singular as connected, and resulting in the
understanding that everything connected, has consequence. The notion of an ‘art object’ is old
fashioned and useless in terms of this transformation. According to Zabala, “when a work of art
truly takes hold of us, it is not an object that stands opposite…. the work is an ‘Ereignis’ – an
event that ‘appropriates us’ into itself. It shocks us, it overturns us, and it sets up a world of its
own (Zabala 7). This is not to say that the art object is futile, but the object itself is not the
important part, it is the experience of the object that is crucial. The immersive aesthetic
experience can engender a mode of thought so deeply engaging, the participant loses track of
identity, experiencing a period of indistinction between notions of ‘same’ and ‘other’ (Kristeva
285). This project has been an attempt to describe the kind of artwork that satisfies these
demands.
The immersive aesthetic experience rewards its participants with the possibility of an
occurrence of the sublime. These works appeal to both sense and reason, their content
ontological. Zabala says, “works of art are not ‘works’ because they are crafted or invented but
rather because they disclose ontological meanings”, through aesthetic understanding (21). The
immersive aesthetic experience describes works whose goal is to shake logical, ethical, and
aesthetic assessments of reality (Zabala 25). I have described examples of immersive aesthetic
experiences that explore ontological concerns: singularity, abjection, presence, responsibility and
the unconscious. These works are able to accomplish the task of art by operating as events of
intertextual interpretation. Kristeva's descriptions of texts, the intertextual, and the poetic
utterance have been fundamental to my argument.
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The text, the poetic utterance, is an event, a spectacle that makes apparent the duality of
being, an event in which the interpreter of the work is at once spectator and actor, watcher, doer,
not reader, or audience, but participant. Excess sensory data and open signifiers facilitate
moments of awareness, of being and its infinite connections, while engaging creative wholebodied thinking. The poetic utterance belongs to sense and Kristeva describes how it is
discernible in the earliest states of being, “detected genetically in infants ‘echolalias’ rhythms
and intonations”, being comes into the world equipped with a poetic language that is musical,
ambiguous and distinct in its permitting of uncertainty and indeterminate articulation (Kristeva
133). Within poetic language, meaning and signification are heterogeneous (Kristeva 133).
Poetic language reveals the indispensable nature of sense in reason. The immersive aesthetic
experience speaks to its participants through poetic language. The experience of poetic language,
like that of the immersive aesthetic experience, draws attention “to a questionable subject-inprocess”, to indeterminate becoming (Kristeva 135). The awareness of ambiguity and
indetermination emphasizes potentiality.
In chapter five we saw how instinctual drives run “across and through the constitutive
and insurmountable frontier of meaning”, creating a symbiotic loop wherein desire is “located in
the matrix of the sign, refers back to an instinctual body” and encodes language (Kristeva 146).
The body, its being, is a tool for interpretation, as much as the mind. The immersive aesthetic
experience emphasizes cooperation between sense and reason and demonstrates the impossibility
of sustaining a signifying identity. Identity, like everything else, is contextual, and thus unstable.
The participant, of an immersive aesthetic experience, is so focused on the art and understanding
that a shedding of identity occurs. This shedding of identity that can occur during the immersive
aesthetic experience, is associated with the sublime. In chapter three we learned that according to

263
Kristeva abjection, which I have argued is a manifestation of the sublime, is a composite of sense
and reason, signs and drives, “of condemnation and yearning” (10). The sublime is revealed as
“singular truth” rather than “knowing thought” (Kristeva 146). The sublime revelation is the
disclosedness of the singularity of being.
According to Zabala, “to formulate an aesthetic judgement today does not consist in
recognizing the beautiful qualities of a work of art but rather in revealing, interpreting” (Zabala
9). The immersive aesthetic experience demands interpretation. Contemplation and logic are
completely necessary, but reason needs sense. Sensing is interpretation. The reverence for reason
and simultaneous discounting of sense results in a disregard of consequence and inability to
account for context. Reason takes practice, but then it relies on, and repeats, it learns, assigns a
process, and drifts from tendency into habit. Sensing is new each time. Sense is necessary to
hazard the traps of reason. Developing sense, in perception, perceiving, intuition, requires
practice, patience, and the willingness to engage, to linger. As we observed in the previous
chapters, many great thinkers agree that the contemporary state of being lacks balance between
reason and sense, that for far too long, far too much attention has been focused on the attainment
of absolute universals. Heidegger asks, “what can it mean, to describe ‘the world’ as a
phenomenon?” and he explains that “it means letting what shows itself in the ‘beings’ within the
world be seen” (Heidegger 63). It means approaching the world with an open and engaged
attempt at understanding that relies equally on sense and reason. It requires operating from a
position of singularity, within the rhizomatic state of connectivity.
To understand this position Deleuze and Guattari recommend considering “the wisdom of
the plants: even when they have roots, there is always an outside where they form a rhizome with
something else – the wind, an animal, human beings” (Deleuze & Guattari 11). All beings affect
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one another, in incalculable ways. Instead of defining and categorizing everything Deleuze and
Guattari suggest there should be a constant celebration of the ‘irruption of the plant in us’, of the
rhizomatic connectivity of singularity:
Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of
flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and tortuous of
lines of n dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialized flows.
Follow the plants: you start by delimiting a first line consisting of circles of
convergence and around successive singularities; then you see whether inside that
line new circles of convergence establish themselves, with new points located
outside the limits and in other directions. Write, form a rhizome, increase your
territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it
becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency.
(Deleuze & Guattari 11)
The problem is that the complexity of infinite connectivity may beget a hesitancy to move, a
failure to decide or take action. Resulting in a state in which all signification appears to become
reversible, the effects of action immeasurable (Nancy 163). What is necessary, to avoid this state,
according to Nancy, is the “firm distinction between nonsense and a lack of sense” (Nancy 161).
Being can find its way through nonsense, but is unable to become without sense. The specificity
of signifiers is unimportant, it is their agreed upon sense that matters (Nancy 165).
In order to regain balance with the millstone of reason, sense must be amplified and
investigated. According to Nancy, “sense gives itself only when one no longer demands it, while
remaining watchful” (Nancy 163). Sense gives itself to those who are open and engaged, present.
Nancy says that “sense must be signified in all possible ways, by each and every one of us, by all
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‘individual’ or ‘collective’ singulars” there is a need to be vigilant in exposing to sense, making
sense, receiving sense, and in leaving sense open (Nancy 165). The immersive aesthetic
experience accommodates the need to become more attuned to sensing.
The world seems to have reached a state of constant crisis, environmental, social,
institutional, all impacted, affected by lack of awareness of context. This research could be
further developed by looking into visitor response, perhaps searching for evidence of
transformation, but my real interests lie in how this mode of language develops in the artist.
What does it take to speak so poetically, in such a manner? Can poiesis and praxis become one
presence? I think we need much more of this work, more opportunity to deeply engage in
creative thought. The role of aesthetic immersive experience is to provide that space in which
participants interpret ambiguous ontological signs, in a state of awareness that is prompted by
engagement of the senses. The more often understanding develops out of sense and reason, out
of context, the more likely we are to avoid catastrophe.
An important part of aesthetics consists in an examination of what art is, what it means,
what it does, or should do. The chapters of this dissertation participate in the tradition of this
enduring dialogue. I have put forth what I imagine a decisive task of art to be, assisting in the
production of beings capable of abolishing unconscious determining constructs, through self
reflection and analysis. Beings capable of discerning greed and hypocrisy. Against the
stronghold of reason, these beings work through and around logic, navigate contradiction, and
experience pleasure in understanding. The immersive aesthetic experience accommodates this
task, by providing opportunities to engage in the practice of creative critical thought. As I
showed in previous chapters, a number of artists and thinkers share a concern for experiences
that can encourage thought, and produce intuition about meaning and being.
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This mode of thought derived from immersive aesthetic experience, involves thinking as
a response to being, it can elicit a dawning awareness that whatever being does or does not do,
amounts to a response. Ultimately resulting in understanding that being responds to, and is
responsible for, the world. And while this sounds like a lofty goal, our nuanced examination of
aesthetic understanding has shed light on the determining role of structures in meaning and in
society, and relationships between them. Becoming aware of these structures and relations does
not destroy or dismantle them, but may assist in navigating and modifying them. Immersive
aesthetic experience can cause a strong emotional response, you love it, or you hate it, it makes
you think. You think about why you love it or hate it. You think about what it is saying and you
are able to make connections, associations with preexisting, unconscious image thoughts,
memory. It is this engagement that distinguishes the immersive aesthetic experience from mere
entertainment. And it is the practice of this mode of engagement that we are in need of today.
i
ii

For a more comprehensive discussion of abjection see Chapter 3

Jean-François Lyotard, coined this term ‘differend’ in his book Le Différend (1983), translated as The Differend: Phrases in
Dispute (1988). The term differend refers to a wrong or injustice that arises because the discourse in which the wrong might be
expressed does not exist and the prevailing hegemonic discourse actively precludes the possibility of this wrong being expressed.
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See Chapter 2 Kusama, page 5 regarding Kusama and spectacle.
See Chapter 3 Kapoor page 8 regarding sculpture after modernism.
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